Wyman's Estate, In re
| Decision Date | 15 October 1962 |
| Citation | 25 Cal.Rptr. 280,208 Cal.App.2d 489 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE of Burton J. WYMAN, Deceased. Alan CRANSTON, Controller of the State of California, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Adele F. WYMAN, Objector and Appellant. Civ. 20385. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Glicksberg, Glicksberg & Goldberg, Lawrence Goldberg, San Francisco, for appellant.
Charles J. Barry, Chief Inheritance Tax Atty., Newell C. Barnett, Assoc. Inheritance Tax Atty., San Francisco, for respondent.
A question of law only is presented in this case, the facts being undisputed. On May 2, 1960, Burton J. Wyman, referee in bankruptcy for the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, died, and upon his death his widow became entitled to a survivor's annuity from the United States Civil Service Commission, to continue until her death or remarriage. By written stipulation of the parties, it is agreed that the annuity is a benefit accruing to the widow under the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, a public retirement system for employees of the Federal Government. The inheritance tax appraiser listed the annuity as taxable and valued it as $29,145.14. Objection was made to the report of the inheritance tax appraiser because of the inclusion of the annuity as a taxable item. The objection was overruled and the report was approved by the superior court, and the widow, as executrix and as distributee, appeals from the order.
In 1956, there was enacted section 13880 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which reads as follows: 'The right of any person to a pension, retirement allowance, return of contributions, the pension, retirement allowance, any optional benefit, or any other right accrued or accruing to any person under any public retirement system is exempt from the tax imposed by this part.' Appellant's argument has the stark simplicity of a syllogism: any right accrued or accruing to any person under any public retirement system is exempt; but the right of appellant has accrued to her under a public retirement system; therefore the right is exempt. It is argued by respondent, the State Controller, that one of the terms of the major premise must be interpreted by the court otherwise than according to its literal meaning; that is, that the term 'any public retirement system,' as used in the statute, means 'any public retirement system established by the State of California or by any of its agencies or political subdivisions.'
This proposition at once appears to transgress the circumscription of the court's function of construction of statutes as contained in section 1858 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads: 'In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.'
We recognize the rule contained in authorities cited by respondent (Warner v. Kenny, 27 Cal.2d 627, 629, 165 P.2d 889; Dempsey v. Market Street Ry. Co., 23 Cal.2d 110, 113, 142 P.2d 929; 45 Cal.Jur.2d, § 116, p. 625, § 130, p. 637), that statutes must be interpreted in such manner as to render their operation reasonable and fair rather than absurd or unjust, and that this is true even if it is necessary to depart from the literal meaning of the words used. We find nothing in the statute herein, however, which demands a construction other than that of literal meaning, in order to avoid absurdity or injustice, and we set forth our reasoning first, the positive side, in support of the literal meaning, and second, in considering the considerations put before us by respondent.
To begin with, we make reference to the proposition that if a statute announces a general rule and makes no exception thereto, the courts can make none. (Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, 47 Cal.2d 469, 476, 304 P.2d 7.)
The dictionary definition of the word 'any' as 'all,' was applied in the case of Emmolo v. Southern Pacific Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 87, 204 P.2d 427, to section 486 of the Civil Code (), so that the requirement of warning by a locomotive at 'any' street, road or highway was held to apply to private as well as to public roads. In Powell v. Allan, 70 Cal.App. 663, 234 P. 339, where a statute required that 'any bonds' (street improvement bonds) not sold within a specified period be turned into a certain fund, the court construed the word 'any' to mean 'all.' Similar construction was given to penal statutes containing the word 'any' in Doble v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. 556, 241 P. 852, and People v. Syed Shah, 91 Cal.App.2d 716, 721, 205 P.2d 1081.
Perhaps as persuasive as the above cases is one in which the Supreme Court came to its conclusion upon the meaning of a tax statute relating to public retirement funds, in part by reference to omission from the statute of the word 'any,' namely Estate of Simpson, 43 Cal.2d 594, 275 P.2d 467, 47 A.L.R.2d 991. Government Code section 31452, as it read at the time of the decision, exempted rights and moneys accruing under county employees' retirement plans from taxation. It was held that the exemption did not include inheritance tax, because this is not a tax on the property itself, but on the privilege of succeeding to the property. In the course of its reasoning (at pp. 599, 600, 275 P.2d 467), the Court distinguished the New York statute, which was construed by the courts of that state as exemption public retirement benefits from inheritance taxation (In re Morrison's Estate, 130 Misc. 438, 224 N.Y.S. 346; In re Fischer's Estate, 132 Misc. 204, 229 N.Y.S. 826, affd. 23 App.Div. 887, 229 N.Y.S. 855), in that the New York statute exempted from any state or municipal tax. The Supreme Court pointed out that the word 'any,' used in the New York statute, was broad enough to comprehend, in its enlarged and plural sense, all state and municipal taxes, without limitation, citing the cases of Doble v. Superior Court; Powell v. Allan; People v. Syed Shah, supra; that the Legislature of California presumably knew the existing laws and decisions, and that presumably the Legislature omitted the word 'any' deliberately.
Following the 1954 decision in Estate of Simpson, the Legislature not only amended section 31452 of the Government Code in 1955, to express exemption of county employees' retirement rights and funds as embracing 'any interitance tax,' but also enacted, in 1956, section 13880 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, in which there is a studious use of the word 'any,' for the statute exempts from inheritance tax the right of any person to a pension, etc., any optional benefit, or any other right accruing to any person under any public retirement act. Since it is presumed that the Legislature knew the previous law and decisions, including the rule in Estate of...
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