Wyandotte Rolling Mills Co. v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 04 October 1876
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Wyandotte Rolling Mills Company v. William D. Robinson

34 Mich. 428

Wyandotte Rolling Mills Company v. William D. Robinson

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 4, 1876

Submitted on Briefs June 20, 1876

Error to Superior Court of Detroit.

Judgment reversed and the default vacated, with costs of this court.

Moore & Moore, for plaintiff in error.

Griffin & Dickinson, for defendant in error, argued that the question of time for appearing and pleading is not one of absolute right, but one of convenience to the court, and is not in the domain of those powers which the legislature alone can exercise and cannot delegate: Wayman v Southard, 10 Wheat. 42; that the legislature can confer upon courts the power to prescribe their own rules of practice: Bank v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51; Beers v. Houghton, 9 Pet. 329; and that the rule in question comes within this class: Vanata v. Anderson, 3 Bin 417; Barry v. Randolph, Ib., 277; Dubois v. Turner 4 Yates 361; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1; U. S. Bank v. Halsted, 10 Wheat. 51; Thompson v. Hatch, 3 Pick. 512; Yan v. Mead, 5 McLean 272; that when a local court of peculiar organization has express power conferred upon it by statute to adopt rules of practice, the appellate court has no right to control its discretion in this regard unless it has abused its authority or violated some law: State v. Smith, 44 Mo. 112; that the statute confers the power upon the superior court to adopt such a rule; and that if any doubt exists on that subject, the practical construction given to the statute ought to have great weight in determining the question: Stewart v Laird, 1 Cranch 299; Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 478; State v. Mayhew, 2 Gill. 487.

OPINION

Graves, J.

The superior court of Detroit having, without the sanction of this court, adopted a rule which it construes as authorizing a defendant sued by declaration to be defaulted for want of a plea within ten days after service of declaration, the defendant in error obtained judgment in that court against the company on a ten day default in a suit so commenced.

The company removed the case to this court by writ of error, and although a point is made upon the proof of service of the declaration, the only important question is, whether the default in point of law is sufficient to support the judgment against the objection made to it. In considering the question it is deemed best to waive controversy about the correctness of the construction which the court below has given to its own rule, and at once inquire whether the court is authorized to maintain on its own authority a ten day rule to plead in actions commenced by declaration.

For many years it has been the clear policy of the state to secure uniformity in all the tribunals of the same class in all substantial matters of practice, and this is discoverable not only in legislation, but in the constitution. As promotive of this policy and to erect a guard against the discordance to be naturally expected if each tribunal were left to establish its own code of rules, it was ordained by the constitution that one tribunal, and that the court of last resort, should by general rules establish, modify and amend the practice in the circuit courts.--Art. VI., § 5. The same idea has been often and various ways acted upon by the legislature, and in many instances the end has been achieved by specific regulations on particular points. Among the provisions giving power to the supreme court to make rules for the circuit courts and other courts of the same class, like the superior court of Detroit, we cite the following:-- §§ 4912, 4921, 4927, 4945, 5069, 5088, 5089, 5795, 5904, C. L. Section 6059, being § 5 of the act to supply lost records, papers, and proceedings in courts of record, declares that "the supreme court may make general rules for proceedings under this act, and such rules when made shall govern all inferior courts." Section forty-three of the water-craft act, being § 6688 of the compilation, gives to this court the power to make any rules deemed necessary for the regulation of proceedings under the act, not conflicting with its provisions; and the forty-seventh section, being § 6692 of the compilation, declares that the proceeding and practice under the act shall be the same as in personal actions at law, except as therein otherwise provided, so far as applicable. Again, it is not given to the probate courts to permanently establish their own code of rules. The statute says "the supreme court of this state shall have power from time to time to make uniform rules for regulating the proceedings in all the probate courts of the state, and to alter, amend or modify the same as it may judge necessary in all cases not expressly provided by law."-- § 5232, C. L. And the legislature have even gone so far as to confer on this court the authority to make rules to limit in certain cases the power and discretion of circuit court commissioners and to regulate their action.-- §§ 5181, 5591, 5592, C. L.

In reference to many things not in their nature beyond the scope of court regulation, the legislature has itself directly intervened and made specific regulations by statute.

For example, it is provided by § 5074 that the equity calendar at any regular term shall not be taken up until the issues of fact have been first disposed of, unless by special order of the court.Sections 5723 and 5724 provide in substance that in all suits commenced by declaration the defendant shall have twenty days to plead in after service. Section 5894 prescribes what time shall be allowed the adverse party for attending after notice in the matter of taking a deposition. Section 5954 gives the time within which a plaintiff must deny by affidavit the defendant's verified set-off if he would prevent the verification of the set-off from being considered prima facie true. Section 5973 declares that notice of trial of any issue of fact in a circuit court shall in all cases be served at least fourteen days before the first day of the court at which the trial is intended to be had. Sections 6188 and 6189 require that in specified cases the defendant must be charged in execution in three months, etc.

Proceedings by way of suggestion to recover damages for rents and profits are required to follow the practice as regulated in personal actions, including of course the provision fixing the time for pleading.-- §§ 6247, 6257, 6395.

The water-craft law provides that there shall be ten clear days' notice of trial.-- § 6670. In replevin the rule to plead must be the same as in personal actions.-- § 6748. In scire facias to annul letters patent and vacate and annul acts of incorporation, twenty days are expressly allowed for pleading: §§ 7064, 7067; and in certain cases on information in the nature of a quo warranto the time for pleading must be the same as in personal actions commenced by declaration, referring of course to the specific regulation by statute giving twenty days.-- §§ 7081, 7084. These references are sufficient to show the course of policy to be as stated. True, there exist some exceptional and provisional regulations.--See §§ 4945, 5660, 5974, 6240, 6511 and 7103. And there can be no doubt of the power of every court of record, when not forbidden, to ordain suitable rules to apply to matters of practice not already regulated by the legislature or the supreme court. But there is nothing in all this contrary to the general policy before mentioned. Proceedings may be devised by the legislature of an anomalous character and requiring rules in the opinion of that body equally anomalous, and so too there may be incidents specifically peculiar in the exercise of jurisdiction in some particular direction or in reference to some special subject, and which may call for a rule or rules directly adapted to the precise emergency and the particular tribunal. These exceptional arrangements stand by themselves. They do not belong to the general stream of practice, and do not fall into it. The commencement of suits by declaration is a statutory innovation, and there never was any common-law practice to prescribe the time to be allowed a defendant for pleading when sued in that way. Still a reasonable time ought to be assured, and the arrangement of it is within the scope of the general practice of all our common law courts of record. It must be fixed either by statute or rule of court. That the time should be the same in all the circuit courts, is not only manifestly expedient,--not only required by the policy mentioned,--but is expressly enacted.

The time is settled at twenty days and no circuit court can abridge it.

As respects civil jurisdiction, the superior court is a tribunal of the same class as the circuit courts. There are no limitations upon its powers, or any enactments affecting its action to impeach the analogy necessary for our present purpose. The nature of the subjects of its jurisdiction, so far as the jurisdiction extends, is the same. It is a court of original jurisdiction, proceeding according to the course of the common law. It is a court of record, and cases are removable from it to this court by writ of error and appeal, as from the circuit courts. There is no sound reason for exempting it from the policy referred to, or for extending to it a power in the establishment of...