Wrought Iron Range Co. v. Johnson

Decision Date04 April 1890
Citation11 S.E. 233,84 Ga. 754
PartiesWROUGHT IRON RANGE CO. et al. v. JOHNSON, Ordinary, et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

1. Only the person who itinerates for trading purposes is a peddler. His employer, though owning the goods, team, and vehicle, is not required to obtain a license, nor subject to any penalty or forfeiture for failing to do so.

2. One whose vocation is to go from place to place with a sample stove carried upon a wagon, exhibit the sample, and procure orders, which his employer afterwards fills by delivering through other agents the stoves so ordered, is a peddler within the meaning of the Code of Georgia. But, though a peddler, if he is a citizen and resident of Virginia, and the orders he solicits and procures are for stoves belonging to a Missouri corporation, which the latter holds in Missouri, and keeps there until they are thus ordered, he is protected by the constitution of the United States, as lately construed by the supreme court, against the provisions of the Code requiring a license to peddle, and declaring a forfeiture for not procuring such license.

3. The parts of the record specified in the bill of exceptions being as follows, "The petition and exhibit thereto attached marked ' A,', and the answer of the defendants," held that the writ of error covers nothing else, and that an affidavit verifying the petition, an acknowledgment of service on the petition, an order of the judge appointing a time and place for hearing the application for injunction and a final order denying the injunction, are not included in the specification, and that the clerk had no warrant or authority for incorporating these things in his certified transcript. These superfluous matters are wholly immaterial to the errors assigned, and this court has no use for them.

Syllabus by the Court.

Error from superior court, Floyd county; MADDOX, Judge.

Official report, referred to in opinion, is as follows: The Wrought Iron Range Company, a corporation of Missouri, and E. N. S Lee, a citizen of, and resident of, Virginia, by their petition, made the following allegations: "The range company manufactures and sells ranges made for cooking purposes at the company's works in St. Louis, and sold by their agents, by samples, throughout the United States, in the following manner: The company furnishes each agent a team and wagon and a sample range, with which the agent travels over the territory allotted to him, and, by exhibiting the sample, takes orders, for the company, for the purchase of such ranges from persons desiring to buy, and transmits the orders to the superintendent of the company at his headquarters, which are sometimes in such territory, and sometimes in another state; and the company thereupon, from its home office and place of business, fills the orders through the superintendent, and delivers the ranges as the orders are taken. But in no case do the agents sell or deliver the sample ranges intrusted to them. The company has no place of business in Georgia. Ranges are sometimes stored in warehouses, after they are sold by sample, until delivered to the purchasers. On February 5, 1890, the range company furnished Lee with two mules and a wagon and sample range and he went into Floyd county therewith, and, by exhibiting the sample, took an order for a range from one of the citizens of the county, and forwarded this order to the superintendent of the range company at Rome, and thereupon the company accepted the order and delivered the range, in the manner above stated, to the purchaser. The ordinary of Floyd county, having been informed of the facts and circumstances above stated, demanded both of the range company and of Lee, under the provisions of section 529 and 1631 of the Code, $50 for a license to peddle such ranges in Floyd county, and, when petitioners refused to pay the same, issued executions against them for it, which were levied by the deputy-sheriff of Floyd county on the mules, wagon, and sample range. The ordinary also issued an execution against them for an alleged forfeiture of $100, under section 536 of the Code, and caused it to be levied on said property; and the sheriff, by direction of the ordinary, has also levied both the fi. fas. on a trunk belonging to Lee, and threatens to arrest Lee under said process if the license fee and forfeiture is not otherwise collected from petitioners, and from each of them. Petitioners denied that they, or either of them, are peddlers of stoves or ranges, or are liable to take out or to pay a license, as peddlers, to the ordinary, under said section of the Code, or otherwise, or that they, or either of them, are liable, on account of their failure to take out and pay for such licenses, to the forfeiture claimed by the ordinary. Section 1631 of the Code, so far as it applies to them, and each of them, is unconstitutional, in that it contravenes, and is repugnant to, article 1,§8, per. 3, of the constitution of the United States." Petitioners pray for an injunction against the ordinary and sheriff; that the execution may be canceled; and for general relief. Attached to the petition was a copy of the execution, and the levy thereon. The defendant admitted the...

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