Yarde v. Roberts

Decision Date15 December 2017
Docket Number4072–17
Parties In the Matter of the Application of Shanell YARDE, on behalf of herself and as next Friend of her minor niece, A.W.B., Petitioner–Plaintiff, v. Samuel D. ROBERTS, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, and Theresa Beaudoin, as Commissioner of the Rensselaer County Department of Social Services, Respondents–Defendants.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

EMPIRE JUSTICE CENTER, Susan Antos, Esq., and Saima A. Akhtar, Esq., Of Counsel, 119 Washington Avenue, 3rd Floor, Albany, New York 12210, Attorneys for Petitioner

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, Attorney General of the State of New York, Kyle W. Sturgess, AAG, Of Counsel, The Capitol, Albany, New York 12224–0341, Attorneys for Respondent Samuel D. Roberts

STEPHEN A. PECHENIK, Rensselaer County Attorney, Christina F. Arriaga, Esq., Of Counsel, 1600 Seventh Avenue, Troy, New York 12180, Attorneys for Respondent Theresa Beaudoin

L. Michael Mackey, J.

Petitioner-plaintiff Shanell Yarde ("petitioner") brings this hybrid Article 78 and declaratory judgment proceeding to annul an administrative decision issued by respondent-defendant Samuel Roberts as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA") denying certain benefits following a "fair hearing." Petitioner also seeks a declaration that respondent-defendant Theresa Beaudoin, as Commissioner of the Rensselaer County Department of Social Services ("DSS"), employs practices that violate statutory and regulatory mandates for responding to inquiries about, and determining eligibility for, certain public assistance programs. Petitioner also seeks to "permanently enjoin" DSS to act in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations and to train its staff to adhere to applicable state procedures, together with costs and legal fees related to this proceeding. OTDA and DSS have answered the petition, opposed all demanded relief and moved for summary judgment dismissing the declaratory judgment action.

This case arises from petitioner's request for certain public assistance benefits on behalf of her minor niece, for whom petitioner has been caring since 2014. Petitioner was granted primary physical custody of her niece by Albany County Family Court on February 10, 2015. In 2015, petitioner was already a recipient of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) administered by DSS. Shortly after petitioner was granted custody of her niece, she telephoned DSS to "add" her niece to her "SNAP case" and "get any kind of assistance" available for her niece. DSS instructed petitioner to visit its office to complete an application. On June 29, 2015, petitioner visited the DSS office and provided her SNAP caseworker with the custody order. On that date, petitioner explained to the DSS representative that she had been caring for her sister's child and needed to get any available assistance for her. DSS conducted a July, 2015 telephone recertification interview with petitioner concerning SNAP benefits; petitioner claims that she specifically asked the caseworker if there were other benefits available for her niece and that she was erroneously advised that the food stamp benefit under SNAP was the only additional available benefit. DSS "added" petitioner's niece to the SNAP benefits and petitioner began receiving SNAP benefits for her niece in addition to SNAP benefits she already received for herself and her three children.

Petitioner completed classes required to become a certified foster care provider for her niece in the mistaken belief that doing so would allow her to obtain additional financial assistance to provide for her niece, and she ultimately was certified as a foster care provider. In January 2017, another DSS representative told petitioner that while she was ineligible for financial assistance through foster care due to her pre-existing custody of her niece, she was eligible for an "other than grantee" ("OTG") public assistance grant1 . On January 25, 2017, petitioner returned to the DSS office and specifically requested an OTG grant for her niece, after which she was provided an application for public assistance on behalf of her niece for the first time. Petitioner completed the public assistance application to obtain an OTG grant and submitted it to DSS on January 27, 2017. She also requested a "fair hearing" to seek retroactive benefits on behalf of her niece based upon her previous requests to DSS for financial assistance to defray costs associated with caring for her niece. The OTG grant was approved in response to the January 2017 application.

On February 22, 2017, a "fair hearing" was held before an OTDA representative who received testimony from petitioner and a DSS senior welfare examiner. In relevant part, the DSS representative testified at the hearing that caseworkers do not advise social services applicants or recipients about programs or benefits for which they may be eligible, instead relying upon the applicant or recipient to specify which program or benefit they seek. The same witness testified that DSS did not make client information pamphlets concerning benefits (including the OTG grant) readily available in the client waiting room at the DSS office because doing so created a "mess."

