Yazoo City v. Lightcap

• Decision Date: 16 March 1903
• Citation: 82 Miss. 148,33 So. 949
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: YAZOO CITY v. HENRY B. LIGHTCAP

33 So. 949

82 Miss. 148

YAZOO CITY v. HENRY B. LIGHTCAP

Supreme Court of Mississippi

March 16, 1903

FROM the chancery court of Yazoo county. HON. HENRY C. CONN Chancellor.

Lightcap the appellee, was complainant in the court below, and Yazoo City, appellant, was defendant there. The object of the suit was to enjoin the issuance of municipal bonds. From a decree in complainant's favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court.

The city of Yazoo had a charter granted it before the code chapter on "Municipalities" (code 1892) was adopted, and did not come under that chapter. It amended its charter in 1901 and 1902, in pursuance of section 3039 of the code of 1892, and the amendment thereof in 1900 (acts 1900 p. 79, ch. 69). These amendments to the charter consisted in the adoption of sections 3014, 3015, 3016 and 3017 of the code, except the restrictive clause of section 3014, as to the amount of indebtedness it might incur. Under these amendments it proceeded to issue bonds for proper municipal purposes, when Lightcap filed a bill in the chancery court enjoining it from so doing. The ground alleged in the bill is that the amendments were illegal and ineffectual, because section 3039 of the code, and the act of 1900 amending it are unconstitutional and void. The bill admits that the charter was amended in strict compliance with the statute, and that the proceedings for the bond issue was in exact conformity to the charter as amended, except that complaint is made that there is no separation of the purpose for which the bonds were to be issued. This bill admits that the amount of bonds proposed to be issued is below the limit prescribed by section 3014.

Reversed and remanded.

J. A. P. Campbell, for appellant. ^[*]

Yazoo City had a charter granted by the legislature in 1884. That was before the provision for chartering municipalities otherwise than by act of legislature in each case, which was made by the code of 1892. Yazoo City did not come under the municipal chapter of that code, and, in 1901 and 1902, it amended its charter, in pursuance of section 3039 of the code, and the amendment of that section in 1900 (acts 1900, p. 79, ch. 69), by adopting as part of its charter sections 3014-3017 of the code, except the restrictive clause of section 3014 as to the amount of indebtedness it might incur. Having amended its charter, it proceeded to issue bonds for proper municipal purposes, when it was enjoined by the appellee on the ground that the amendment of its charter was illegal and ineffective, because section 3039 of the code and the act of 1900 amending it are unconstitutional and void. The bill admits that the charter was amended in strict conformity to these statutes, and that the procedure for the issuance of the bonds was in exact conformity to the amended charter, except that some complaint is made of a want of separation of the purposes for which the bonds were to be issued. While the restriction of section 3014 of the code as to the amount of indebtedness the city may incur was not included in the amendment, the bill admits that the amount of bonds proposed to be now issued is below the limit prescribed by that section. It is thus seen that the question presented by the bill, which was demurred to by Yazoo City, is as to the constitutionality of section 3039 of the code and its amendment by act of March 12, 1900 (acts 1900, p. 79, ch. 69). By section 3039, then existing municipalities, which did not come under the chapter of which the section is a part, were authorized to amend their charter, as it provides, consistently with the constitution and laws of the United States and this state, including the chapter of which section 3039 is the last. By it any amendment was required to consist with that code chapter. By the amendment of March 12, 1900, the amendment of its charter by a municipality need not consist with chapter 93 of the code, and is not expressly required to conform to the laws of the state, other than chapter 93 of the code, but that is probably implied. But no question of that sort is here involved, since the amendment of its charter by Yazoo City was not inconsistent with any law of the state. Indeed, the amendment of the charter of Yazoo City was not inconsistent with chapter 93 of the code, but consistent with it. The restrictive part of section. 3014 was not embraced in the amendment, but the restriction was not disregarded in issuing the bonds. As the action of Yazoo City, which is assailed by this bill, is not inconsistent with chapter 93 of the code, but in strict conformity to it, as to issuance of bonds, the case may be said to rest on section 3039 of the code, independently of the amendatory act of March 12, 1900, if there is any constitutional objection to the latter which does not apply to the former, though I do not think there is. The bill avers that neither section 3039 of the code, nor the amendatory act of 1900, was referred to the committee on local and private, legislation. A reference to section 89 of the constitution, with reference to which this averment is made, will at once show the frivolous nature of this assailment of these laws, which bear no resemblance to the local and private legislation contemplated by it. The real ground of the attack on section 3039 of the code and its amendment is that it was not competent for the legislature to confer on local agencies (municipalities) the power to amend their charters; that this is a delegation of legislative power, which can be exercised by the legislature alone, and cannot be delegated.

