Yant v. Woods, ___ S.W.3d. ___ (Ark. 6/26/2003)
| Decision Date | 26 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | 03-53 |
| Citation | ___ S.W.3d. ___ |
| Parties | Wayelon YANT v. Sharon WOODS |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
1. JUDGMENT — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — WHEN PROPER. — Summary judgment is proper when a claiming party fails to show that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact and when the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law; once a moving party establishes a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by affidavits or other supporting documents or depositions, the opposing party must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact by meeting proof with proof.
2. JUDGMENT — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — STANDARD OF REVIEW. — On appeal, the reviewing court simply determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of its motion leave a material fact unanswered.
3. JOINT VENTURES — JOINT ENTERPRISE — FACTORS REQUIRED. — To find that a joint enterprise exists, Arkansas law requires a showing of: (1) a common object and purpose of the undertaking, and (2) an equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other in respect to the common object and purpose of the undertaking; both requirements must be shown, or there is no joint enterprise.
4. JOINT VENTURES — JOINT ENTERPRISE — EFFECT OF APPLICATION. — The effect of application of the doctrine of joint enterprise is that the driver's negligence or misconduct is imputed to the passenger to bar the passenger's recovery; the proper query for joint enterprise is whether there is enough evidence to show "an equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other in respect to the common object and purpose of the undertaking."
5. JOINT VENTURES — JOINT ENTERPRISE — REQUIREMENTS. — A joint enterprise requires something beyond mere association of the parties for a common end; a mutual "right of control" over operation of the vehicle — or in other words, an equal right in the passenger to be heard as to the manner in which it is driven must be shown; it is not the fact that he does or does not give directions that is important in itself, but rather the understanding between the parties that he has the right to have his wishes respected, to the same extent as the driver; in the absence of circumstances indicating such an understanding, it has been held that fellow servants in the course of their employment, although they may have a common purpose in the ride, are not engaged in a joint enterprise.
6. JOINT VENTURE — JOINT ENTERPRISE — BOTH REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED. — Evidence indisputably showed that the two requirements for a joint enterprise were present in the nature of the agreement between the three employees; although the existence of a joint enterprise is ordinarily a question for the jury, in the present case, it was abundantly clear that the parties testified in agreement on the essential factual question — i.e., whether they could be found by implication to have agreed to an equal voice in management of the vehicle; the facts showing the first element — the common object and purpose to the undertaking — were undisputed, and with respect to the second element, both appellant and appellee, who happened to be driving when the accident occurred, affirmed that every person in the car had an equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other in respect to the common object and purpose of the undertaking.
7. JUDGMENT — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — GRANT OF AFFIRMED. — It was clear from the testimony that both appellant and appellee considered everyone to have an equal right to control the vehicle; because there was no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment.
8. APPEAL & ERROR — ARGUMENT NOT RAISED BELOW — ARGUMENT NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. — Where appellant attempted to raise a second point on appeal, which was not argued, considered, or ruled on at the trial court level, the argument was not preserved for appeal; the supreme court does not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal; a party cannot change the grounds for an objection or motion on appeal, but is bound by the scope and nature of the arguments made at trial.
9. JOINT VENTURE — JOINT ENTERPRISE — DOCTRINE NOT FAVORED IN LAW. — The doctrine of joint enterprise appears to have fallen into considerable disfavor; joint enterprise is a very complex doctrine that has generally fallen into disrepute; courts "should be expected to continue to narrow the scope of the doctrine in order to ameliorate its rigors"; the Eighth Circuit has expressed its belief that the supreme court would not apply the joint-enterprise doctrine to suits among members of the enterprise; by this opinion, the supreme court announced its intention to reexamine viability of the joint-enterprise doctrine, including whether it should be available as a defense against another member of the enterprise. [cme]
Appeal from Faulkner Circuit Court; Michael Maggio, Judge; affirmed.
