Wyandotte Sav. Bank v. Eveland

• Decision Date: 01 October 1956
• Docket Number: No. 44,44
• Citation: 347 Mich. 33,78 N.W.2d 612
• Parties: WYANDOTTE SAVINGS BANK, a Michigan banking corporation, And The National Bank of Wyandotte, a National banking association, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Maurice C. EVELAND, as Commissioner of Banking for the State of Michigan, and Security Bank, a Michigan corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 612

78 N.W.2d 612

347 Mich. 33

WYANDOTTE SAVINGS BANK, a Michigan banking corporation And The National Bank of Wyandotte, a National banking association, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Maurice C. EVELAND, as Commissioner of Banking for the State of Michigan and Security Bank, a Michigan corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 44.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 1, 1956.

Marx, Levi, Thnl & Wiseman, Detroit, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Thomas M. Kavanagh, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., Lansing, Maurice M. Moule and Burton P. Daugherty, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant and appellee, Banking Comr.

Harry F. Vellmure, Ecorse, for defendant and appellee, Security Bank.

Before the Entire Bench.

SMITH, Justice.

We have here a case of statutory construction. The principal question is a narrow one: May banks operating in this State operate branches in unincorporated villages?

The plaintiffs are the Wyandotte Savings Bank, a Michigan banking corporation, and, the National Bank of Wyandotte, a national banking association. The defendants are Maurice C. Eveland, as Commissioner of Banking for the State of Michigan, and Security Bank, a Michigan corporation. The Wyandotte Savings Bank has its main office in the downtown business section of Wyandotte, with three branches in the city, one of which is directly across Fort street from Ecorse township. The National Bank of Wyandotte also has its main office in the city of Wyandotte, and also operates a branch on the border of Wyandotte, directly across Fort from Ecorse township. These branch locations were so placed in order to serve customers in the township area. The defendant Security Bank has its main office in the city of Lincoln Park, and at the time of the trial was operating four branches, one of which is in Lincoln Park at a point approximately three-tenths of a mile from the edge of Ecorse township area.

The portion of the unincorporated area of Ecorse township with which we are here concerned (described in the record in Exhibit 8 [c]) has had a rapid growth. It had, at the time of trial, a population of between 18,000 and 20,000 persons, having doubled since the 1950 census. The assessed value has more than doubled since 1949, it being in 1954, more than $22,000,000. There were over 5,000 homes in the area. Certain portions are 'built up solid' with homes and commercial establishments. In certain areas not yet built up solid there is substantial building activity. 'In 1953, 475 building permits were issued in Ecorse township contemplating an expenditure of $3,695,000 of which $2,535,000 was for new residences and $1,160,000 for commercial and miscellaneous construction. That was for the first six months of 1953. There was, of course,' testified Deputy Banking Commissioner Taylor, 'very pronounced residential development, and the business development in prospect of course was building up to the levels that were warranted by the area. The residential development at the time the area was inspected had outstripped the business area, I would say.' Hand in hand with the establishment of homes came schools, six in number (all elementary, 'the plans are completed for a high school,') and several churches. The area was served commercially by supermarkets, drug stores, motels and gas stations. 'Referring to the survey, this lists forty stores, drive-in restaurant, professional and dental offices, Federal Department store, parking for five thousand automobiles.' We have the picture of a thriving, growing community of 'new homes, brick homes, occupied by a net income bracket of industrial workers.' There was, we are told, 'every type of business except the bank. We have no banks.' It was the effort of the defendant Security Bank to place a branch (with the approval of defendant Commissioner Eveland) 'very nearly in the center of the greatest amount of the population' which gave rise to this litigation. Why? Because the assemblage of homes, schools, churches and stores we have described was in an unincorporated area. It was merely a part of the township of Ecorse.

