Wuotilla v. Duluth Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 18 June 1887
• Parties: WUOTILLA v DULUTH LUMBER CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

37 Minn. 153

33 N.W. 551

WUOTILLAvDULUTH LUMBER CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 18, 1887.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Evidence considered, and held sufficient to sustain the verdict.

The fact that a servant knows the defective condition of the instrumentalities with which he works, does not necessarily charge him with contributory negligence, or the assumption of the risks growing out of such defects. He must also understand, or ought, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, to understand, the risks to which these defects expose him; following former decisions.¹

Although it be negligence on the part of the master to leave dangerous machinery uncovered, yet the servant is not necessarily guilty of contributory negligence because he works in the vicinity of it, knowing its condition; the measure of the duty of the two in that regard not being the same.¹

Appeal from district court, St. Louis county.

The cause was tried before STEARNS, J., and a jury, and plaintiff had a verdict. From an order refusing a new trial, defendant appeals. The facts appear in the opinion. Defendant's fourth, fifth, and seventh requests for instructions to the jury, which were refused by the trial court, and which are referred to in the opinion, are as follows: “Fourth. In cases of this kind, where the defect in the machine, or other appliance from which the danger arises, is of such a character, or occurs at such a time, that the employer cannot reasonably be expected to have knowledge thereof, it is the duty of the employe to give notice, and the neglect of such duty exempts the employer from responsibility. Fifth. In this case, if you find that it was the duty of plaintiff to oil the cogs in which he was injured, and the bearings immediately under the same, daily or oftener, and for that purpose he must necessarily have seen and observed the uncovered condition of the cogs in doing such work when the cover was off, you must find for the defendant, for the reason that, if this cover had not been off long enough before plaintiff was injured for him to have discovered it, it had not been off long enough to charge the defendant with neglect in failing to discover it; and, if it had been off long enough to charge defendant with negligence in failing to remedy the defect, plaintiff was guilty of contributory neglect in remaining with and not reporting such defect, so that it might be repaired.”“Seventh. In case you find that defendant's foreman showed plaintiff the cogs in which he was injured, and explained to him the need there was in keeping that board in place, and that plaintiff appeared to comprehend the instruction, and afterwards worked there, with a board, evidently in plain view, off the gearing, so that it was exposed, then he was guilty of contributory negligence, and you must find for the defendant.”

White, Shannon & Reynolds, for Duluth Lumber Company, appellant.

Allen & Parkhurst, for Wuotilla, respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This was an action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant. The plaintiff was employed in defendant's saw-mill as an “off bearer;” his duty being to stand at the head of the “live rollers,” and start the slabs, etc., down the rollers after they left the saws. In case a slab got crooked, or a piece of bark got into the rollers, (which would occur occasionally,) he had to leave his stand, and go down and straighten it, or take it out. In doing this he had to go past a gearing where two wheels “mashed.” On one occasion, as he was going down to straighten a slab on the rollers, the gearing caught his clothing, and drew in his leg, causing the injuries complained of. The negligence charged against defendant consists in not boxing or covering the gearing.

The main contention here is that the verdict was not justified by the evidence, for the reasons (1) that it does not appear that defendant was guilty of any negligence; and (2) that it does appear that plaintiff himself was guilty of contributory negligence.

The first requires but little consideration. There was abundant evidence tending to prove that it was dangerous to leave the gearing open, and that ordinary prudence would have required it to be covered. There was also evidence that the covering had been off at least two weeks,-ample time for defendant to have discovered the fact, and replaced it.

Second. It is undisputed that plaintiff had known, for two weeks before the accident, that the gearing was uncovered, and that he continued to work there without objection or complaint. Defendant contends that this conclusively establishes, as a matter of law, contributory negligence. The grand fallacy running all through the argument of the learned counsel is in assuming that, if it was negligence for defendant to leave the gearing uncovered, it must necessarily have been negligence on the part of plaintiff to work near it while in that condition, and that, because he knew that it was uncovered, therefore he knew, or ought to have known, that it was dangerous to go near it. But the master and servant do not stand at all upon the same footing in these matters. It is the master's duty to supply safe instrumentalities for the use of his servants. He is bound to exercise reasonable diligence in informing himself as to whether his machinery is safe; whereas the servant, in the absence of notice to the contrary, or something to put him on inquiry, has a right to assume that his master has done his duty, and to rely on his superior judgment. Of course, a servant is bound to use his senses, and cannot be heard to plead ignorance of a danger that was obvious to any one on inspection; but, on the other hand, because he engages to work with or in the vicinity of machinery, he is not necessarily bound to know as much as his master ought to know as to what is or what is not safe. Again, it is one thing to be aware that machinery is defective, or in a...