Wyatt, By and Through Rawlins v. King

• Decision Date: 11 September 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3195-N.
• Citation: 803 F. Supp. 377
• Parties: Ricky WYATT, By and Through his aunt and legal guardian Mrs. W.C. RAWLINS, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, Diane Martin, et al., Plaintiffs-Intervenors, v. Royce G. KING, as Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and the State of Alabama Mental Health Officer, et al., Defendants, United States of America, et al., Amici Curiae.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

803 F. Supp. 377

Ricky WYATT, By and Through his aunt and legal guardian Mrs. W.C. RAWLINS, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs Diane Martin, et al., Plaintiffs-Intervenors, v. Royce G. KING, as Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and the State of Alabama Mental Health Officer, et al., Defendants United States of America, et al., Amici Curiae.

Civ. A. No. 3195-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, N.D.

September 11, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ira Burnim, Washington, D.C., for proposed intervenor Bretz.

R. Emmett Poundstone, III and Ricky Trawick, Alabama Dept. of Mental Health, Montgomery, Ala., for Horsley and Dept. of Mental Health.

Andrew J. Barrick and Mitchell W. Dale, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Washington, D.C., for U.S.

Byrd R. Latham, Patton, Latham, Legge & Cole, Athens, Ala., for Gunter, Steagall and Brassell.

Joel Kline, Christopher Cerf, Washington, D.C., for Dept. of Mental Health & Horsley.

David Ferleger, Philadelphia, Pa., for intervenors Martin, et al.

Reuben Cook, Edward Stevens, Victoria Farr, and Donald Tipper, Ala. Disabilities Advocacy, Tuscaloosa, Ala., for intervenors Martin, et al.

Peter G. Thompson, Sandra Lord, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.

Pamel Chen, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Rights Div., Sp. Litigation Section, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae U.S.

Algert Agricola, Mark Montiel, and David Byrne, Montgomery, Ala., for State defendants.

R. David Christy, Montgomery, Ala., for Horsley.

ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, Chief Judge.

The plaintiffs in this case first sued officials of the State of Alabama over 20 years ago claiming that conditions at facilities operated by the Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation violated residents' rights under state and federal law. Six years ago, on September 22, 1986, the court approved a consent decree which resolved the parties' continued conflicts over the adequacy of the state's funding and administration of facilities for the mentally ill and mentally retarded under court-ordered standards. The cause is again before the court, this time on two motions filed by the defendants requesting that the court modify the 1986 decree in several respects. The defendants seek to have eliminated those provisions that, among other things, establish patients' rights to dignity, privacy, and humane care and require that treatment be provided in the least restrictive environment. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the defendants' motions should be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1972, after finding that conditions in state institutions for the mentally ill and mentally retarded violated patients' constitutional rights, this court entered injunctions requiring the defendants to bring state facilities into compliance with certain minimal constitutional standards. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 373 (M.D.Ala.1972) (Johnson, J.) (standards for the mentally ill, hereinafter referred to as "MI Standards"), aff'd in relevant part, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 387 (M.D.Ala.1972) (Johnson, J.) (standards for the mentally retarded, hereinafter referred to as "MR Standards"), aff'd in relevant part, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.1974). In these and earlier orders, see also Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F.Supp. 1341 (M.D.Ala. 1971) (Johnson, J.), the court criticized numerous aspects of the state system, from the inadequate staffing to the dangerous and unsanitary physical conditions; among the court's chief concerns, however, was the lack of "a humane psychological and physical environment." 344 F.Supp. at 375; 334 F.Supp. at 1343. The court found the almost total lack of privacy in the institutions to be "dehumanizing" for patients, and aspects of patient care, including the admissions procedure, "degrading" and "humiliating." 334 F.Supp. at 1343; see also 344 F.Supp. at 375. With the assistance of the parties and experts in the fields of mental health and mental retardation, the court developed detailed standards, now known as the Wyatt standards, designed to remedy these and other serious constitutional violations that the court had discovered in the state system. 344 F.Supp. at 379-86, 392, 394-407.

