Wurster v. Armfield

• Decision Date: 02 June 1903
• Citation: 67 N.E. 584,175 N.Y. 256
• Parties: WURSTER et al. v. ARMFIELD.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

175 N.Y. 256

67 N.E. 584

WURSTER et al.

v.ARMFIELD.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 2, 1903.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Action by Frederick W. Wurster and others against William W. Armfield. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (73 N. Y. Supp. 609), affirming a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Ira Leo Bamberger, for appellant.

Joseph A. Burr, for respondents.

HAIGHT, J.

This action was brought to compel the specific performance of an agreement to renew a lease for a period of 10 years. In November, 1889, one Mary Rebecca Armfield executed and delivered to the plaintiffs a lease of three lots of land belonging to her on the easterly side of Kent avenue, in the city of Brooklyn, for a period of 10 years, at an annual rental of $1,200 per year. The lease contained a covenant that the lessees should be entitled to a further demise of the premises for an additional term of 10 years from November 1, 1899, provided that they gave notice of their desire to renew such lease, in which case the landlady bound herself to enter into a written agreement of lease at a rental which, if not otherwise mutually agreed upon, should be 5 per cent. per annum of the value of the lots on the 1st day of August, 1899. It further provided that, if the parties did not agree to such value before September 1, 1899, then such values should be determined by two disinterested competent then owners of real estate in the immediate vicinity of such demised property, or real estate agents or brokers well versed in the value of such property in that vicinity, one of whom should be chosen by each of the parties to the lease; and, if they were unable to agree they should choose a third person, and a decision of the majority of the three should be final, but, if no two of them agree, the average of the values determined upon by the three should be accepted. After the execution of this lease Mary Rebecca Armfield conveyed the premises in question to the defendant, who is now the owner thereof. It further appears that the plaintiff desired a continuation of his lease for the second period of 10 years, and, pursuant to the provisions of the lease, gave to the defendant due notice of such desire. Thereupon appraisers were appointed by or on behalf of the respective parties, who, being unable to agree, appointed an umpire, who, with the appraisers selected by the plaintiff, fixed the value of the premises at $11,500, which, under the contract, made the yearly rental $575, less than half the rent payable under the contract for the first period of 10 years. Upon the failure of the defendant to execute the renewal lease at the rental fixed by the appraisers, this action was brought to compel specific performance on his part. The answer interposed puts in issue most of the allegations of the complaint, and sets up separate defenses to the effect that in 1897 the defendant was attacked by a mental disease, in which his mind began to fail, and that for the past year he has been afflicted with progressive paresis; that he was 74 years of age, and his ailment was incurable; and that ever since the 1st day of January, 1899, he has been, and now is, incompetent to manage himself or his affairs, in consequence of lunacy, idiocy, or imbecility arising from old age, loss of memory and understanding, and other causes. It is further alleged that the appraisers who signed the award were biased against the defendant; that their action was unfair, and subversive of his rights; that the award did not represent the actual and honest value of the premises, but was grossly inadequate, and partial to the plaintiff; and that the submission to arbitration and the determination of the arbitrators were void, for the reason that the defendant was at the time incompetent to manage his affairs by reason of lunacy.

Upon the trial of this action the defendant's counsel offered testimony tending to prove that the defendant was of unsound mind and memory, incompetent to manage his affairs at the time the notice of the renewal of the lease was served upon him, and that from that time on he had been mentally incompetent to select any appraiser or execute any paper. All this evidence was excluded by the trial court, and an exception was taken to such exclusions. At the conclusion of the evidence the court awarded judgment in favor of the plaintiff that the defendant execute and deliver to the plaintiff a proper lease of the premises in question for the period of 10 years at the annual rental of $575 per year.

We think that the defendant's counsel had the right to show that the defendant, at the time the appraisers were selected, was an incompetent person by reason of insanity, and that he could not and did not appoint the appraiser who took part in the determination of the value of the premises, and that the trial court erred in excluding the pertinent evidence offered to establish that fact. It is quite true that at that time no committee had been appointed of the defendant's person or his estate and that the legal presumption of his competency still continued, and that a person dealing with him in good faith without knowledge of his incompetency would be protected by a court of equity, in so far as he had been induced to part with money or property. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541. But in this case the plaintiff has parted with nothing that operates to his prejudice. He was...