Consequently, following the approval of the application of defendant Security Bank for permission to operate a branch office 'at or near the intersection of North Line Road and Dix-Toledo Road, in the unincorporated section of Ecorse township known as Southgate, Wayne county, Michigan,' appellants filed their bill in chancery in the Wayne circuit court. It sought to vacate and set aside the commissioner's approval of defendant Security Bank's application to establish and operate the described branch, to enjoin the bank's establishment and operation of the branch so located, 'or at any other location in said Ecorse township,' to obtain a finding that the approval of such application was an abuse of discretion, and prayed additional relief. After a hearing upon facts stipulated and testimony taken, and after taking further proofs upon a reopening of the case, the trial court dismissed the bill. The holding of the trial court, in summary, was that the statutes permited the establishment and operation of branch banks in unincorporated villages, that the area in which the disputed branch was authorized 'was already an unincorporated village,' and that the commissioner had not thereby abused his discretion. Following the denial of motion for new trial or rehearing, the case comes to us on a general appeal.

The plight of the bankless community is not new. It has existed in this country from colonial days and will doubtless continue in one form or another in the future. The results thereof, however, are matters for the consideration of the legislature, not the courts. We turn to the act to seek within its four corners the legislative intent, the degree to which Michigan aggregations of population shall have the banking facilities of a parent or branch bank, or shall remain bankless.

The State banking department is vested with jurisdiction over banks transacting business under the laws of this State. C.L.1948, § 487.3, Stat.Ann.1943 Rev. § 23.721. The powers, duties, management and control of the State banking department are vested in a commissioner of the banking department, who will be hereinafter referred to as the commissioner. His authority is set forth in the Michigan Financial Institutions Act, P.A.1937, No. 341, C.L.1948, § 487.1 et seq., as amended. The statutory provisions with respect to branch banking had their origin in Act No. 144 of the Public Acts of 1933, which permitted the establishment of branches anywhere within the State, it referring not only to cities but to incorporated or unincorporated villages. Section 8(a), amending section 4 of Public Acts 1929, No. 66, C.L.1929, § 11901. In later codification and revision of the law relating to financial institutions, however, the phraseology has been modified, the present proviso, C.L.1948, § 487.34, Stat.Ann.1955 Cum.Supp. § 23.762, referring merely to 'branches within a village or city'. It is the contention of appellants that the present use of the word 'village,' alone, without descriptive adjective, prohibits the establishment and operation of a branch bank in Michigan outside the limits of an incorporated municipality. If appellants are correct in such contention they must here prevail, for the branch sought to be established is not within the limits of any incorporated city or village. Appellees, on the other hand, contend that the word 'village' as so used refers to the term as commonly accepted, that the settlement hereinabove described, with its stores and churches, schools and homes, is in fact a village, and hence that the branch proposed comes within the statutory provisions.

We note, at the outset, that the term 'village' is not defined in the Financial Institutions Act and we reject the contention that its definition in other acts (e. g., C.L.1948, § 74.1, Stat.Ann. § 5.1465, defining the meaning of village 'whenever used in this act', namely, Act No. 3 of the Public Acts of 1895, for the incorporation of villages) controls its use in the case before us. We employ, rather, the rule set forth in the statute governing the general rules of construction of specific words and phrases as found in C.L.1948, § 8.3, Stat.Ann. § 2.212:

'In the construction of the statutes of this state, the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, that is to say:

'1. All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.'

When, however, the words are not explicit (and few words have a content so intrinsic that zeal of advocacy cannot ascribe a contrary meaning) we read and construe them in the light cast by the obvious purpose of the statute and the mischief sought to be remedied. Chancellor Kent expressed our duty in words often quoted:

"When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt, and the objects and remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed, according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion." State ex rel. Lorenzino v. County Commissioners, 20 N.M. 67, 74, 145 P. 1083, 1084, L.R.A.1915C, 898, quoting Kent's Commentaries (14 ed.), Vol 1, § 462.

See, also, Melia v. Appeal Board of the Michigan Employment Security Commission & Universal Products Co., Mich., 78 N.W.2d 273.

The word 'village' is not a technical word, or one having a peculiar meaning, but is a common word in general usage with an ancient lineage. It is merely an assemblage or community of people, a nucleus or cluster for residential and business purposes, a collective body of inhabitants,...