In 1975, the parties returned to court to determine whether the defendants had complied with the standards established in the 1972 orders. Approximately four years later, after it had become clear that constitutional violations persisted, the court appointed the Governor of Alabama as receiver of the state system and approved the Governor's proposed plan of compliance. The Governor's plan provided that the defendants would achieve compliance with all Wyatt standards, with certain limited exceptions, within 18 months.

The plaintiffs again returned to court in 1981 seeking to ensure that the Wyatt standards were fully implemented, as required by the Governor's compliance plan. In response, the defendants moved the court to modify the 1972 orders by eliminating all of the Wyatt standards, thus relieving the defendants of any obligation to comply with these standards, and substituting in their place a requirement that the defendants achieve accreditation of the state's mental illness facilities by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and certification of the mental retardation facilities through Title XIX of the Social Security Act.

In July 1986, the parties submitted to the court a proposed consent decree resolving all outstanding disputes between the parties. On September 22, 1986, after having given notice of the proposed decree to the plaintiff class and after having conducted a hearing on the objections to the decree, the court entered an order and memorandum opinion approving the decree.¹ Under the terms of the consent decree, the receivership was dissolved and the Alabama Mental Health and Mental Retardation System freed from active judicial supervision. The decree further provided that all prior orders and standards issued by the court regarding the obligations of the state system were to remain in full force and effect and that the defendants would "continue to make substantial progress in achieving compliance" with these orders and standards. Consent Decree of Sept. 22, 1986, at ¶¶ 6, 7. The defendants also agreed "to continue to make substantial progress in placing members of the plaintiff class in community facilities and programs," and "to make all reasonable efforts to achieve full accreditation of Alabama's mental health facilities ... and full certification of Alabama's mental retardation facilities." Id. at ¶¶ 8, 9.

On January 18, 1991, the defendants moved the court for a finding that they had met their obligations under the 1986 consent decree and for an order terminating the lawsuit. In response to the motion and by agreement of the parties, the court appointed an expert to "investigate and report to the Court and the parties ... the factual issues pertaining to defendants' compliance with the outstanding orders of the Court." Parties' Agreement of April 15, 1991.² The court-appointed expert is now in the process of conducting his investigation.

On April 19 and 26, 1991, while the motion to terminate this litigation was pending, the defendants filed the two motions now at issue requesting that the court modify the consent decree. The defendants seek the elimination of numerous provisions in the original Wyatt standards, as these standards are applied through the decree, as well as the elimination of one paragraph of the decree itself.³ The proposed "modifications" fall within four basic groups. First, defendants would have the court eliminate any reference in the Wyatt standards to a requirement that patients receive treatment in the least restrictive conditions necessary.⁴ Second, the defendants would eliminate the Wyatt standard which recognizes the rights of each mentally retarded person confined in a state facility "to a habilitation program which will maximize his human abilities and enhance his ability to cope with his environment."⁵ Third, defendants seek elimination of that provision in the consent decree which requires the defendants "to continue to make substantial progress in placing members of the plaintiff class in community facilities and programs." Consent Decree of Sept. 22, 1986, at ¶ 9. Fourth and finally, the defendants ask that this court eliminate those Wyatt standards which establish that patients involuntarily committed to state facilities for the mentally ill or mentally retarded have a right to privacy, dignity, and humane care.⁶

The defendants submit three arguments in support of these modifications. First, the defendants contend that modification of the 1986 consent decree is "necessary" because the decree currently imposes upon the State of Alabama standards of care which exceed minimal constitutional standards. Second, the defendants argue that the vagueness of certain decree provisions warrants modification. Finally, they claim that the defendants' record of compliance justifies modification of the decree.

II. STANDARD FOR MODIFICATION OF A CONSENT DECREE

The parties do not dispute that a district court retains the power to modify a decree of injunctive relief where changed conditions make continued application of the decree inequitable. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County, 502 U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). A consent decree, although it represents a settlement agreement voluntarily adopted by the parties, is nonetheless a judicial decree approved and enforced by the court and is thus subject to modification according to the same rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees. Id.

For many years, parties seeking modification of a consent decree were held to the rigorous test established in United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). In Swift, an antitrust action brought against the giants of the meatpacking industry was...