There has been a vast amount of judicial discussion on the subject, and nowhere an abler one than in Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652, where may be found all that is worth reading on the subject, taking the arguments of counsel and opinion of the court. There is no dispute of the general proposition that all legislative power is vested in the legislature, and that it cannot abdicate its appropriate function, but it is equally true that the grant to the legislature of full legislative power includes the power of committing to local agencies the power to do for the legislature what it might do. Cooley says: "The maxim that legislative power must not be delegated is to be understood in the light of the immemorial practice of this country and England, which has always recognized the policy and propriety of vesting in the municipal organization certain powers of local regulation, in respect to which the parties immediately interested may fairly be supposed more competent to judge of their needs than central authority." Cooley, Const. Lim., p. 140, note 118. Again he says: "The right of the legislature, in the entire absence of authorization or prohibition, to create towns, etc., and confer on them the right of local government, and especially of local taxation and police regulations usual with such corporations, would always pass unchallenged." Ib., pp. 228, 229, note 191. Thompson on Corporations, Vol. 1, sec. 36, says: "In the absence of constitutional restraints, no reason is perceived for holding that the legislature cannot delegate to subordinate agencies the power of creating corporations, prescribing the manner in which the power shall be exercised." I could multiply citations and quotations to the same effect, but it is needless.

Constitutions are framed with full view of existing systems and prevailing conditions, and are to be interpreted accordingly. In all the states of the United States, one of the most prominent features of government is the practice of committing to local agencies the power of local government, and perhaps nowhere has this feature been more prominent and this practice more constant than in Mississippi. From an early day the practice has been, in this state, to delegate power as to matters of local concern to those directly interested, and such exercise of power has always been sustained when questioned. Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 221; 61 Am. Dec, 508; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652; Barnes v. Pike Co., 51 Miss. 305; Schulherr v. Bordeaux, 64 Miss.,. 59; 8 South., 201; Lum v. Vicksburg, 72 Miss. 950; 18 South, 476. Municipal and other corporations were created, or authorized, and armed with power to legislate as to their internal affairs and local concerns. Ordinances and bylaws are but legislative acts performed by authority conferred by the legislature. Every corporation must have power to legislate. That is essential to its existence. Every ordinance or bylaw is a law of a limited nature, but still a law; and, therefore, every law creating, or authorizing the creation of, a corporation, may be said to be a delegation by the legislature of power to legislate, but none is so reckless as to assert that such delegation by the legislature is unconstitutional. Consider the great number and variety of agencies, besides municipalities, existing in this state, and exercising the delegated power to effect the purpose of their organization.

The code of 1857, ch. 35, prepared, under the constitution of 1832, by three great lawyers, provided for the creation of corporations by act of the persons desiring incorporation who were to prepare a charter drawn Up on parchment or paper, to contain, among other things, "the powers to be exercised," and, upon its approval by the governor, it was to be effective. This includes cities and towns. There was no general incorporation act to be adopted, but the broad power was conferred to "state the powers to be exercised." In other words, the incorporators prepared the charter to suit themselves. The validity of that act was never questioned. It was re-enacted, with some change as to the corporations which might be formed under the constitution of 1869, and is contained in the codes of 1871 and...