In the decision after fair hearing dated February 28, 2017, the commissioner's representative made various factual findings that are material to disposition of this proceeding. In relevant part, the administrative decision confirmed the chronology of petitioner's request for assistance, beginning with petitioner's telephone contact with DSS requesting that her niece be added to her SNAP case together with "any other assistance" that she could get from DSS for her niece. The decision also credited petitioner's claim that she consistently asked for "any other assistance" that she could get from DSS to meet the needs of her 2–year–old niece during her interactions with DSS in July 2015. The decision also found that although petitioner was not legally responsible for her niece, she had nonetheless supported her between February, 2015 and January 2017, when a private advocacy agency advised her that an OTG public assistance grant was available for her niece. Ultimately, the commissioner's decision found that while DSS violated regulations requiring its representatives to affirmatively and proactively advise applicants and recipients of benefits and programs for which they may be eligible, regulations did not authorize any retroactive award of benefits such as the OTG grant for which petitioner was eligible as of July 2015 when she met with an agency representative after obtaining custody of her niece. Together with declaratory and injunctive relief, petitioner now seeks judicial review of this administrative determination.

Standard of review

The judicial standard of review of administrative determinations pursuant to CPLR Article 78 is whether the determination is arbitrary and capricious, and a reviewing court is therefore restricted to an assessment of whether the action in question was taken "without sound basis in reason and ... without regard to the facts." Matter of Pell v. Board of Education , 34 N.Y.2d 222, 356 N.Y.S.2d 833, 313 N.E.2d 321 (1974). The test usually applied in deciding whether a determination is arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion is whether the determination has a rational or adequate basis. Matter of Peckham v. Calogero , 12 N.Y.3d 424, 883 N.Y.S.2d 751, 911 N.E.2d 813 (2009). The reviewing court in a proceeding pursuant to Article 78 will not substitute its judgment for that of the agency unless it clearly appears to be arbitrary, capricious or contrary to the law. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Gibraltar Cas. Co. , 90 N.Y.2d 507, 663 N.Y.S.2d 133, 685 N.E.2d 1214 (1997). However, "an agency determination arrived at in a manner inconsistent with its own regulations is not supported by a rational basis." Mid Island Therapy Associates, LLC v. New York State Educ. Dept. , 129 A.D.3d 1173, 10 N.Y.S.3d 688 (3d Dep't 2015) (citations omitted).

Analysis

The state must provide adequately for individuals and families who lack sufficient funds to support themselves and provide such services as far as possible to ensure that families remain together and do not become separated for reasons of poverty alone. N.Y. Constitution, Article 17, § 1 ; Social Services Law § 131(1), (3). OTDA administers two cash assistance programs, Family Assistance and Safety Net Assistance, which were created by the Legislature. Social Services Law §§ 158, 349. OTDA, in turn, delegates to local social services districts such as DSS the obligation to provide assistance and care for any person unable to provide for himself, subject to reimbursement. Social Services Law §§ 62(1), 131(1). Local social services districts are further required to "make available through the district's website or by other means information for relatives caring for children outside the foster care system" including information about "child only grants" and how to apply for them, as well as information regarding resources for relative caregivers. Social Services Law § 392(2), (3).

Various regulations define the rights and obligations of public assistance applicants and the agencies that administer the programs. Applicants for public assistance are entitled to apply for cash assistance that they believe will meet their needs. 18 NYCRR 350.3(a)(1). Each inquiry received by DSS shall be answered promptly and where the requested information is not available, the inquiry must be acknowledged and referred to the appropriate source for reply. 18 NYCRR 356.2(a). Each person who inquires about or applies for public assistance or care must be given information by the social services district about the eligibility requirements, method of computing a public assistance grant or determining eligibility for care, and...

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4 cases
  • Giardini v. Keshtgar
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term
    • 28. Juni 2018
    ...of action against a former landlord for the return of a security deposit prior to the time stipulated for the security deposit's return. 79 N.Y.S.3d 462Consequently, plaintiffs' motion was properly denied and the branch of defendant's cross motion seeking to dismiss the complaint was proper......
  • Torres v. Roberts
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • 23. April 2019
    ...[citations omitted] ). Thus, proceeding on an Article 78 may make the declaratory relief "duplicative and unnecessary" ( Yarde v. Roberts , 60 Misc 3d 686, 695 [Sup Ct, Albany Cty 2017] ). Here, the only thing at stake for this petitioner is the retroactive payments of benefits; there is no......
  • Goyer v. Roberts
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • 22. April 2019
    ...[citations omitted] ). Thus, proceeding on an Article 78 may make the declaratory relief "duplicative and unnecessary" ( Yarde v. Roberts , 60 Misc 3d 686, 695 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2017] ). Here, the only thing at stake for this petitioner is the retroactive payments of benefits; there is......
  • Amankwah v. Dep't of Educ. of N.Y.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • 10. April 2019
    ...submit affidavits and other written proof to explain or shed light on the contents of the administrative record (see Matter of Yarde v Roberts, 60 Misc 3d 686, 694 n 3 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2017]). Where, as here, an administrative determination is made, and there is no statutory requireme......

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