Yawn v. Dorchester Cnty., Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-440-MBS
| Decision Date | 17 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-440-MBS |
| Citation | 446 F.Supp.3d 41 |
| Parties | Mitch Randall YAWN and Juanita Mae Stanley d/b/a Flowertown Bee Farm and Supplies, Plaintiffs, v. DORCHESTER COUNTY; Town of Summerville; Allen Aviation, Inc. ; and Al Allen, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Michael T. Rose, Summerville, SC, W. Andrew Gowder, Jr., Pratt-Thomas Walker, Charleston, SC, for Plaintiffs.
Marshall Andrew Earhart, Roy Pearce Maybank, Maybank Law Firm, Charleston, SC, for Defendants.
This case arises as the result of an aerial mosquito spray conducted by Dorchester County, South Carolina ("Defendant") that Mitch Randall Yawn and Juanita Mae Stanley ("Plaintiffs") allege killed millions of bees on their bee farm, Flowertown Bee Farm and Supplies. On January 27, 2017, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant; the Town of Summerville, South Carolina;1 Allen Aviation, Inc.; and Al Allen2 in the Court of Common Pleas for Dorchester County, South Carolina. ECF No. 1. The case was removed to federal court on February 13, 2017. Id. In an amended complaint, filed on August 18, 2017, Plaintiffs allege violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. ECF No. 28 at 7. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the spray and subsequent death of the bees amounted to an unconstitutional Taking and that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses were violated because their property was taken without notice and opportunity to object. Id. at 7-9. Plaintiffs bring their federal Constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also bring state constitutional claims under South Carolina Constitution Article I, §§ 13, 22, the Takings Clause; and Article I, § 2, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 9-11. Plaintiffs also bring claims of negligence, trespass, and strict liability under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. Id. at 11-13.
On December 16, 2019, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 101. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to properly state a § 1983 claim. Additionally, Defendant argues that in the event a § 1983 claim was properly alleged, its actions did not violate the constitution. Defendant did not address the state law claims in its motion. Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition on January 14, 2020. ECF No. 105. A hearing was held on Defendant's motion on February 26, 2020. ECF No. 112.
In 2016, Defendant received numerous calls from concerned citizens asking Defendant to take action to combat the growing number of mosquitoes in the area, which can transmit the zika virus to humans. ECF No. 101-1 at 10. Officials working for Defendant determined that the usual method to control mosquito populations, spraying with a truck, would not allow mosquito killing agents to reach all areas with mosquito populations. Id. at 9. Therefore, Defendant hired Allen Aviation to perform various aerial sprays of a mosquito killing agent. ECF No. 28 at 5. Defendant states that the purpose of the aerial spray was to stop the spread of the zika virus. ECF No. 101-2 at 35. The zika virus was a serious health concern in 2016.3 At the time of the spray, there were confirmed cases of the zika virus in South Carolina. Id. at 35-36. Clayton Gaskins ("Gaskins"), the Mosquito Abatement Coordinator for Defendant, coordinated the aerial sprays. ECF No. 101-1 at 3. Tracey Langley, the public information officer for Defendant, placed notices about the first aerial spray with numerous television news channels and in Charleston, South Carolina's Post and Courier newspaper. Id. at 11-12. Gaskins also made a courtesy call to various beekeepers to inform them that an aerial spray was to take place, in order to give beekeepers further opportunity to protect their bees from the chemicals. Id. at 5. Gaskins admitted that he made a mistake and did not call Plaintiffs on this occasion. Id. at 16. Plaintiffs did not take any precautions to protect their bees. The aerial spray occurred on August 28, 2016, which Plaintiffs allege resulted in the killing of millions of Plaintiffs' bees. ECF No. 28 at 5.
The court shall grant summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(a). The moving party will be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law if the "nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Accordingly, "[o]ne of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses." Id. at 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party must initially show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant has made this showing, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A "mere scintilla" of evidence is insufficient to overcome the summary judgment motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Title 42, U.S.C. § 1983 provides a vehicle through which plaintiffs can seek relief for violations of their civil rights. Section 1983 states, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Municipalities are considered "persons" under § 1983. A municipality may be sued if "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers" caused a Constitutional tort. Monell v. New York City Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The "policy which ordered an unconstitutional act can be established by a single decision by proper municipal policymakers." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484 n.11, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986).
The state's power of eminent domain allows it to take private property for public use. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution requires that the state compensate those from whom it takes property for public use, providing that "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment applies the Fifth Amendment to the states. Murr v. Wisconsin, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942, 198 L.Ed.2d 497 (2017). Often, the Takings Clause is implicated in cases where the government appropriates land or other real property from individuals. However, the Takings Clause also applies to cases where the government appropriates personal property.
Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427, 192 L.Ed.2d 388 (2015) (). The test to determine if the Takings Clause was violated requires a reviewing court to determine if there was a Taking, and then whether such a Taking " ‘deprives the owner of all economically valuable use’ of the item taken." Id. (quoting Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (2002) ). Some courts impose an affirmative act element to Takings Clause claims. Chae Bros., LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, No. CV GLR-17-1657, 2018 WL 1583468, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2018) ()(quoting Ridge Line v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ).
The state's power of eminent domain is separate and distinct from the state's police power. The police power refers to the state's "general power of governing." Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012). Specifically, such power "extends to all matters affecting the public health or the public morals." Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818, 25 L.Ed. 1079 (1879).
The court must first determine whether Defendant, a municipality, enacted a policy that would subject it to liability under § 1983. In this case, Gaskins determined that the usual method of mosquito abatement was not effective given the growing mosquito population and the geographical limitations of truck sprays. ECF No. 101-1 at 6. Gaskins reported this information to his supervisor, Jason Ward ("Ward"), the Dorchester County Administrator. Id. at 7. Ward instructed Gaskins to contact officials in Berkeley County, South Carolina, and Charleston County, South Carolina, to inquire about aerial sprays, as those counties had conducted aerial sprays in the past. Id. Ward also contacted the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, which suggested that Defendant conduct aerial sprays. Id. at 8. With this information, Ward requested and received funding to conduct the aerial sprays from the ...
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