McHenry & McHenry, by: Donna McHenry, Robert McHenry, and Greg Taylor, for appellant.
Matthews, Sanders, & Sayes, by: Doralee I. Chandler and Roy Gene Sanders, for appellee.
This appeal requires our examination of the tort doctrine of joint enterprise. Appellant Wayelon Yant, appellee Sharon Woods, and Cliff Jenkins were all employed by Hoosier Trucking; the three delivered vehicles around the country for Hoosier. On June 11, 1999, Yant, Woods, and Jenkins had each delivered a bus to Macungie, Pennsylvania, and decided to rent a car together in order to return to Arkansas. Jenkins paid the rental charge on his credit card, and he was the first to begin their drive, with Yant in the passenger seat and Woods in the back. The three stopped to refuel the car and to use the restroom in Raphine, Virginia. When Yant and Jenkins came back out of the gas station, Woods was sitting behind the steering wheel. Jenkins got in the front seat, and Yant sat in the back. About half an hour after Woods began driving, an eighteen-wheeler began to pull into her lane. In an attempt to avoid being hit by the truck, Woods swerved onto the shoulder, causing her to lose control and flip the vehicle over. Yant, who was lying down in the back seat, suffered head injuries in the accident.
In June of 2001, Yant sued Woods, Jenkins, the car rental company, his insurance company, and his employer. Eventually, all defendants except Woods were dismissed from the suit. Woods then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that she and Yant were engaged in a joint enterprise at the time of the accident; as a consequence, Yant was barred by the joint-enterprise doctrine from recovering anything from her. The trial court granted Woods's motion, and Yant appeals.
This court has held that summary judgment is proper when a claiming party fails to show that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact and when the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Palmer v. Council on Econ. Educ., 344 Ark. 461, 40 S.W.3d 784 (2001). Once a moving party establishes a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by affidavits or other supporting documents or depositions, the opposing party must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact by meeting proof with proof. Id. On appeal, the reviewing court simply determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of its motion leave a material fact unanswered. Chavers v. General Motors Corp., 349 Ark. 550, 79 S.W.3d 361 (2002).
To find that a joint enterprise exists, Arkansas law requires a showing of (1) a common object and purpose of the undertaking, and (2) an equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other in respect to the common object and purpose of the undertaking. Lovell v. Brock, 330 Ark. 206, 952 S.W.2d 161 (1997); RLI Ins. Co. v. Coe. 306 Ark. 337, 813 S.W.2d 783 (1991). Both requirements must be shown, or there is no joint enterprise. See Woodard v. Holliday, 235 Ark. 744, 361 S.W.2d 744 (1962).
The effect of the doctrine's application is that the driver's negligence or misconduct is imputed to the passenger to bar the passenger's recovery. W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 72, at 518 (5th ed. 1984). In Neal v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 305 Ark. 97, 805 S.W.2d 643 (1991), this court explained that the proper query for joint enterprise is whether there is enough evidence to show "an equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other in respect to the common object and purpose of the undertaking." Id.; see also Woodard, supra. In the case now before us, both Yant and Woods agree that they were involved in a common object and purpose — that is, to obtain a rental car for the return trip to Arkansas. It is only the second requirement that is contested in this case. Thus, we must determine whether Woods and Yant showed an equal right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other on their trip home.
Many of this court's cases dealing with joint-enterprise issues have relied on Prosser and Keeton for guidance. The Woodard case, in particular, quoted the treatise extensively as follows:
The prevailing view is that a joint enterprise requires something beyond the mere association of the parties for a common end, to show a mutual "right of control" over the operation of the vehicle — or in other words, an equal right in the passenger to be heard as to the manner in which it is driven. It is not the fact that he does or does not give directions which is important in itself, but rather the understanding between the parties that he has the right to have his wishes respected, to the same extent as the driver. In the absence of circumstances indicating such an understanding, it has been held that . . . fellow servants in the course of...
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