Yates Real Estate, Inc. v. Plainfield Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, Civ. No. 18-12700-KM-CLW

• Decision Date: 23 January 2020
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 18-12700-KM-CLW
• Parties: YATES REAL ESTATE, INC.; Yates House for Military Veterans, Inc.; and John and Jane Doe, Plaintiffs, v. PLAINFIELD ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT; City of Plainfield, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

435 F.Supp.3d 626

YATES REAL ESTATE, INC.; Yates House for Military Veterans, Inc.; and John and Jane Doe, Plaintiffs,

v.PLAINFIELD ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT; City of Plainfield, Defendants.

Civ. No. 18-12700-KM-CLW

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed January 23, 2020

Steven C. Rother, Post, Polak, Goodsell, Macneil, & Strauchler, P.A., Roseland, NJ, for Plaintiffs.

Peter Anthony Vignuolo, Clarkin & Vignuolo, P.C., Milltown, NJ, John F. Gillick, Rainone Coughlin Minchello, LLC, Iselin, NJ, for Defendants.

Kevin McNulty, United States District Judge

I have entered an order and opinion denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Defendants, the Plainfield Zoning Board of Adjustment ("Board") and the City of Plainfield ("City"), seek to convert that ruling into a grant of summary judgment in their favor. (DE 30). The plaintiffs, Yates Real Estate, Inc. ("Yates RE") and Yates House for Military Veterans, Inc. ("Yates House"), oppose the conversion. (I will distinguish between the plaintiffs as necessary, but otherwise refer to them collectively as "Yates." Where applicable, I refer to Andre Yates, principal of Yates House, as "Mr. Yates.")

In 2017, Yates filed an application with the Board for thirty-eight variances and thirty-three waivers to permit it to develop a 25-unit apartment complex in the City’s Van Wyck Brooks Historic District. To do so, Yates required use, density, height, and bulk variances, as well as design waivers. Yates purchased the property in 2012, knowing that the property was in the historic district and was zoned for residential use.

Between October 4, 2017 and June 6, 2018, the Board held six days of hearings on Yates’s application (the "Hearing"). It was midway through the Hearing that Yates first agreed to deed-restrict the property to military veterans. Yates proffered that homeless veterans frequently suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

("PTSD"), but never agreed to confine residency to veterans with PTSD. Yates argued, however, that because the building was likely to service PTSD sufferers, several federal civil rights statutes mandated that Yates’s application be granted as a reasonable accommodation.

By way of resolution dated August 1, 2018, the Board denied the application. It found that the requested variances would violate not only historic-preservation provisions as such, but also basic regulations (e.g. , minimum square footage of units, storage space, parking) that would apply generally to any apartment building.

On August 13, 2018, Yates filed this action against the Board and City, alleging that the denial of its application violated (1) the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"); (2) the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (3) the Rehabilitation Act; and (4) the New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law ("MLUL"). For current purposes, the analysis would be similar under any of the three federal statutes.

In seeking the preliminary injunction, Yates requested that this Court effectively grant its zoning application so that permits could be issued and renovations could begin at the subject property. (DE 8). The Court filed an opinion denying the request for a preliminary injunction (DE 26, the "Prior Opinion").

Counsel, on behalf of Defendants, then requested by letter that the Prior Opinion be converted into an order granting summary judgment. (DE 30). Counsel for Plaintiffs opposed that request. (DE 31). Recognizing that Plaintiffs were entitled to an opportunity to respond to the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Prior Opinion, I issued an order to show cause in writing why the Prior Opinion should not be converted into a ruling granting summary judgment to the Defendants. (DE 32). Both parties filed briefs in accordance with this order. (DE 33, DE 35). For the reasons set forth below, I now find that the Prior Opinion ought to be converted into an opinion granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

I. Background¹

The relevant facts were laid out at length in the Prior Opinion and are incorporated by reference herein. (Pr. Op. 3-26).

