Wroth v. Norton

• Decision Date: 01 January 1870
• Citation: 33 Tex. 192
• Parties: J. W. WROTH v. E. H. NORTON.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

33 Tex. 192

J. W. WROTH

v.E. H. NORTON.

Supreme Court of Texas.

1870.

1. No safe conclusion can be deduced from circumstantial evidence, if it be left reasonable to suppose that the circumstances themselves did not transpire.

2. On a trial of the right of property levied on, the court below charged the jury that the plaintiff might prove his case either by direct evidence or “by circumstantial evidence--that is, by the proof of such facts as will naturally lead the mind to that conclusion, and will exclude any other reasonable inference.” Held, that the charge is not necessarily to be understood as requiring the plaintiff to make out his case by circumstantial evidence of so conclusive a character as to admit of no reasonable conclusion to the contrary; and the charge appearing to have worked no prejudice to the appellant, it is held not to be error.

APPEAL from Austin. Tried below before the Hon. I. B. McFarland.

The facts appear in the opinion of the court.

Sayles & Bassetts, for the appellant. Under the charge given by the court the jury were not authorized to find for the plaintiff, although the testimony fully supported and decidedly preponderated in favor of the hypothesis presented by him; but they were required to go one step further, and inquire if every other reasonable hypothesis were excluded.

In Pilkinton v. The State, 19 Tex. 217, it is said that on the subject of doubts there is a distinction between civil and criminal cases. “In the former the jury weigh the evidence, and after determining on which side there are the greater degrees of probability, or there is the preponderance of evidence, decide accordingly; but in criminal cases, as every man is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, a mere probability that he may be guilty will not warrant a conviction; the evidence must be sufficient to satisfy the jury that he is guilty, and if there be a well founded or reasonable doubt of his guilt, not merely speculative, imaginative, possible or conjectural, but a real doubt of his guilt, the jury ought to acquit.” In other words, in criminal cases the evidence should exclude every reasonable inference inconsistent with the guilt of the party, but in civil cases the jury should decide in accordance with the greater degrees of probability or preponderance of evidence.

In Chandler v. Muckelroy, 22 Tex. 42, it is well said “that it is one of the substantial rights of the party defendant, when he takes the proper steps, to demand that the facts alleged as a ground of action against him should be established by proof reasonably sufficient to satisfy the mind of the truth of the allegations.” In the case at bar the jury were told not only that the plaintiff must sustain his case by proof of such facts as will naturally lead the mind to that conclusion, but that he must also exclude any other reasonable inference. They were not directed to weigh the testimony; they were not authorized to be controlled by proof reasonably sufficient to satisfy their minds of the truth of the plaintiff's allegations; they were not permitted to render a verdict in accordance with the preponderance of the testimony and the reasonable probability of the truth; but before they could find for the plaintiff, he must have excluded every reasonable inference inconsistent with his case.

It has been repeatedly said by this court that when the testimony is conflicting, it is the province of the jury to judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of evidence, and their verdict will not be disturbed, although the evidence may not be satisfactory to this court. McDonald v. Morgan, 27 Tex. 503;Clark v. Davis, 7 Tex. 556; Walker v. Walker, 22 Tex. 33; Branch v. Dever, 18 Tex. 611; Howard v. Booth, 16 Tex. 94;Long v. Steiger, 8 Tex. 460.

It is peculiarly the province of the jury, in cases of a conflict of the evidence of an equal grade and dignity, to weigh the evidence and find the truth of the contested fact. Russell v. Mason, 8 Tex. 226;Sims & Smith v. Chance, 7 Tex. 561;Mitchell v. Matson, 7 Tex. 3.

The rule is not varied in civil cases, although a question of fraud is involved. “Fraud may be established as any other fact. The law has no scales wherein to weigh the different degrees of probability, still less to ascertain what weight of evidence shall amount to proof of any disputed fact.” Layton v. Hall, 25 Tex. 212. Nor do we know of any principles of law requiring a different rule, because the facts are to be established by circumstantial evidence.

In Lynn v. Wright, 18 Tex. 3-7, the exact point is decided. In discussing the case, the facts of which are almost identical with those of the case in hand, the court say (fo. 336): “To warrant the jury in so finding, it was not necessary that the circumstances tending to that conclusion should have been incapable of being accounted for upon any other hypothesis. There is no such rule of evidence or principle of law as that, in order to authorize a jury to deduce from circumstantial evidence the conclusion of fraud, the circumstances must be of so conclusive a nature as to exclude every other hypothesis than the one sought to be established.”

The whole paragraph, from which this extract is made, seems so fully to dispose of the question under discussion, that we ask a perusal of it in the original decision, 18 Tex. 336-7.

Hunt & Holland, for the appellee. It was admitted that the goods were taken from the possession of the claimant (appellee here); and plaintiff, Wroth, took upon himself the burden of proving that claimant's possession was fraudulent, and that the goods levied on were in fact the property of Messner, the defendant in execution; and in order to sustain that position, plaintiff took a very wide range, and brought forward numerous disjointed and disconnected circumstances, more or less pertinent as well as impertinent.

The whole issue before the jury was one particular fact...