Wyoming v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 24 August 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-CV-037B.,98-CV-037B.
• Citation: 61 F.Supp.2d 1209
• Parties: The State of WYOMING, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants, and Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, et al., Intervenor-Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Wyoming

61 F.Supp.2d 1209

The State of WYOMING, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants, and Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance, et al., Intervenor-Defendants.

No. 98-CV-037B.

United States District Court, D. Wyoming.

August 24, 1999.

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Gay Vanderpoel Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General, Ronald P. Arnold, Assistant Wyoming Attorney General, Lynda G. Cook, Assistant Wyoming Attorney General, Cheyenne, WY, for plaintiff.

Kenneth E. Kellner, Department of Justice., Washington, DC, for defendant.

Alan B. Minier, Rothgerber Johnson & Lyons, Cheyenne, WY, James S. Angell, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund, Bozeman, MT, for interveners.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING ALL OTHER PENDING MOTIONS AS MOOT

BRIMMER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on several motions: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Intervenor-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Amended Complaint and Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and for a Preliminary Injunction. The Court, after reading the briefs, hearing oral arguments, and being fully advised of the premises, FINDS and ORDERS as follows:

INTRODUCTION

This case is the result of a dispute between the State of Wyoming ("Wyoming") and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") over the proper management of brucellosis on the National Elk Refuge ("Elk Refuge") outside of Jackson, Wyoming. Brucellosis is a bacterial borne pathogen, strains of which may infect the mammary glands and reproductive tracts of many undulants, including elk and cattle. Brucellosis often results in spontaneous abortions among newly infected animals. This contagious disease is spread when infected animals come into contact with uninfected animals. Studies are inconclusive whether the disease is spread between species, such as from elk to cattle, or vice versa. The efficacy of vaccinating elk against brucellosis with a cattle-specific vaccine is also disputed.

In the winter, Wyoming vaccinates elk against brucellosis on several state-operated feeding grounds. Wyoming filed this lawsuit when the FWS refused to allow Wyoming Game and Fish personnel to enter the Elk Refuge for the purpose of vaccinating elk. Wyoming argues that although the Elk Refuge is Federal public land, it is nevertheless entitled to vaccinate the elk on the Refuge regardless of whether the FWS objects to this type of management.

In July 1998, the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint in order to clarify the scope of the claims and jurisdictional bases contained therein.¹ Based upon the Amended Complaint and the competing motions for summary judgment, the parties have conceded that this dispute is properly decided on the motions before the Court. Although the parties disagree as to the efficacy of the FWS's and Wyoming's respective brucellosis management plans, that dispute does not prohibit the resolution of this case on the motions. The Court need not, and indeed should not, address that issue in this order. The Court thus turns to the pending motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.

STANDARD FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS

When considering a party's motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997). In a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the Court considers whether the complaint, standing alone, is legally sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Swoboda v. Dubach, 992 F.2d 286, 288 (10th Cir.1993). The standards used to judge a motion to dismiss brought under 12(b)(6) are slightly different: a 12(b)(6) motion "should not be granted `unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" See GFF Corp., 130 F.3d at 1384 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The Court must convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to one under Rule 12(b)(6), or for summary judgment, "[i]f the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the case." Bell v. United States, 127 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir.1997).

I. Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' cause of action should be dismissed for many reasons: (1) Plaintiffs do not have standing (2) Defendants have not waived sovereign immunity, (3) Plaintiffs do not fall within the zone of interests of the statute under which they seek relief, (4) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted, and (5) Defendants' actions were committed to agency discretion and are unreviewable. The Court will address these arguments in turn.

A. Article III Standing

For the Court to hear this case, the plaintiffs must have standing. To satisfy the standing requirement of Article III, the plaintiffs must demonstrate all the following factors:

(1) that the plaintiff[s] have suffered an "injury in fact" — an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;

(2) that there [is] a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court; and

(3) that it [is] likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1163, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351, (1992)).

Neither the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., nor any other congressional enactment can lower the Article III standing threshold. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Plaintiffs have the burden to establish jurisdiction by clearly alleging facts demonstrating that they are "a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute." United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995).

Plaintiffs have met this burden. First, Plaintiffs sufficiently have alleged that they have suffered an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs allege that the FWS's refusal to vaccinate elk against brucellosis has reduced the efficacy of Wyoming's own vaccination efforts among the resident elk population of Wyoming. Second, Plaintiffs have alleged a causal connection between their injury — a less effective vaccination program — and Defendants' conduct — refusal to vaccinate or allow vaccination on the Elk Refuge. Finally, Plaintiffs have alleged that their injury would be redressed by a favorable outcome in this suit. Plaintiffs' allegations, accepted as true, are sufficient to show that requiring the defendants to allow a state-run vaccination program on the Elk Refuge would reduce the transmission of brucellosis among the resident elk population and improve the efficacy of the state's vaccination program.

Because Plaintiffs have demonstrated constitutional standing, the Court now moves to the individual counts of Plaintiffs' Complaint. The Court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' claims and whether Plaintiffs have stated claims upon which relief may be granted.

B. Count 1: Impingement on State Sovereignty

As the Court understands the first Count, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Babbitt's decision to prohibit Wyoming from conducting a vaccination program on the Elk Refuge is ultra vires and contrary to congressional intent. Babbitt's prohibition of a Wyoming-run vaccination program on the Elk Refuge reduces the efficacy of Wyoming's own vaccination program and impinges on its sovereign authority to manage its resident wildlife population. Plaintiffs argue that Wyoming has authority to manage resident wildlife on the Elk Refuge because the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd et seq. ("Refuge Act"), neither implicitly nor explicitly preempts the State from doing so.

Before the Court reaches the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, it must determine if it has jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing jurisdiction in this Court. See United States v. Bustillos, 31 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir.1994). The first question a Court must ask when confronted with a suit against the Federal Government is whether the Government has waived sovereign immunity. "Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, ___, 119 S.Ct. 687, 690, 142 L.Ed.2d 718 (1999). "The States of the Union, like all other entities, are barred by federal sovereign immunity from suing the United States in the absence of an express waiver of this immunity by Congress." Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 280, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983). By passing statutes that include waiver provisions, Congress has waived its immunity for several types of suits. See Blue Fox, 525 U.S. at ___, 119 S.Ct. at 691, 142 L.Ed.2d 718. However, any waiver of governmental immunity must be narrowly construed in favor of the sovereign; a waiver of immunity will not be implied. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996).

Plaintiffs have the burden to show that the Federal Government has waived sovereign immunity. See Fostvedt v. United States, 978 F.2d 1201, 1203 (10th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiffs do not identify an unequivocal waiver of immunity in Count I. Instead, Plaintiffs identify several alternative grounds for jurisdiction in general. The Court will consider each statute mentioned by the plaintiffs so to determine whether the statute waives sovereign immunity.

Plaintif...