The order requesting that the Plaintiffs show cause why the Prior Opinion should not be converted was entered as a memorandum and procedural order on September 25, 2019. (DE 32). Plaintiffs were given 30 days to file a brief not to exceed 25 pages. (Id .). Within 21 days thereafter, Defendants were given the opportunity to file a responding brief not to exceed 25 pages. (Id .). Both parties were ordered to assume that the Court "is familiar with the arguments made for and against preliminary injunctive relief" and not to "repeat them unnecessarily." (Id .). Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to the conversion of the court’s opinion on October 25, 2019 (DE 33) and Defendants filed a further brief in support on November 15, 2019 (DE 35).

II. Standards

A. Conversion to Summary Judgment

The standards that applied to the court’s preliminary injunction decision are well settled: (1) likely success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) balance of harms; and (4) the public interest. (See Pr. Op. 27.)

While it is possible to consider a preliminary injunction hearing to be tantamount to a hearing on summary judgment or even a trial on the merits, it is not always appropriate to equate them. See, e.g. , Resorts Intern., Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc. , 830 F. Supp. 826, 829 (D.N.J. 1992) (declining to consolidate a preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits "because of suspicions that more evidence on liability might be forthcoming"). In the memorandum accompanying my order to show cause (DE 32), I quoted an outline of the legal standard governing the conversion issue:

Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "empowers district courts to grant preliminary injunctions." Doe v. Banos , 713 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410 (D.N.J.), aff’d , 416 F. App'x 185 (3d Cir. 2010). "Because the scope and procedural posture of a hearing for a preliminary injunction is significantly different from a trial on the merits ... ‘it is generally inappropriate for a federal court at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the merits.’ " Anderson v. Davila , 125 F.3d 148, 157 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch , 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S. Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981) ). In appropriate circumstances, however, Rule 65(a)(2) provides a district court with the discretion to "advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the [preliminary injunction] hearing." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). A district court may also convert a decision on a preliminary injunction application into a final disposition on the merits by granting summary judgment as long as sufficient notice is provided pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SeeKrebs v. Rutgers , 797 F. Supp. 1246, 1253 (D.N.J. 1992) ; Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. , 898 F.2d 1393, 1397 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1990) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).

Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).....

The Third Circuit has held, in accordance with principles of due process, that a district court should give the parties notice of its intent prior to entering summary judgment sua sponte. SeeAnderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp. , 621 F.3d 261, 280 (3d Cir. 2010). Notice is sufficient, however, "when ‘the targeted party had reason to believe the court might reach the issue and received a fair opportunity to put its best foot forward.’ " Zimmerlink v. Zapotsky , 539 Fed.Appx. 45, 49 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Gibson v. Mayor & Council of City of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding no notice is required if there is a fully developed record, a lack of prejudice to the parties, and a decision on a purely legal issue)). "Even if a court fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f), however, any such error ‘may be excused if the failure was a harmless error.’ " Zimmerlink, 539 F. App'x at 49 (quoting Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989) ).

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie , 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 496–97 (D.N.J. 2014).²

B. Review of Zoning Board decision

Regarding the proper scope of review of a zoning board decision, the Third Circuit has held that "courts hearing reasonable accommodations challenges should ordinarily limit their review to the administrative record." Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Tp. of Scotch Plains , 284 F.3d 442, 451 (3d Cir. 2002). Importantly, "[t]his rule permits local land use boards to have the initial opportunity to provide reasonable accommodations to facilitate housing for the handicapped; it also comports with the tradition in American law that land use decisions are quintessentially local in nature." Id. (citing FERC v. Mississippi , 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30, 102 S. Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) ("Regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity.")); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas , 416 U.S. 1, 13, 94 S. Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that zoning "may indeed be the most essential function performed by local government").

Limiting the federal court’s review in this manner "compels plaintiffs to ‘present all of the evidence they have that would justify why an accommodation is necessary ... to the local land-use board.’ " Barnabei v. Chadds Ford Twp. , 125 F. Supp. 3d 515, 519-20 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Lapid-Laurel , 284 F.3d at 451 ). Moreover, "if plaintiffs fail to do so, they will be prohibited from introducing evidence in support of their FHA claims in federal court." Id. This framework further ensures that municipalities are not held liable for refusing to grant an accommodation where "those municipalities ‘never knew the accommodation[s] ...