Wysocki v. Oberlin Police Dep't
Decision Date | 30 June 2014 |
Docket Number | C.A. No. 13CA010437 |
Citation | 2014 Ohio 2869 |
Parties | JOSEPH WYSOCKI Appellant v. OBERLIN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al. Appellees |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
{¶1} Appellant, Joseph Wysocki, appeals from the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} In 2010, Mr. Wysocki was charged with one count of domestic violence. The Oberlin Municipal Court issued a temporary protection order, which prohibited Mr. Wysocki from possessing any deadly weapons. The Oberlin Police Department seized two firearms pursuant to the order. The temporary protection order was terminated after he pleaded no contest to a reduced charge of criminal mischief.
{¶3} After termination of the case and the temporary protection order, Mr. Wysocki moved the court for release of the firearms. The court found that, because the prosecution had not sought either a criminal or civil forfeiture of the firearms, it did not have authority to release the weapons to him unless he filed a replevin action.
{¶4} In 2012, Mr. Wysocki sued the Oberlin Police Department and chief of police, Thomas A. Miller, ("Appellees") for replevin and conversion. The court scheduled a replevin hearing after Mr. Wysocki filed a motion for possession of the firearms pursuant to Revised Code Section 2737.03. Instead of taking testimony and evidence at the replevin hearing, the court set a briefing schedule and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted the Appellees' motion, denied Mr. Wysocki's motion as moot, and denied his motion for possession. Mr. Wysocki filed a timely appeal and sets forth one assignment of error for this Court's review.
{¶5} Mr. Wysocki argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the applicable case law and statutes when it granted summary judgment to the Appellees. Specifically, he maintains that he is not prohibited from owning or possessing firearms and is entitled to return of his property. This Court agrees.
{¶6} An appellate court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). "We apply the same standard as the trial court, viewing the facts in the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolvingany doubt in favor of the non-moving party." Garner v. Robart, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25427, 2011-Ohio-1519, ¶ 8. Pursuant to Civil Rule 56(C), summary judgment is proper if:
(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977). The movant must specifically identify the portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). If the movant satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden to point to specific facts that show a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. The nonmoving party must identify some evidence that establishes a genuine issue of material fact, and may not rely upon the allegations and denials in the pleadings. Sheperd v. City of Akron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26266, 2012-Ohio-4695, ¶ 10. The parties agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact that remain and that this case concerns whether the Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
{¶7} Mr. Wysocki sued the Appellees for replevin and conversion of the firearms. "Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to the exclusion of the rights of the owner, or withholding it from [his] possession under a claim inconsistent with [his] rights." Kostyo v. Kaminski, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010266, 2013-Ohio-3188, ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Toma v. Corrigan, 92 Ohio St.3d 589, 592 (2001). "The three basic elements of conversion are: '(1) plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion; (2) defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of plaintiff's property rights; and (3) damages.'" Id., quoting Scott Charles Laundromat, Inc. v. Akron, 9th Summit Dist. No. 26125, 2012-Ohio-2886, ¶ 9. (Citations omitted.) Wilson v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 26154, 2012-Ohio-2748, ¶ 11.
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9).
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).
{¶10} Although he was originally charged with domestic violence, Mr. Wysocki pleaded no contest to and was convicted of the reduced charge of criminal mischief under Revised Code Section 2909.07. That statute provides that no person shall:
R.C. 2909.07(A)(1)-(5). In this case, Mr. Wysocki's conviction was a third-degree misdemeanor. If his offense had created a risk of physical harm to any person, his conviction would have been classified as a first-degree misdemeanor. See R.C. 2909.07(C)(2).
{¶11} This Court is not persuaded that Mr. Wysocki's conviction for criminal mischief constitutes a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." The activity that constitutes criminal mischief under Revised Code Section 2909.07(A) involves a crime against property rather than a person. It is not unless there is a risk of physical harm to a person that criminal mischief becomes a first-degree misdemeanor. R.C. 2909.07(C)(2). Mr. Wysocki was not, however, convicted of a first-degree misdemeanor, but rather a third-degree misdemeanor. This Court concludes that, given the fact that he was convicted of a third-degree misdemeanor, his conviction did not involve the risk of physical harm to his victim. This Court further notes that criminal mischief is not listed as an "[o]ffense of violence" as defined by Revised Code2901.01(A)(9)(a). See City of Cleveland Hts. v. Fanara, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 37743, 1978 WL 218186, *2 (Dec. 7, 1978). See also United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113, 1127 (10th Cir.2006) (...
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