Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran

Decision Date14 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. 08–cv–1460 (RCL).,08–cv–1460 (RCL).
Citation864 F.Supp.2d 24
PartiesSheryl WULTZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robert Joseph Tolchin, The Berkman Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Ramsey Clark, Clark & Schilling, New York, NY, David Taylor Case, Mitchell R. Berger, Sarah P. Kenney, Walter P. Loughlin, Washington, DC, Siubhan J.E. Magee, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This action arises out of the April 17, 2006 suicide bombing attack at the Rosh Ha'ir restaurant in Tel Aviv, Israel. The explosion killed eleven people and wounded dozens of others. Among the wounded were two of the plaintiffs in this case: sixteen-year-old Daniel Wultz and his father Yekutiel “Tuly” Wultz. Tragically, Daniel succumbed to his injuries and died on May 14, 2006. Daniel's mother, Sheryl Wultz, and his siblings, Amanda and Abraham Wultz, are also plaintiffs in this action against defendants Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), Iranian Ministry of Information and Security (“MOIS”) (collectively, “Iranian Defendants), Syrian Arab Republic (“Syria”), Syrian Ministry of Defense, Syrian Military Intelligence, and Syrian Air Force Intelligence Directorate (collectively, “Syrian Defendants).

This action is brought pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 et seq., which was enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (“NDAA”). Pub.L. No. 110–181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338–44 (2008). That provision, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, provides “a federal right of action against foreign states.” In Re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F.Supp.2d 31, 40 (D.D.C.2009). Plaintiffs contend that, by providing financial and logistical support to the terrorist group responsible for the attack, defendants are legally responsible for the severe physical and emotional toll that the restaurant bombing wreaked upon the Wultz family. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that plaintiffs have provided sufficient evidence to support their cause of action, and determines that defendants are liable under the FSIA's state-sponsored terrorism exception for a total of $332,068,634 in compensatory and punitive damages.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs here are the Estate of Daniel Wultz, Tuly Wultz, his wife Sheryl Wultz, and their two children, Amanda and Abraham Wultz. In their First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs set forth a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(c) against defendants for their provision of material support for the bombing, which plaintiffs allege was an act of extrajudicial killing. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93–105 [ECF No. 12]. This Court's prior Order transferred plaintiffs' claims under the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333, against defendant Bank of China to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Mem. Op. & Transfer Order, Jan. 28, 2011 [ECF Nos. 102–03]. This Court also dismissed all individually named governmental defendants as duplicative of the Iranian and Syrian Defendants. Order Dropping Individually Named Defs. Oct. 20, 2010 [ECF No. 87].

Plaintiffs served copies of the relevant papers, along with translations, by diplomatic channels through the U.S. Department of State, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4). According to the diplomatic note, service was effected as to Syrian Defendants on September 7, 2009, and as to Iranian Defendants on October 1, 2009. Return of Service/Affidavit, Sept. 17, 2009 [ECF No. 51]; Return of Service/Affidavit, Dec. 13, 2009 [ECF No. 67]. Under the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, defendants had 60 days to respond. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d).

Syrian Defendants appeared and filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint. Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Nov. 16, 2011 [ECF No. 60]. After this Court denied Syrian Defendants' motion to dismiss, Order [ECF. No. 86], Syrian Defendants defaulted. Clerk's Entry of Default, Feb. 10, 2011 [ECF No. 105]. Iranian Defendants did not appear or respond to the initial service. Therefore, the Clerk of the Court entered default on plaintiffs' behalf against Iranian Defendants on Dec. 17, 2009. Clerk's Entry of Default, Dec. 19, 2009 [ECF No. 66].

On February 27 and 29, 2012, this Court held a two-day evidentiary hearing where plaintiffs presented evidence in order to obtain a default judgment in accordance with FSIA § 1608(e). Based on the evidence presented to the Court at that hearing, as well as the additional affidavits filed with the Court, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Clerk of the Court entered Iranian Defendants' default on December 17, 2009, and Syrian Defendants' default on February 10, 2011. However, prior to entry of final default judgment, the FSIA requires that courts evaluate the evidence before them to ensure that plaintiffs have established their right to relief “by evidence that is satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e). This requirement “imposes a duty on FSIA courts to not simply accept a complaint's unsupported allegations as true, and obligates courts to inquire further before entering judgment against parties in default.” Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F.Supp.2d 163, 171 (D.D.C.2010) (internal quotations omitted).

