Yancey v. Tillman
| Decision Date | 07 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 1:20-CV-03269-JPB |
| Parties | KHANAY YANCEY, Plaintiff, v. GREGORY TILLMAN and CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
This matter comes before the Court on Gregory Tillman's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 50] and Clayton County's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 53] Khanay Yancey's (“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint. This Court finds as follows:
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a resident of Clayton County, Georgia. [Doc. 44, p. 4]. Beginning on July 4, 2019, Plaintiff allowed a friend, the friend's daughter and the friend's boyfriend, Kevin Clark, to stay at Plaintiff's residence following the friend's eviction. Id. at 6. At some point thereafter, Plaintiff did not feel safe with Clark in her home and asked him to leave. Id. Clark left on July 14, 2019. Id.
On July 15, 2019, Clark arrived unannounced at Plaintiff's residence and attempted to enter her home, although Plaintiff did not allow Clark to come inside. Id. at 6-7. Clark called 911 and reported that Plaintiff was denying him access to retrieve his personal belongings. Id. at 7. Gregory Tillman (“Defendant Tillman”), an officer with the Clayton County Police Department (“CCPD”), responded to the 911 call and arrived at Plaintiff's home around 1:25 PM. Id. Clark informed Defendant Tillman that he left a remote control, a TV stand and other small items inside Plaintiff's residence. Id.
Defendant Tillman then knocked on Plaintiff's door. Id. Plaintiff opened the door and informed Defendant Tillman that Clark previously removed his belongings and that Clark was not welcome in her home. Id. Within two minutes of his arrival, Defendant Tillman raised his hand, shouted at Plaintiff to “STOP” and purportedly threatened Plaintiff, saying “if you're not going to listen, I'm just going to do what I need to do.” Id. Plaintiff asked her son, who was home at the time, to contact CCPD and request that a supervisor report to her residence. Id. Plaintiff again explained to Defendant Tillman that Clark had been a guest in her home and was not a lawful resident. Id. at 8. Plaintiff contacted CCPD to request a supervisor, but Defendant Tillman “repeatedly refused” to provide her with his name and badge number. Id. at 7. Dispatch advised Plaintiff that a supervisor was en route to her home. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff informed Defendant Tillman that she was closing her door until the supervisor arrived. Id. Defendant Tillman responded by pushing against the door with his shoulder to prevent it from closing. Id. Plaintiff was able to close the door, but Defendant Tillman used his shoulder to break the door off its frame. Id. He then entered Plaintiff's home, grabbed Plaintiff, wrenched both arms behind her back and used his leg to sweep Plaintiff's legs from underneath her and knock her to the floor. Id. Defendant Tillman placed a knee on Plaintiff's back, “roughly handcuffed her” and “knowingly us[ed] excessively tight restraints [that] he was told were causing Plaintiff pain and injury.” Id. Meanwhile, both Plaintiff's son and Plaintiff herself informed Defendant Tillman that Plaintiff suffered from health problems; Plaintiff specifically told Defendant Tillman that she had a seizure disorder and restrictive lung disease. Id. at 9. Defendant Tillman nonetheless remained on top of Plaintiff, and she subsequently had a seizure. Id.
A CCPD supervisor arrived at Plaintiff's home, at which point Plaintiff's handcuffs were removed and her medical needs addressed by EMS.[1] Id. In lieu of an arrest, Plaintiff was given citations on charges of misdemeanor obstruction and criminal trespass - family violence. Id. at 9-10. These charges were later dropped or otherwise dismissed. Id. at 10.
Upon arriving at Plaintiff's residence, the CCPD supervisor informed Clark that he could not enter Plaintiff's home without a court order. Id. at 13. The CCPD supervisor asked Defendant Tillman why he kicked down Plaintiff's door. Id. at 10. Defendant Tillman responded that he did so “because we had the charge of criminal trespass” and, when asked again, said that “he feared for his safety” because he “didn't know what was behind the door.” Id. Finally, Defendant Tillman informed the CCPD supervisor that he instructed Plaintiff to open her door before he broke it down, but Defendant Tillman did not ask or tell Plaintiff to open her door during the encounter. Id.
A CCPD Internal Affairs review of this incident found that Defendant Tillman “incorrectly believed that a crime of Criminal Trespass - Family Violence had occurred, when in fact the matter was purely civil in nature.” Id. at 13. That review concluded that Defendant Tillman violated CCPD policy by forcibly entering Plaintiff's home and arresting her. Id. As part of the investigation into Defendant Tillman's conduct, the CCPD Chief of Police determined that Defendant Tillman lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff or to issue a family violence charge against her; Plaintiff was within her rights to refuse Clark entry into her home; and Defendant Tillman's decision to forcibly enter Plaintiff's home on the premise of exigent circumstances was “unfounded.” Id. at 14. The investigation also concluded that Defendant Tillman violated CCPD policies related to civil disturbances, arrest procedures and use of force, as well as County Civil Service Rules on unbecoming conduct and improper/negligent performance. Id. at 14-15.
Plaintiff filed this action in the State Court of Clayton County on June 10, 2020. [Doc. 1-1]. Defendant Tillman removed the case to this Court on August 6, 2020. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May 4, 2021, adding Clayton County, Georgia, (“Defendant Clayton County”), as a defendant.[2] [Doc. 44]. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brought four claims against Defendant Tillman under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: (1) unlawful entry/seizure, (2) excessive force, (3) false arrest and (4) malicious prosecution. Plaintiff also brought six state-law claims against Defendant Tillman: (1) assault, (2) battery, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (4) malicious arrest, (5) malicious prosecution and (6) false imprisonment. Plaintiff brought one claim under § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against Defendant Clayton County, alleging that it knew or should have known that CCPD's training was deficient in “(1) distinguishing purely civil matters from criminal matters; (2) de-escalation measures; and (3) circumstances justifying warrantless entry into a citizen's home.” [Doc. 44, p. 27].
On May 17, 2021, Defendant Tillman filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, arguing that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims, that this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims and that, alternatively, he is entitled to official immunity as to Plaintiff's state-law claims. [Doc. 50]. Defendant Clayton County filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on May 26, 2021, arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under Monell. [Doc. 53].
“At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). In determining whether this action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although detailed factual allegations are not necessarily required, the pleading must contain more than “‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Importantly, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Plaintiff brought both federal claims under § 1983 and state-law claims under Georgia law against Defendant Tillman. The Court will address each group of claims in turn.
Defendant Tillman argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. The defense of qualified immunity is ordinarily addressed at the summary judgment stage of a case. Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001).
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it may be raised and considered on a motion to dismiss. St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). Because qualified immunity is a “‘defense not only from liability, but also from suit, it is important for a court to ascertain the validity of a qualified immunity defense as early in the lawsuit as possible.'” Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276 1284 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)). But even though “‘qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of litigation, '” the United States Supreme Court “has not suggested that the procedural rules applicable to a motion to dismiss should be abrogated.” Byrd v. City of Atlanta, 683 F.Supp. 804, 812 (N.D.Ga. 1988) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When considering the qualified immunity defense on a motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether the ...
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