Wyatt v. Wyatt

• Decision Date: 05 June 1953
• Docket Number: No. 36021,36021
• Citation: 58 N.W.2d 873,239 Minn. 434
• Parties: WYATT v. WYATT et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 873

58 N.W.2d 873

239 Minn. 434

WYATT v. WYATT et al.

No. 36021.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 5, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. An endorsement attached to a policy of insurance forms part of the contract, and the policy and the endorsement must be construed together.

2. Where provisions in the body of the policy conflict with a rider or endorsement, the provisions of the endorsement will govern.

3. A. construction of an insurance policy which entirely neutralizes one provision should not be adopted if the contract is susceptible of another construction which gives effect to all its provisions and is consistent with the general intent.

4. The exclusions in the body of the policy are as much a part of the contract as the stated coverage and cannot be ignored in construing the policy and an attached endorsement.

5. Stated exclusions in the endorsement cannot be used to enlarge the coverage of the policy.

Gallagher, Farrish & Sheran, Mankato, and Miles B. Zimmerman, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Regan, Regan & Kroon, Mankato, for respondent.

KNUTSON, Justice.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. On March 30, 1949, the garnishee issued to defendant a policy of insurance on the form customarily used for insuring the owner of an automobile against liability for personal injury or property damage. The pertinent portions of the policy are found in coverage B, which reads:

'Property Damage Liability: To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.'

The policy thereafter contains the following provision:

'Exclusions

'This policy does not apply:

'(f) under coverage B, to injury to or destruction of property owned by, rented to, in charge of or transported by the insured;'

Defendant did not own an automobile. In the space in the policy form in which the automobile covered by the insurance is usually described the words 'See Endorsement' were typed. Attached to the policy was an endorsement entitled 'Operator's Policy (Private Passenger Automobiles).' As far as here material, the endorsement read:

'It is agreed that Such insurance as is afforded by the policy * * * for Property Damage Liability applies subject to the following provisions:

'1. The insurance applies to the named insured with respect to his operation of or presence in any private passenger automobile.

'3. The insurance does not apply:

'(a) to any automobile owned in full or in part by or registered in the name of the named insured;' (Italics supplied).

On May 6, 1949, an automobile owned by Charles Wyatt was damaged while defendant was using it as a bailee with the permission and consent of Charles Wyatt. He sued defendant to recover damages to his automobile and recovered a verdict. Judgment was entered thereon. Thereafter, supplemental proceedings were instituted against the garnishee, and the garnishee denied liability. Charles Wyatt died during the pendency of such proceedings, and Katherine Wyatt, as the representative of his estate, was substituted as plaintiff. The trial court held the garnishee liable under the policy, and, pursuant to the court's findings and order, judgment was entered against the garnishee for $963.72, which is the amount of the original judgment obtained by Charles Wyatt against defendant plus interest and costs. This appeal is from the judgment so entered.

There can be no question but that the automobile of Charles Wyatt, at the time it was damaged, was 'in charge of' the insured within the meaning of exclusion (f). Faust v. Dawes, 257 Wis. 353, 43 N.W.2d 365; Speier v. Ayling, 158 Pa. Super. 404, 45 A.2d 385. See, Annotation, 131 A.L.R. 1105. It must follow that liability of the garnishee is excluded by clause (f) unless the exclusion is nullified by the attached endorsement. It is the contention of plaintiff that paragraph 1 of the endorsement has the effect of cancelling the exclusion provided in clause (f).

In construing a policy of insurance we are governed by certain well-established rules.

1. The endorsement forms part of the insurance contract, and the policy and the endorsement must be construed together. In Narver v. California State Life Ins. Co., 211 Cal. 176, 181, 294 P. 393, 395, 71 A.L.R. 1374, the California court said:

'* * * Taken by itself, this indorsement means nothing. Of itself, it is not a contract in any sense of the word. By its terms it refers to the main policy and the application therefor, and, except as specifically excepted in the indorsement, it put the provisions of the policy into force and effect. Indorsements on an insurance policy form a part of the insurance contract (25 Cyc. of Law and Procedure, 743), and the policy of insurance with the indorsements and riders thereon must be construed together as a whole * * *.'

See, also, 29 Am.Jur., Insurance, § 174; 13 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 7538.

2. Where provisions in the body of the policy conflict with a rider or endorsement, the provisions of the endorsement will govern. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Houston Oil & Transport Co., 5 Cir., 49 F.2d 121; 13 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 7538; 44 C.J.S., Insurance, § 300.

3. A construction of an insurance policy which entirely neutralizes one provision should not be adopted if the contract is susceptible of another construction which gives effect to all its provisions and is consistent with the general intent. Soukup v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. Ltd., 341 Mo. 614, 108 S.W.2d 86, 112 A.L.R. 149; 29 Am.Jur., Insurance, § 160.

4. The exclusions provided by clause (f) are as much a part of the policy as the coverage and must be read as part of coverage B. The endorsement, on...