In considering whether to enter default judgment, courts in FSIA cases look to various sources of evidence to satisfy their statutory obligation. Courts may, for example, rely upon plaintiffs' ‘uncontroverted factual allegations, which are supported by ... documentary and affidavit evidence.’ Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F.Supp.2d 52, 59 (D.D.C.2010) (alteration in original; quoting Int'l Road Fed'n v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 131 F.Supp.2d 248, 252 n. 4 (D.D.C.2001)). In addition to traditional forms of evidence—testimony and documentation—plaintiffs in FSIA cases may also submit evidence in the form of affidavits. Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F.Supp.2d 40, 53 (D.D.C.2006) (citing Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 424 F.Supp.2d 74, 82 (D.D.C.2006)). Finally, a FSIA court may ‘take judicial notice of related proceedings and records in cases before the same court.’ Valore, 700 F.Supp.2d at 59 (quoting Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F.Supp.2d 43, 50–51 (D.D.C.2009)). Here, plaintiffs rely on documentary, affidavit, and testimonial evidence in support of their motion for default judgment.

A. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

1. For several months prior to April 17, 2006, an organization called the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”) planned and made preparations to murder and injure Jewish civilians by carrying out a suicide bombing in a crowded public location in Tel Aviv, Israel.

2. At the time of the attack, PIJ was designated a terrorist organization by the State Department under Executive Order 13224. See Dep't of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Individuals and Entities Designated by the State Department under E.O. 13224, Jan. 26, 2012, http:// www. state. gov/ j/ ct/ rls/ other/ des/ 143210. htm (May 14, 2012, 11:40 AM).

3. PIJ was established in 1980, influenced by the revolution in Iran. Its founder, Fathi Shiqaqi, preached the use of violence against Israel as a way to bring people back to a truer form of Islam. PM Hr'g Tr. 23, Feb. 27, 2012; PM Hr'g Tr. 8–9, Feb. 29, 2012; see generally Ex h. 46, Marius Deeb, Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process (2003).

4. PIJ was originally an offshoot of the Ham as organization. Hamas' roots date back to an earlier organization known as the Palestinian Society of Muslim Brothers established in 1945. PIJ emerged in 1980 when its founders left Hamas and established a new organization heavily inspired and influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The PIJ and Hamas, however, remain similar in goals and methods, and both engage in terrorism against Israel and the West. PM Hr'g Tr. 25, Feb. 27, 2012; PM Hr'g Tr. 8, Feb. 29, 2012; Decl. of Colonel Ofer Saad (“Saad Decl.”), at ¶ 10.

5. PIJ is headquartered in Damascus, Syria, and has strong ties to Iran-which in turn has a close alliance with Syria. Funding for the PIJ comes from Iranian Defendants which transfers it through Syrian Defendants. Until he was assassinated in 1995, the former head of the PIJ, Fathi Shiqaqi, received funds from Syria through its intelligence services. Since 1996, Ramadan Shalah has lead the PIJ and continues to receive funding through Iran and Syria, which is then provided to PIJ operatives for use in terrorist operations. PM Hr'g Tr. 26, 29, Feb. 27, 2012; PM Hr'g Tr. 11, 22, Feb. 29, 2012; Saad Decl. ¶¶ 9–10. 6. Iranian money passed through the Syrian Defendants from the 1990s up until at least 20062007, the time of this bombing. After Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip, Iran has been able to provide funds more directly to both Hamas and the PIJ. PM Hr'g Tr. 26, 32, Feb. 27, 2012; PM Hr'g Tr. 14, Feb. 29, 2012.

7. During the Second Intifada, the outbreak of Palestinian–Israeli conflict in 2000 that continued until 2005, terrorist suicide bombers became a common weapon of the Palestinians against Israel. This was a direct result of the influence of Iran and Syria which encouraged the PIJ and other terror organizations to engage in these types of attacks. The PIJ, a smaller organization than Hamas, is responsible for approximately 25 percent of the suicide bombings perpetrated in Israel during this period. The PIJ was taught and trained to use suicide bombers by the Hezbollah organization, an Iranian funded organization, which has engaged in this method of attacks since 1983. PM Hr'g Tr. 27–31, Feb. 27, 2012; Saad Decl. ¶ 10.

8. The evidence shows that at the time of the April 17, 2006, bombing the PIJ was sheltered and headquartered in Syria with the...

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