Yates v. United States, 13541.

• Decision Date: 16 January 1956
• Docket Number: No. 13541.,13541.
• Citation: 227 F.2d 851
• Parties: Oleta O'Connor YATES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

227 F.2d 851 (1955)

Oleta O'Connor YATES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

No. 13541.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

July 26, 1955.

Rehearing Denied November 2, 1955.

Writ of Certiorari Granted January 16, 1956.

Margolis, McTernan & Branton, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellants.

Gladstein, Andersen & Leonard, San Francisco, Cal., Robert W. Kenny, Daniel Marshall, Los Angeles, Cal., amici curiæ.

Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty., Norman W. Neukom, Los Angeles, Cal., Lawrence K. Bailey, Washington, D. C., Ray H. Kinnison, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.

Before STEPHENS, FEE and CHAMBERS, Circuit Judges.

Writ of Certiorari Granted January 16, 1956. See 76 S.Ct. 322.

JAMES ALGER FEE, Circuit Judge.

On July 8, 1952, an order, judgment and certificate of criminal contempt was entered as to Oleta O'Connor Yates upon eleven specifications of refusal to respond to questions put to her on cross-examination after a direction by the court while she was a witness in the trial of the case entitled on the records of that court United States v. Schneiderman, No. 22,131-C.D, D.C., 106 F.Supp. 941. This certificate recited these refusals "were committed in the actual presence of the Court and were seen or heard by the Court."

After the sentence of five years in the principal case was imposed upon Mrs. Yates on August 7, 1952, in the main case in which she was a defendant, Yates v. United States, 9 Cir., 225 F.2d 146, she was in custody thereunder, together with the other convicted defendants. The court held a hearing on August 8, 1952, at which she was present, personally, and was represented by counsel. Based upon the "order, judgment and certificate of criminal contempt" of July 8 under 18 U.S.C.A. § 401, hereinabove referred to, the court adjudged Mrs. Yates had been convicted of eleven separate criminal contempts therein set out. The defendant was thereupon committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States for one year for each of such contempts. These sentences were made to run concurrently with each other, but all were made to take effect upon the release of defendant from custody following execution of the five year sentence of imprisonment imposed August 7, 1952, upon this defendant in Case No. 22,131, United States v. Schneiderman.

Appeal was taken from this judgment of criminal contempt on August 13, 1952.

The proceedings of the court were fair and in accordance with the precedents. There was due process at every stage. When the matter came on for hearing the day after sentence in the main case, the court had power to impose appropriate sentence for the contempts specified in the order of July 8.

There was a lapse of time between the commission of the disobedience of the order in open court and the entry of the judgment establishing each refusal as a criminal contempt on July 8 and the entry of sentence on each of the contempts on August 8. It is now well established practice for the trial judge to reserve punishment of contempts by participants in a criminal trial. The dangers surrounding such procedure are not legal in nature, but arise in policy. None was apparent here.

A point was made in the trial court that, since defendant was in custody after June 26, when she was committed, until she had given answer to four questions which were propounded to her upon that date, the time so spent should have been applied in mitigation of this punitive sentence. But that measure applied only to the four questions, as noted above, propounded on that date. These eleven questions, each of which was propounded upon June 30, constitute incidents separate and distinct from the first four. Furthermore, verdicts of guilty were returned in the main case against Mrs. Yates and the other defendants on August 6, and she was held in jail on that charge pending sentence. The custody on the first contempt charge ended with the discharge of the jury. Neither the coercive custody on the first contempt charge nor yet confinement after verdict upon the main charge was relevant to the criminal sentences here.

The main contention of defendant is that, when this punitive sentence was imposed, it was no longer possible for defendant to purge herself because the trial had ended and that it is improper for the court to use criminal contempt as a coercive rather than a punitive proceeding.

While it is true the court did speak of his disposition to release the defendant from the adjudication of contempt on these specifications in the event she bowed to the authority of the court, this was a suggestion of grace. It must be clearly recognized that it was no longer possible for the situation to be restored so that she could testify. In another proceeding as to other contempts, the trial judge indicated his opinion that he had power to imprison defendant until the questions there were answered. In this proceeding, there was no attempt at coercion to require the answers.

The persistent and recalcitrant refusal to bow to the authority of the august tribunal, even when offered grace after the trial was over, is highly illuminating.

The next contention of defendant takes color therefrom. Defendant, notwithstanding her defiance of the orders of the court and her refusal of grace, insists that the sentence of one year is excessive and arbitrary, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is a denial of due process of law in violation of the Eighth and Fifth Amendments to the federal Constitution.

The defendant had been committed for coercive purposes on June 26 to compel her answers to certain questions. Four days later, while still in custody and still under cross-examination, she committed the contempts certified in this case by refusal to answer other questions. The trial judge found from her own statement in open court on the day of sentence that "she is as adamant now as she was the day the questions were put."

The processes of justice require that all witnesses in a criminal case should obey the legal orders of the court. These processes cannot function without evidence adduced by legitimate questions and answers...