Yardley v. Cnty. of Imperial, D064757
| Decision Date | 15 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | D064757 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | RAY ALAN YARDLEY, et al. Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF IMPERIAL, Defendant and Respondent. |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. Nos. ECU04902, ECU04959, ECU05024, ECU05033)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Jeffrey B. Jones, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Reed Smith, Margaret M. Grignon, Paul D. Fogel and Kasey J. Curtis; Law Offices of C. Ray Carlson, C. Ray Carlson and Jennifer B. Smith; Alder Law, C. Michael Alder, Stephen K. McElroy and Jennifer Burke, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
The Viviano Law Firm and Charles A. Viviano, for Defendant and Respondent.
This case arises from an automobile accident in Imperial County (County) in which a semi tractor-trailer collided with a second vehicle carrying six people. In the second vehicle, three people were killed and three sustained serious injuries. Thesurvivors and the children of those killed in the second vehicle (collectively plaintiffs) brought actions against several defendants, including the County. Those actions were later consolidated. Plaintiffs alleged two causes of action against the County: (1) negligence; and (2) dangerous condition of public property (Gov. Code,1 § 835).
On the eve of trial, the court sua sponte raised the issue whether plaintiffs had a viable legal basis for recovering against the County. This triggered a series of procedural moves, which resulted in the parties agreeing plaintiffs' counsel would make an offer of proof and the court would rule on the County's nonsuit motion. After the parties had the opportunity to brief the issues and plaintiffs' counsel made an offer of proof, the court granted the nonsuit motion on both causes of action, and entered judgment in the County's favor.
Plaintiffs appeal. We determine the court erred in granting the County's nonsuit motion on the dangerous condition cause of action (§ 835), but the court properly entered judgment in the County's favor on the negligence cause of action. We remand for further proceedings on the dangerous condition claim.
Our factual summary is based solely on plaintiffs' offer of proof. For purposes of this opinion, we assume the truth of the stated facts and all reasonable inferences fromthose facts. (See Cooper v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 876, 891 (Cooper).)
The traffic collision occurred at the intersection of Shank Road (a County road) and Highway 115 (a state highway). Shank Road runs east-west. Highway 115 runs north-south. Shank Road has a 55-miles-per-hour speed limit, and Highway 115 has a 65-miles-per-hour speed limit.
Shortly before the accident, three couples (plaintiffs or plaintiffs' parents) were in a vehicle traveling south on Highway 115 toward Shank Road. At the same time, Cordell Perkins was traveling eastbound on Shank Road toward Highway 115. The drivers of both vehicles were driving at or just below the speed limit.
There are no traffic controls for Highway 115 drivers at the Shank Road intersection. Shank Road has a stop sign for eastbound drivers just before Highway 115. However, within a day or two of the collision, this stop sign had fallen or otherwise become broken, and an unidentified person reattached the sign to a three- or four-foot post with bailing twine. By the morning of the accident, the face of the stop sign had turned so it was facing southbound motorists on Highway 115, rather than eastbound motorists on Shank Road. The stop sign thus made it appear to eastbound motorists on Shank Road that they had the right of way and did not need to stop.
About one hour before the collision, at about 6:40 a.m., Imperial County Deputy Sheriff Moises Badena was on duty in his patrol vehicle and discovered the damaged and misdirected stop sign. While seated in his vehicle, he radioed his dispatcher about the problem, and then left the scene without taking any action to warn drivers on the tworoads. Badena had flares and other warning and safety equipment in his vehicle, but after reporting the problem, he did not deploy this equipment and instead returned to the station, completed paperwork, and went off duty.
At 6:48 a.m., the sheriff's dispatcher called the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to inform the agency about the misdirected stop sign. The CHP assigned CHP Officer Robert Gonzalez to travel to and secure the intersection. Officer Gonzalez left the CHP station shortly after. At 7:15 a.m. the sign maintenance unit was called.
About 20 minutes later—before Officer Gonzalez or the sign maintenance employee reached the scene—Perkins (who was unfamiliar with the area) was driving his truck on Shank Road eastbound approaching Highway 115. He briefly noticed the stop sign on the side of the road, but saw that it faced toward southbound drivers and made a "split second" decision that it applied to Highway 115 motorists. By the time he saw the limit line on the pavement, he was unable to stop. His truck entered the intersection and crashed into plaintiffs' vehicle. The driver, Roger Cox, and two others in the front seat of the vehicle (Cox's wife, Arda Cox, and Ray Yardley) were seriously injured. The three passengers sitting in the back seat (Ray's wife, April Yardley, and another couple, Colleen and Randall Bradshaw) were killed.
CHP officer Gonzalez received a radio call about the collision while he was driving to secure the intersection. About 10 minutes after the accident, Caltrans road maintenance workers arrived and repaired the sign. Officer Gonzalez concluded that if he had seen the defective stop sign earlier, he would have stayed on the scene with his emergency lights activated until it had been repaired.
On the day of the accident, Deputy Badena's responsibilities included patrolling a designated area of the County, preventing traffic accidents and providing assistance to the motoring public. He had received the standard Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) required of all California peace officers. The POST guidelines provide that when a peace officer encounters a damaged or malfunctioning sign (like the one at issue here) the officer should assess the hazard and deploy " 'appropriate warning devices, such as patrol vehicle emergency lights, flare patterns, cones, portable stop signs . . . .' " The initial responding officer " "
Deputy Badena violated these guidelines. Although his patrol car was equipped with emergency flashing lights, emergency flares, and orange safety cones, he did not remain at the scene or deploy this equipment. Instead, he radioed the sheriff's dispatcher about the misdirected stop sign and then left. Plaintiffs' expert on police conduct and training would testify that a law enforcement officer under these circumstances should and could have taken steps to secure the intersection to make it safe until the sign could be repaired.
The County owns Shank Road and the State of California (State) owns Highway 115. Generally, the State owns an intersection if it owns at least one of the intersectingstreets. The State owns the defective stop sign, and was responsible for maintaining it. However, the stop sign was located on property owned by the County, and therefore the State was required to obtain the County's permission and consent to place the sign on the property.
Plaintiffs' amended consolidated complaints against the County alleged two causes of action: (1) dangerous condition of public property (§ 835); and (2) negligence based on a vicarious liability theory.2 Although the County did not file any dispositive pretrial motions, in ruling on the in limine motions, the court sua sponte questioned whether the County owed plaintiffs a duty under the alleged factual circumstances and/or whether the facts supported plaintiffs' claim that the County was liable for a dangerous condition based on Deputy Badena's knowledge of the defective sign.
The court and parties then engaged in a series of procedural steps, leading to an agreement that plaintiffs would provide an offer of proof, and the County would move for a nonsuit.3 On the day scheduled for the offer of proof, the court orally raised additional issues based on its own independent research, including whether the County could beheld liable if the facts showed the State owned and maintained the stop sign and the accident occurred at the State-controlled intersection.
Immediately following this discussion, plaintiffs' counsel presented an offer of proof based on the facts summarized above. After considering these facts and allowing the parties to brief the issues, the court granted a nonsuit on both of plaintiffs' claims (negligence and section 835 dangerous condition) and entered judgment in the County's favor. The court identified numerous grounds for its ruling, but we need not detail those grounds here. Under the applicable de novo standard, we review the court's conclusion, and not its reasoning or rationale. (See County of Orange v. Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 21, 32.)
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