Wynes v. State
| Decision Date | 06 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | WD 83891 |
| Citation | 628 S.W.3d 786 |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Micah WYNES, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Kenneth C. Hensley, Raymore, MO, for appellant.
Julia E. Rives, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.
Before Special Division: Cynthia L. Martin, Chief Judge, Presiding, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge and Alok Ahuja, Judge
Micah Wynes ("Wynes") appeals the denial of his pro se Rule 24.0351 motion to set aside his guilty plea to the charge of murder in the second-degree. Wynes alleges that the motion court committed clear error because his guilty plea was not voluntarily made because he was under duress at the time he entered the plea. Wynes also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not advised that the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter could have been submitted to the jury. Finding no error, we affirm.
Wynes was charged with murder in the first-degree on September 6, 2017, in connection with the death of Donald Hadden ("Victim") on approximately July 5, 2015. Victim's body was discovered on February 12, 2017, by hunters in the woods near Cannonball Road and Missouri Highway 33 in Clinton County, Missouri.
On December 4, 2018, the first day of Wynes's trial, Wynes announced that he wished to plead guilty pursuant to an agreement with the State to amend his charge from first-degree murder to second-degree murder. The State's plea offer had been extended to Wynes about a week prior to trial. As a part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to argue for a sentence of no more than twenty years, though Wynes would be required to enter an open plea, exposing Wynes to a sentence within the full range of punishment of up to thirty years or life imprisonment.
During the guilty plea hearing, Wynes acknowledged reviewing the amended information charging him with murder in the second-degree, and acknowledged having had sufficient time to go over the document with his attorney. Wynes confirmed that he understood the amended charge and the range of potential punishment. Wynes confirmed on more than one occasion that he understood the trial court remained free to sentence Wynes within the full range of punishment, and that if the court imposed a sentence in excess of that argued by the State, Wynes would not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.
Wynes identified the petition to enter plea of guilty and waiver of rights filed on his behalf, and acknowledged his signature on the petition. Wynes acknowledged reading and understanding the petition. The petition included two affirmations that are material to this case. In paragraph 7, Wynes affirmed that his "attorney has counseled and advised me on the nature of each charge, on all lesser-included offenses, if any, and on all possible defenses that I might have in this case." In paragraph 15, Wynes affirmed that "[n]either I, nor any of my friends or loved ones, has been mistreated, threatened, coerced, or forced in any manner by anyone to get me to plead guilty, nor were there any promises, inducements or representations made except as set forth in Paragraph 14 above."2
Wynes confirmed in response to questioning that he had "absolutely no complaints" about how trial counsel handled his case, and that he had not been "threatened or coerced in any manner" to plead guilty. Specifically, Wynes confirmed that there had been no "threat of physical violence to you, family, friends, [or] relatives" that had in any manner caused him to plead guilty.
When asked to explain his conduct giving rise to the amended charge, Wynes admitted that he and another person (later described as Joseph Seward ("Seward")) had Victim in a car and were driving around pleading with Victim to leave town and go to Georgia. Wynes admitted that although he did not intend to take Victim's life, he was "willing to do some harm to him" because he had heard Victim was a snitch. Wynes said that when the car ran out of gas on a gravel road, he and Victim got out of the car. Wynes said that he pulled out a shotgun, pointed it at Victim, pulled the trigger, and continued to pull the trigger as Victim ran until, after hearing bushes rustling, it became silent. Wynes said an uninvolved bystander then came by and assisted he and Seward with getting gas, and that Wynes and Seward left the area. Wynes did not know whether he had, in fact, shot Victim, but acknowledged that Victim "went missing" after this altercation, and that as a result, Wynes believed he caused Victim's death with the shotgun.
