Wynn v. Frederick

Docket Number314PA21
Decision Date15 December 2023
PartiesPAUL STEVEN WYNN v. REX FREDERICK, in his official capacity as a magistrate, and GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Heard in the Supreme Court on 21 September 2023.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 278 N.C.App. 596 863 S.E.2d 790 (2021), affirming an order entered on 15 January 2020 by Judge John O. Craig III in Superior Court Orange County. On 17 August 2022, the Supreme Court allowed plaintiff's conditional petition for discretionary review as to an additional issue.

Carlos E. Mahoney and Barry D. Nakell for plaintiff-appellee.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Sarah G. Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General, Nicholas S. Brod, Deputy Solicitor General, and Lindsay Vance Smith, Deputy Solicitor General for defendant-appellant Rex Frederick.

NEWBY CHIEF JUSTICE

In this case we consider whether magistrates can be sued in a statutory bond action under N.C. G.S. § 58-76-5 based on actions they take in their official capacities or whether sovereign immunity and/or judicial immunity bars suit. To answer this question, we must first determine whether magistrates are "other officer[s]" under N.C. G.S. § 58-76-5. Because the provision's text, history, and broader statutory context reveal that section 58-76-5 encompasses only county, rather than state, officers, magistrates fall outside the scope of "other officer[s]" under the statute and accordingly retain their sovereign immunity. Additionally, we hold, in accordance with our established precedent, that judicial immunity applies to official and individual capacity claims. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff alleges the following facts. In 2016, plaintiff owned two nearby properties in Mebane, North Carolina. Plaintiff lived at one property and rented the second property to his sister, Judy Wynn, and her twenty-four-year-old son, Robert Morris. Morris had suffered from severe mental health issues since he was a teenager and was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. In addition, Morris engaged in significant alcohol and drug use and was diagnosed with substance abuse disorders. When Morris did not take his medications, his conditions caused him to become violent towards others. As a result, Morris had been involuntarily committed to UNC Hospitals on several occasions, including three separate times during 2016. To monitor Morris's condition and medication compliance, Morris received regular visits at his home from the UNC Center for Excellence in Community Mental Health's Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) team. The ACT team provides medical support and treatment to individuals with severe mental illnesses who live at home in Orange County. Dr. Austin Hall, a psychiatrist at the UNC Center for Excellence in Community Mental Health, served as the ACT team's Medical Director and provided psychiatric care and treatment to Morris.

During the week of 12 December 2016, Morris was living with Ms. Wynn at the Mebane property that she rented from plaintiff. Morris was not taking his medications, had not slept for three days, and stayed outside at night guarding the house with a crossbow. In addition, earlier that week, Morris drained Ms. Wynn's car battery to prevent her from leaving the house. Accordingly, Ms. Wynn informed the ACT team and Dr. Hall about Morris's condition. On the morning of 16 December 2016, Dr. Hall met with Ms. Wynn and Morris at the Mebane property, and upon evaluating Morris, Dr. Hall determined that Morris needed to be involuntarily committed. Dr. Hall returned to his office, prepared an Affidavit and Petition for Involuntary Commitment, and faxed it to the Orange County Magistrate's Office. Defendant, a magistrate in Orange County, received the faxed affidavit and petition.

Upon reviewing the affidavit and petition, defendant issued a Findings and Custody Order for Involuntary Commitment and faxed the custody order to UNC Hospitals so that Morris could be served and committed at the hospital. Defendant thought Morris was already at the hospital; however, Morris was still at his home in Mebane. Therefore, Morris was not served with the custody order on 16 December 2016.

On the morning of 17 December 2016, Dr. Hall called Ms. Wynn to ask if the Orange County Sheriff's Office had served Morris with the custody order and taken him to UNC Hospitals. Ms. Wynn told Dr. Hall that Morris was still at the Mebane property. Dr. Hall then called defendant to ask about the status of the custody order, and defendant informed Dr. Hall that he faxed the custody order to UNC Hospitals. Dr. Hall explained that Morris was still at his home and accordingly told defendant he would again fax the documents to defendant so that Morris could be served at the Mebane property.

