Yarborough v. King

• Decision Date: 03 October 2011
• Docket Number: C/A No. 2:11-2602-MBS-BHH
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Mary Helen Yarborough, Plaintiff, v. Sarah L. D. King, DHA, Director of Office of Public Relations; Raymond S. Greenberg, M.D., Ph.D., President of the Medical University of South Carolina; Practice Partners Network-McKesson, Medical University of South Carolina; MUSC Board of Trustees; Reece H. Smith, MUHA Compliance; Medical University Hospital Authority; University Medical Associates, Defendants.

Mary Helen Yarborough, Plaintiff,
v.
Sarah L. D. King, DHA, Director of Office of Public Relations;
Raymond S. Greenberg, M.D., Ph.D., President of the Medical University of South Carolina;
Practice Partners Network-McKesson, Medical University of South Carolina;
MUSC Board of Trustees; Reece H. Smith, MUHA Compliance;
Medical University Hospital Authority; University Medical Associates, Defendants.

C/A No. 2:11-2602-MBS-BHH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Dated: October 3, 2011

Report and Recommendation
Background of this Case

Plaintiff is a resident of Little River, South Carolina. She is a former employee of the Medical University of South Carolina in Charleston. Defendant King is Plaintiff's former supervisor. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have subject her to defamation, slander, invasion of privacy, coercion, fraud, collusion, harassment, internet crimes, violations of HIPPA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), perjury, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and financial distress. In her prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks (1) "Reward equivalent to lost wages and anticipated of wages [sic] based upon plaintiff's anticipated

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income based upon work history[;]" (2) "Lost retirement/pension based upon employment and anticipated employment[;]" (3) "Damages related to financial losses, harm[;]" (4) punitive damages "related to the emotional, personal, psychological and economic devastation and anticipated recovery of the defendant [sic][;]" and (5) "Cease/Desist and recorded apology of all forms of negative, fraudulent and otherwise harmful and unhelpful statements regarding plaintiff as a person, former employee, by the defendant [sic] and all associates." In a separate motion (ECF No. 5), Plaintiff also seeks a temporary restraining order to prevent threats, retaliation, and "influence of harm" for filing this case.¹

Discussion

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995)(en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978).

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This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Such pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 93 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).

Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, _ U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1953, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions"). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition or complaint to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct a plaintiff's or petitioner's legal arguments for him or her, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or "conjure up questions never squarely presented" to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

Generally, a case can be originally filed in a federal district court if there is diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 or there if there is so-called "federal question" jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,

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"constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute." In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, "and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears." Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352.

"[T]he facts providing the court jurisdiction must be affirmatively alleged in the complaint." Davis v. Pak, 856 F.2d 648, 650 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936)). To this end, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide "a short plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends[.]" If, however, the complaint does not contain "an affirmative pleading of a jurisdictional basis, the federal court may find that it has jurisdiction if the facts supporting jurisdiction have been clearly pleaded." Pinkley, Inc., 191 F.3d at 399 (citing 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 8.03[3] (3rd edition 1997)).

Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999). If the court, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, finds insufficient allegations in the pleadings, the court will lack subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

The Medical University of South Carolina and its Board of Trustees are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, which divests this court of jurisdiction to entertain a

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suit brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts, such as a state agency or department. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (although express language of Eleventh Amendment only forbids suits by citizens of other States against a State, Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State filed by its own citizens); Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110 (4th Cir. 2009); Belcher v. South Carolina Board of Corrections, 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-809 (D.S.C. 1978); and Simmons v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 195 F. Supp. 516, 517 (E.D.S.C. 1961).

State-funded and state-governed colleges and universities are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Clemson University v. W. R. Grace and Co., 1991 WL 112319 (D.S.C., June 18, 1991) (court looks into state's control over day-to-day operations to determine that Clemson University is an alter ego of the State), the Medical University of South Carolina is not a "person" subject to suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Cady v. SUNY Cortland, 2000 WL 1456285 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2000) (State University of New York at Cortland and its campus police department immune from suit under Eleventh Amendment); and Maryland Stadium Authority v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2005).

In the...