The State added that its evidence would be that witnesses saw Victim, Wynes, and Seward leave a hotel in the north part of Kansas City in a car, and that this was the last time anyone besides Wynes or Seward saw Victim alive. The State advised that Seward would testify that after driving for a long while in unfamiliar areas, the car ran out of gas, and Wynes and Victim got out of the car. Seward heard a shotgun blast, and then saw Victim react as if he had been hit in the arm or face. Victim started to run to nearby woods, and Wynes took steps in the same direction and continued firing. Seward said that he and Wynes later tried to find Victim's body, but could not determine exactly where they were at the time Victim was shot, though Seward was able to generally describe the area, including the unique orientation of the gravel road. The State noted that when hunters found Victim's body nearly two years later, it was in an area that very closely matched Seward's description. Scientific evidence would have established, according to the State, that Victim's remains had been in the woods for an amount of time that was consistent with Victim having been shot on July 5, 2015. After hearing the State's recitation of the expected evidence, Wynes agreed with the evidence and noted he had no amendments or corrections.
The trial court accepted Wynes's guilty plea and ordered a sentencing assessment report. Following a sentencing hearing on February 20, 2019, where numerous witnesses testified, the trial court announced a sentence of twenty-eight years. The trial court noted in a docket sheet entry the particulars of Wynes's guilty plea and announced sentence, followed by the statement "All as per formal Sentence & Judgment to be prepared and filed." The trial court then entered a written judgment of conviction and sentence ("Judgment") on February 22, 2019.
On August 20, 2019, Wynes filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion ("Motion"). Retained counsel later entered an appearance and filed a statement that no amended motion would be filed.3 The pro se Motion alleged that sentence was imposed on February 20, 2019, although the Judgment was not filed until February 22, 2019.
Although the Motion raised three claims, only two are at issue in this appeal. Wynes claimed: (i) that he was coerced into pleading guilty by threats made to family members, and that as a result, his guilty plea was not voluntary; and (ii) that trial counsel did not advise him of lesser-included offenses, specifically voluntary manslaughter, and that as a result, his guilty plea was not voluntary.
At a hearing on the Motion on June 12, 2020, Wynes and his father, Randall Wynes, testified. Wynes's trial counsel did not testify. The motion court found that the purported threat about which Wynes and his father testified (which was allegedly made by Victim) occurred before Victim was killed, and could not have influenced Wynes's guilty plea. The motion court also found that Wynes's claim that he pled guilty under duress because of this purported threat was expressly refuted by the record, as Wynes testified during the guilty plea hearing that neither he, nor any member of his family, friends, or relatives, had been threatened or coerced in any manner as to cause him to plead guilty.
With respect to Wynes's claim of ineffective assistance based on trial counsel's alleged failure to advise Wynes of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the motion court found that Wynes failed to "state that but for the failure of counsel to advise of the lessor-included [sic] to second degree murder he would have proceeded to trial as charged of first-degree murder and thus fails to establish that prejudice occurred." In addition, the motion court found that Wynes failed to plead any facts in his Motion that "show how ‘sudden passion,’ as contemplated in the voluntary manslaughter statute arises or applies to his case." In addition, the motion court noted that Wynes's statement during the guilty plea hearing about the circumstances that led to him shooting Victim included no facts that would have supported submission of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
Based on these findings, the motion court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law denying the Motion (" Rule 24.035 Judgment"). The 24.035 Judgment noted that Wynes "was sentenced on February 20, 2019," (the date of the sentencing hearing), although the Judgment of conviction and sentence was not filed until February 22, 2019.
Wynes appeals.
Before addressing Wynes's points on appeal, we must address the State's request to dismiss Wynes's appeal given the alleged untimeliness of the Motion. Relevant to this case, Rule 24.035(b) provides:
A person seeking relief pursuant to this Rule 24.035 shall file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence substantially in the form of Criminal Procedure Form No. 40.... The motion shall be filed no earlier than the date the sentence is entered if no appeal is taken.... If no appeal of such judgment or sentence is taken, the motion shall be filed within 180 days of the date the sentence is entered .
(Emphasis added.) "Failure to file a motion within the time provided by ... Rule 24.035 shall constitute a...
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