Yankee Network, Inc. v. Gibbs

• Decision Date: 02 July 1936
• Citation: 295 Mass. 56,3 N.E.2d 228
• Parties: YANKEE NETWORK, Inc. v. GIBBS et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

295 Mass. 56

3 N.E.2d 228

YANKEE NETWORK, Inc. v. GIBBS et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

July 2, 1936

Suit in equity by the Yankee Network, Inc., against George Gibbs and others. From a final decree, defendants appeal.

Modified and, as modified, affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Macleod, Judge.

W. J Day, of Boston, for appellants.

G Alpert and J. A. Farrer, both of Boston, for appellee.

QUA Justice.

The plaintiff operates a chain of broadcasting stations. The defendants are the officers and members of ‘ Local No. 9,’ which is located in Boston and is affiliated with and forms part of the American Federation of Musicians. The primary purpose of the suit is to restrain the defendants from interfering with the conducting of an orchestra by one Kendis in the plaintiff's studio.

For about eighteen months prior to April 1, 1935, the officials of the local had been endeavoring to induce the plaintiff to employ a ‘ house orchestra,’ so called, but the plaintiff had refused to do so, because it was unable to find a conductor of suitable talent. Shortly before April 1 the plaintiff requested Kendis to get together an orchestra of ten musicians, which he did by selecting ten members of the local. Their work proved satisfactory to the plaintiff, and thereupon, on April 1, the plaintiff and Kendis entered into a contract in writing by which the plaintiff engaged Kendis for one year as ‘ contractor, conductor, arranger and pianist’ at a salary of $100 per week. Kendis was a member of the American Federation of Musicians, belonging to locals in New York City and elsewhere, but not to Local 9. A by-law of the federation provided that ‘ a member who has his transfer card on deposit in a Local is not entitled, without the consent of the Local, to solicit, accept or play any permanent engagement during a period of three months after the date of deposit, but otherwise is entitled to all the privileges of the Local,’ with exceptions not here material. Another by-law common to both the federation and the local required members to include in their contracts with employers a stipulation to the effect that nothing in the contract should be construed to interfere with any obligation which they owed to the federation as members thereof. A so-called ‘ Price List’ of the local contained a regulation requiring members playing exclusively for broadcasting ‘ to file contracts with the Secretary prior to the engagement.’ Kendis, upon coming to Boston, deposited his transfer card with Local 9, but he did not obtain the consent of that local before accepting and executing his contract with the plaintiff. The stipulation required by the by-law was not included in that contract. It did not appear that he was ‘ playing exclusively for Radio broadcasting,’ so as to bring him within the regulation. On April 1, after signing the contract, Kendis submitted it to the officials of Local 9 for approval. On April 3 the executive committee voted to refuse permission to Kendis to accept the contract, and on April 8 he was officially notified that fines aggregating $500 had been imposed upon him for violation of the by-laws and of the regulation hereinbefore mentioned. On the same day the orchestra ceased to play. Up to this point there is little, if any, dispute as to the facts.

The judge found that Kendis had not violated any of the by-laws or regulations of the federation or of Local 9. He further found that the ten musicians employed by Kendis desired to continue to play at the plaintiff's studio, ‘ that they were entirely satisfied with the compensation and the conditions of their employment, and that the only reason they did not continue to play was because as the result of the threats made to them by the officials of the Union they feared substantial fines, suspension or expulsion,’ that ‘ there was no legitimate or reasonable basis for refusing the permission to Kendis to carry out his contract with the plaintiff,’ and that suspension or expulsion of the ten musicians would be arbitrary, unreasonable and illegal. Upon the facts found by him and upon ‘ all the evidence’ he found and ruled ‘ that the conduct of the officials of the Union in interfering with the employment of Kendis and the members of the orchestra by the plaintiff constituted an impairment of the plaintiff's right to a free flow of labor, and that conduct was illegal, and in violation of the plaintiff's rights.’

The case is here on appeal with a report of the evidence. We must examine the testimony and draw our own conclusions as to facts, giving due weight to the findings of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and not reversing his findings either of subsidiary or of ultimate facts unless they are erroneous in law or the evidence shows them to be plainly wrong. Cook v. Mosher, 243 Mass. 149, 153, 137 N.E. 299; New England Wood Heel Co. v. Nolan, 268 Mass. 191, 167 N.E. 323, 66 A.L.R. 1079; Masterson v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 288 Mass. 518, 521, 193 N.E. 59; MacLeod v. Davis (Mass.) 195 N.E. 315.

We think it is plain on evidence practically undisputed that Kendis had violated the two by-laws in question by accepting without the consent of the local and before the expiration of the three-month period a contract for a permanent engagement which did not contain the required stipulation. We deal with the case on this basis. The other findings of fact hereinbefore stated cannot be pronounced plainly wrong. They are consistent with inferences which a reasonable mind might draw from evidence which, as elicited from witnesses in the court room, might have been convincing. It is true that there was no direct evidence of ‘ threats' by the officers of the local to the ten musicians, but there was evidence which could have been thought to show advice from the officers which caused the musicians to abandon their employment through fear of action by the officers and the local and against their own desire. The precise word used to describe this is unimportant.

The findings and the evidence together show that the defendants having no trade dispute of any kind with the plaintiff, combined to prevent the carrying out of the contract between the plaintiff and Kendis and to prevent Kendis from working for the plaintiff and that they succeeded in that purpose. Such a...