Xodus Med. v. Prime Med.
Decision Date | 22 December 2021 |
Docket Number | 3:18-cv-415-JPM,3:18-cv-413-JPM,3:18-cv-414-JPM |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Parties | XODUS MEDICAL, INC., ALESSIO PIGAZZI, and GLENN KEILAR, Plaintiffs, v. PRIME MEDICAL, LLC., and SYMMETRY SURGICAL INC. Defendants. XODUS MEDICAL, INC., ALESSIO PIGAZZI, and GLENN KEILAR, Plaintiffs, v. PRIME MEDICAL, LLC., and SYMMETRY SURGICAL INC. Defendants. XODUS MEDICAL, INC., ALESSIO PIGAZZI, and GLENN KEILAR, Plaintiffs, v. G&T INDUSTRIES, INC. Defendant. |
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER THE ON-SALE BAR OF SECTION 102 AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER 35 U.S.C § 101
Before the Court is Defendants Prime Medical LLC, Symmetry Surgical Inc. and G&T Industries, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment Under the On-Sale Bar of Section 102, filed under seal on October 19, 2021. (ECF No. 260.)[1] Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition on November 12, 2021. (ECF No. 286.) Defendants filed a Reply on November 22, 2021. (ECF No. 311.) For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Under the On-Sale Bar of Section 102 is DENIED.
Also before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, filed under seal on October 19, 2021. (ECF No. 258.) Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition on November 19, 2021. (ECF No. 303.) Defendants filed a Reply on December 7, 2021. (ECF No. 331.) For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is DENIED, and Summary Judgment is GRANTED for Plaintiffs as to the patents-in-suit's eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The background of these three cases is provided in this Court's Claim Construction Order.
(ECF No. 138.) This background is quoted below:
(ECF No. 138 at PagelD 2880-83.)
A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material' for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that fact would establish or refute an essential element of the cause of action or defense.” Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov't, 687 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2012).
“In considering a motion for summary judgment, [the] court construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). “The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.” Mosholder v. Barnhardt, 679 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
“Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue of material fact.” Mosholder, 679 F.3d at 448 49; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. “When the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof, the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment is proper.” Martinez v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 703 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chapman v. UAW Local 1005, 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc)); see also Kalich v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2012).
To “show that a fact is, or is not, genuinely disputed, ” both parties must do so by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, ” “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, ” or showing “that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Bruederle, 687 F.3d at 776 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)); see also Mosholder, 679 F.3d at 448 . “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge[.]” Martinez, 703 F.3d at 914 (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
“The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). “[T]he district court has no ‘duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.'” Pharos Capital Partners, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, 535 Fed.Appx. 522, 523 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) ( ). “‘[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles' that might be buried in the record.” Emerson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 446 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991)).
The decisive “question is whether ‘the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'” Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
Summary judgment “‘shall be...
To continue reading
Request your trial