Yaun v. Baldridge, 18150
| Decision Date | 03 January 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 18150,18150 |
| Citation | 134 S.E.2d 248,243 S.C. 414 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Fred N. YAUN, Respondent, v. Glenn W. BALDRIDGE and Dorothy Busbee, Appellants. Linda Y. BALDRIDGE, by her Guardian ad Litem, Fred N. Yaun, Respondent, v. Glenn W. BALDRIDGE and Dorothy Busbee, Appellants. |
Henderson, Salley & Cushman, Aiken, for appellants.
Lybrand, Simons & Rich, Aiken, for respondents.
These two appeals arise out of an automobile accident. Glenn W. Baldridge, the defendant, was the driver, and Linda Yaun was his guest passenger. Both were teenagers and had been going together for several years. They were married about two months after the accident. Linda Yaun Baldridge sued her husband for damages for her personal injuries and her father sued him for medical expenses, etc. Both recovered judgments and he has appealed. The appeals involve identical issues which will be resolved in both by our disposition of the appeal in the personal injury action.
The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict under the guest statute, Sec. 46-801, Code of 1962, and complains of error in the charge.
Plaintiff's serious injuries were sustained when the automobile being driven by the defendant veered to the right of the highway, traveled for about fifty feet on a narrow, dirt shoulder and struck a tree. There were no brake marks and no physical evidence of an attempt to control the direction of travel. The tire tracks left the highway at an angle and were straight to the point of impact. No other traffic or obstacle on the highway was involved.
These undisputed facts, standing alone, are susceptible of either of two inferences: (1) That the defendant deliberately brought about the collision; or (2) that the defendant exercised no control over the movement of the automobile just prior to the collision. Either inference inculpates him and calls for a reasonable explanation. This is attempted by the answer, which alleges that defendant was operating the automobile in a careful and prudent manner when the plaintiff fainted and started to fall forward, whereupon it became necessary for defendant to 'reach over and catch her to prevent her falling against the dash, * * * and also to refrain from applying the brakes and suddenly stopping the automobile; however, he was unable to successfully hold and protect her and prevent the automobile from leaving the road and striking the tree in question.'
The accident occurred on a winding paved highway with narrow unkept dirt shoulders and trees growing close to the paved surface in places. The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour.
In support of his answer, the defendant testified that as he drove along the roadway at 30 miles per hour or 'a little faster,' his companion, who was seated well to his right, became unresponsive. He looked at her and 'saw her head falling (he) reached out to grab her and felt something pull the wheelafter a few seconds.' He looked up for the first time since his attention had been withdrawn from the road and saw the tree immediately in front of him. He testified that the shoulder at the point where the car left the road was practically level and that the wheel action to which he referred was caused by a dip in the shoulder near the tree. He 'didn't know (he) was off the road until (he) got just about to the tree.' And, of course, he did not know how far the car traveled on the paved surface while he was not looking at the road. In reaching for plaintiff with his right hand, he slid over toward her side of the seat. When asked why he had not applied the brakes, his first response was, in effect, that he had not had time and that his 'foot was actually too far from the brake * * *'; that he 'had moved over too far to reach them.'
As illuminating defendant's complete inattention to the road, we quote from his cross-examination.
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Defendant testified to no facts concerning the position of plaintiff's body in the car necessarily raising an apprehension that she would be injured if he did not rescue her. He simply stated several times that he saw her head 'falling' or 'fall forward' or 'fall over.' His testimony is consistent with the inference that she was seated in a normal position and that the motion of her head was similar to a nod.
Under the terms of Sec. 46-801, the liability of a motorist for injury to a guest is restricted to harm intentionally inflicted or caused by the driver's heedlessness and 'his reckless disregard for the rights of others.' The following definition of recklessness has been approved by this court:
'* * * 'Recklessness implies the doing of a negligent act knowingly. When a man actually acts negligently and he realizes that he is acting negligently, the law says he is reckless or willful and wanton, whichever term you prefer, they all mean the same thing, that is, the conscious failure to exercise due care." State v. Rachels, 218 S.C. 1, 8, 61 S.E.2d...
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