Wyatt v. State

• Decision Date: 03 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 73,101,73,101
• Citation: 23 S.W.3d 18
• Parties: (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) WILLIAM E. WYATT, JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 18

23 S.W.3d 18 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)

WILLIAM E. WYATT, JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

No. 73,101

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

May 3, 2000

Rehearing Denied June 14, 2000.

ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM BOWIE COUNTY

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O P I N I O N

HOLLAND, J., delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Appellant was convicted in February 1998 of capital murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 19.03(a)(8). Pursuant to the jury's answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. See Article 37.071 2(g).¹ Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. See Article 37.071 2(h). Initially, we sustained a portion of appellant's third point of error, abated the appeal, and remanded the cause to the trial court so that it could enter its findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding appellant's confession. See Article 38.22, 6; Green v. State, 906 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). We now address appellant's remaining points of error.

In his first two points of error, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in failing to suppress his confessions due to the location in which they were taken. In point of error one, appellant claims that the confessions were obtained after he was illegally arrested, interrogated, and detained in the State of Arkansas in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. He specifically argues that the arrest was illegal because the Texas police officer was outside the jurisdictional limits of his authority. In his second point of error, appellant asserts that his confessions should have been suppressed because subchapter B of Chapter 361 is unconstitutional in that it attempts to change Texas's boundaries, see U.S. CONST. art. I, 10, cl. 3,² and violates the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. See Art. 51.14. Appellant also argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because a Texas attorney could no

t represent him in Arkansas. The record shows that appellant was arrested inside the Bi-State Criminal Justice Center in Texarkana. The Center sits directly on the Arkansas/Texas state lines. The State concedes that appellant gave his statements and was arrested in a portion of the building that is on the Arkansas side of the state line.

Subchapter B of Chapter 361 of the Texas Local Government Code allows for and governs Justice Centers located on the state line. Section 361.029 governs arrests, prosecution, extradition, and service of process at the Bi-State Justice Center.³

The record in the instant case shows that appellant voluntarily agreed to go to the Justice Center on February 4, 1997, for questioning. Appellant was taken to the Criminal Investigation Division on the third floor where he was read his Miranda⁴ warnings and agreed to give a voluntary statement. After completing this statement, appellant consented to having a sexual assault kit performed on him at Wadley Hospital. He was then brought back to the Justice Center where his Miranda warnings were again administered before further questioning. At the conclusion of questioning that evening, appellant was placed under arrest and held at the Justice Center.

Although we note that the evidence shows that the Justice Center sallyport and the Criminal Investigation Division are both located in the part of the building on the Arkansas side of the state line, sections 361.029 (e) and (j) clearly gave the officer in question jurisdiction to arrest appellant inside the Bi-State Criminal Justice Center without extradition. The language of the statute does not attempt to alter the state borders.

Further, we find it unnecessary to reach the constitutionality issue. Appellant voluntarily went to the center and voluntarily gave his statements to the Texas police officers. See point of error three, infra. Appellant does not challenge that his arrest was properly made with probable cause and without force. Appellant did not request counsel; therefore, because he had none, counsel could not be ineffective. Further, appellant concedes that the purpose of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act is to provide safeguards to fugitives from justice. Because appellant was not a fugitive, the Act did not apply in the instant case. Points of error one and two are overruled.

In his third point of error, appellant posits that the trial court erred in admitting his February 5 and 6, 1997, confessions because they were not freely and voluntarily given. See Articles 38.21 and 38.22 2(b).⁵ Appellant claims that the interrogating officers yelled at him, called him a "liar," and "talked short" to him. He contends that this behavior made him feel threatened, scared, and intimidated. Appellant also asserts that his requests for counsel went unanswered.

"At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony." Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court's findings if those findings are supported by the record. See Penry, 903 S.W.2d at 744. Instead, "[w]e only consider whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts." Id.

The statement of an accused may be used in evidence against him if it appears that it was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion. See Article 38.21. "The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is based on an examination of the totality of circumstances surrounding its acquisition." Penry, 903 S.W.2d at 744.

The following information was elicited at the suppression hearing: Upon request on February 4, 1997, appellant voluntarily went to the Bi-State Justice Center to give a statement to police. Texarkana Police Officer Larry Parker read appellant his warnings pursuant to Miranda and Article 38.22. Appellant also signed warning forms acknowledging that he had received and understood those rights. During the statement, Parker received information from the hospital that the child victim had been sexually assaulted, but finished taking the statement already in progress.⁶ Parker then asked appellant if he would agree to have a "sexual assault kit" taken. Appellant voluntarily complied, and Parker accompanied him to the hospital. After the kit had been completed and appellant had returned to the Justice Center, Parker again read appellant his rights and then placed him under arrest.

Around 9:00 a.m. on February 5, Parker interviewed appellant once more. Parker read appellant his warnings, and appellant again signed an acknowledgment form. Appellant did not request an attorney nor did he ask for the interview to cease at any time, and Parker stated that the interview would have ceased immediately had appellant requested either. The written statement appellant gave included a recitation of appellant's rights and an acknowledgment that he knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights. Additionally, appellant was allowed to review the statement and make any changes to the statement that he felt were necessary. Appellant initialed all changes that were made.

Parker testified that although he was upset by the death of a small child, he did not yell at, coerce, threaten, or promise appellant anything at any time. Parker did not deny that he "talked short" with appellant or that he told appellant that he thought appellant was a liar. But Parker also testified that he did not do so until after appellant had completed his statement. Parker further testified that he requested that another officer take appellant's statement on February 6 because of Parker's feelings about the case.

Texarkana Officer Ronnie Sharp took appellant's February 6 statement. Sharp advised appellant of his rights, and appellant voluntarily signed an acknowledgment form. Appellant did not request an attorney nor did he ask to stop the interview at any time. Sharp stated that the interview would have stopped had appellant requested either. Sharp also testified that he felt appellant was aware of his rights and understood them. As with the previous day, the written statement included a recitation of appellant's rights at the top and included an acknowledgment that appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. Appellant reviewed the statement and made changes to the statement that he felt were necessary. Appellant initialed all changes made. Sharp further testified that he did not raise his voice or curse at appellant; he felt that appellant was very cooperative during the entire process and did not appear to be scared.

Appellant, a high-school graduate and former local jailor, testified that, although he voluntarily made a statement on February 4, he did not voluntarily make any other statements. He claimed that he did not voluntarily sign the waiver forms on February 5 or 6, and he also asserted that the officers made up the statements. He stated that he signed one statement because he was scared, but then he later stated that he signed it because the officer told him that it was the same statement that he had made on February 4. Appellant further testified that the officers yelled at him, cursed him, threatened him, and intimidated him into signing the statements. He asserted that his requests for a lawyer went unanswered, and he also stated that he did not read the statements before signing them and did not make any corrections because he did not have his glasses with him. Appellant did, however, admit that he could see well enough to sign the forms and statements on the lines provided. He also conceded that all the initialing and signatures were, in fact, his handwriting.

As the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their...