At 9:27 a.m., Dr. Hall again faxed the Affidavit and Petition for Involuntary Commitment to the Magistrate's Office, and Chief Magistrate Tony Oakley received the documents. By 11:02 a.m., Chief Magistrate Oakley had also received a copy of the custody order. He then contacted the Sheriff's Office and requested a deputy to serve Morris at his house. Around 11:20 a.m., Deputy Malcolm Hester retrieved the custody order from the Magistrate's Office and began driving to the Mebane property.

Meanwhile, around 11:00 a.m., plaintiff went to his sister's property to jump-start her car battery. After starting the car, plaintiff went inside Ms. Wynn's home not knowing that Morris was off his medication and experiencing a psychotic episode. After plaintiff entered the house, Morris used a crossbow to shoot plaintiff in the neck with an arrow, instantly paralyzing plaintiff. Ms. Wynn called 911 at 11:18 a.m. Deputy Hester arrived at the Mebane property with the custody order by 11:36 a.m., and emergency services arrived shortly thereafter. At that time, Morris was taken into custody.

On 17 September 2019, plaintiff filed suit against defendant, in his official capacity as a magistrate, under defendant's official bond pursuant to N.C. G.S. § 58-76-5, and Great American Insurance Company, defendant's insurer. Plaintiff alleged defendant was negligent in faxing the custody order to UNC Hospitals rather than to the Sheriff's Office so that a deputy could serve Morris with the custody order at his home. Plaintiff sought damages under the bond in the amount of $100,000.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on 21 October 2019 asserting sovereign immunity, absolute judicial immunity, public official immunity, and that plaintiff otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Great American Insurance Company also filed a motion to dismiss, joining in and adopting defendant's motion. On 6 January 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the motions, in which it heard arguments, reviewed the complaint, and considered briefs submitted by the parties. On 15 January 2020, the trial court entered an order denying defendant's motion to dismiss.1[] The trial court determined that the factual allegations in the complaint establish that defendant is not entitled to sovereign immunity or judicial immunity for the statutory bond action and that plaintiff stated a claim upon which relief could be granted against defendant in his official capacity.2[] Defendant appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. Wynn v. Frederick, 278 N.C.App. 596, 597, 863 S.E.2d 790, 792 (2021). First, the Court of Appeals held that N.C. G.S. § 58-76-5, which waives sovereign immunity for certain officials covered by a statutory bond, applies to magistrates. Id. at 601, 603, 863 S.E.2d at 794-95; see N.C. G.S. § 58-76-5 (2021) (waiving sovereign immunity for a "register, surveyor, sheriff, coroner, county treasurer, or other officer" to the extent of their respective bonds). The Court of Appeals explained that while magistrates are not specifically enumerated in the statute's list of officers, magistrates nonetheless fall into the statute's general category of "other officer[s]." Wynn, 278 N.C.App. at 602-03, 863 S.E.2d at 795. Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, section 58-76-5 plainly waived defendant's sovereign immunity. Id.

The Court of Appeals next addressed the issue of judicial immunity. The Court of Appeals held that "judicial immunity is [only] an available defense for judicial officers sued as individuals." Id. at 603, 863 S.E.2d at 796. According to the Court of Appeals, because plaintiff sued defendant in his official capacity, rather than in his individual capacity, defendant could not assert judicial immunity as a defense to suit. Id. The Court of Appeals thus categorically limited judicial immunity to suits in which judicial officers are sued in their individual capacity. Id.

Defendant filed a petition for discretionary review with this Court on 24 August 2021, and plaintiff filed a conditional petition for discretionary review on 3 September 2021.

On 17 August 2022, this Court allowed defendant's petition for discretionary review and allowed in part plaintiff's conditional petition for discretionary review.3[]

In this case we consider whether sovereign immunity and judicial immunity are available defenses in a statutory bond action for a magistrate sued in his official capacity under N.C. G.S. § 58-76-5. We review de novo a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss that raises immunity as a ground for dismissal. White v. Trew, 366 N.C. 360, 362-63, 736 S.E.2d 166, 168 (2013).

This Court has long recognized the doctrine of sovereign immunity acknowledging that "[i]t is an established principle of jurisprudence . . . that a state...

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