Yee Chuck v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. University

• Decision Date: 04 April 1960
• Docket Number: No. 18542,18542
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: YEE CHUCK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, a corporation, Woodward Clyde and Associates, Defendants and Appellants.

Page 825

3 Cal.Rptr. 825

179 Cal.App.2d 405

YEE CHUCK, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY, a corporation, Woodward Clyde and Associates, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 18542.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

April 4, 1960.

Ruffo & Chadwick, Robert S. Chadwick, San Jose, for appellant, Stanford University.

O. Vincent Bruno, Frank C. Burriesci, San Jose, for appellant, Woodward-Clyde Associates.

Philip Steiner, San Francisco, for respondent.

DUNIWAY, Justice.

Defendants appeal from a judgment against both of them, entered upon a jury verdict in an action for personal injuries, in the sum of $20,000. Defendant, the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University (Stanford), claims error in giving and refusing instructions. Defendant Woodward Clyde and Associates (Contractor) claims insufficiency of the evidence to establish any negligence on its part; that its own negligence, if any, did not cause the accident; that the negligence, if any, was that of Stanford alone; that plaintiff was, as a matter of law, a trespasser to whom it owed no affirmative duty of card; that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law; and that the damages awarded were grossly excessive as a matter of law. We find no error.

The Facts

The accident occurred on lands of Stanford now the site of its medical center, and then vacant and known as the aster beds. At the time of the accident, on March 28, 1956, the land was vacant, level, not traversed by any roads, and, while a part of the 'Stanford Farm,' located at some distance from the portions then in active use by the University. It was reasonably free of weeds, and the ground itself was readily visible. The area in question was leased, by Stanford, by written lease, to one Prentice, and by him sublet, by written sublease, to one Redetzke, both leases being then in effect. It had been used for growing asters. The growers had oral subleases from Redetzke, which had expired on December 31, 1955. It was the practice of Redetzke to lease various areas, of a few acres each, to Chinese growers, each of whom would use his area during one year, and then, in the next year, move to another area because asters could not be successfully grown on the same land in successive years. One of the growers was Walter Chuck, and plaintiff Yee Chuck was his employee. Apparently the accident occurred on adjoining land leased by Redetzke to one Sam Lock, not on that leased to Walter Chuck.

Stanford was planning to erect its medical center on the property, and all of the growers moved off in the latter part of 1955. It had been the practice each year for the growers, at the close of the growing season and usually before the end of the calendar year, to clean up the land, removing all debris, outhouses, bunkhouses, and other material left on the land. This was required by their oral subleases and by Stanford. However, because of heavy rains this was not done in 1955, and plaintiff, Sam Lock, and others had returned for this purpose, and were jointly engaged in a cleanup of the area, when the accident occurred.

In preparation for the erection of its medical center buildings, Stanford hired the Contractor to make soil tests, including test borings, in order to determine the type of foundations necessary. The Contractor was a true independent contractor, not an agent of Stanford. One of the test holes was about three feet square and over 30 feet deep. Certain tests were made while this hole was being dug, but it was not filled in thereafter because the Contractor might have further use for it--to see to what extent water would seep in, and for making further inspections and tests of the soil. The hole was completed sometime in February. One of the Contractor's employees testified that he covered it with the platform or floor of an old outhouse left there by the growers, placing a small box over a hole in the platform, and placing on it a few heavier boards, four inches or six inches by six inches, and about four feet long, and some stones, to hold it down. The platform was about three and a half feet square and light enough that one man could lift it and throw it aside. No railing was ever erected around the hole, no warning sign of flag was ever placed at or near it and nothing was done thereafter, either by the Contractor or by Stanford, to see whether the cover remained on it, or the boards and stones remained on the cover. At the time of the accident few, if any, of these weights were on the cover and it may not have been still over the hole.

Stanford had the right to terminate the Prentice and Redetzke leases, but did not do so, nor does it appear that it had permission from either of them to go on the land, either itself or through the Contractor.

On the day in question, plaintiff had picked up a few boards that were lying on the property, may have tripped on something, and fell in the hole. He did not see the hole, or any warning signs or barriers. He was severely injured. He suffered two fused vertebrae, was hospitalized for nearly six weeks, suffered severe pain, and was rendered incapable of working. He had been earning $3,000 per year plus board and room. His medical expenses were $1,138.22, and there was a prospect of further expense. He was 73 years old and had a life expectancy of over seven years.

We have stated the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all conflicts and drawing all inferences in his favor, since he obtained the verdict.

The Relationship of the Parties

A. Stanford was a trespasser.

Stanford, as owner, had no right to be upon the land without the permission of the sublessee, Redetzke. A lease gives the lessee 'the right to occupy a parcel of land to the exclusion of the grantor' (landlord). Bachenheimer v. Palm Springs, etc., Corp., 116 Cal.App.2d 580, 591, 254 P.2d 153, 159. Thus the jury could have found that, in taking possession, either itself or through the Contractor, Stanford was, as to Redetzke, a trespasser. Rest., Torts, § 329, Comment d; Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133, 148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221. It could also be found that Stanford was not a more casual trespasser, such as a hunter, fisherman, or hiker who enters on the lands of another but does not take possession, but that it had taken possession. A trespasser who takes and holds possession of another's land is, as to all the world except one having a superior right and those claiming under him, the owner, and his rights and liabilities, in relation to a third person, are those of an owner. (Rest., Torts, § 329, Comment a 1, c; Prosser, Torts, § 75, p. 427, § 76, pp. 433, 434.) However, as against those having superior rights, the possessor remains a trespasser, and his rights and liabilities, as to such persons, are those of a trespasser only, and not those of a possessor. Rest., Torts, § 329, and Comment d; § 380, and Comments c, d; § 381 and Comment b; Prosser, Torts, § 76, p. 434; cf. Hamakawa v. Crescent Wharf, etc., Co., 4 Cal.2d 499, 503, 50 P.2d 803.

B. The Contractor was subject to the same rights and duties as Stanford.

The Contractor had no greater right than Stanford, and is subject to the same liabilities on account of the condition that it created upon the land as Stanford, because it was working upon the land solely by reason of its contract with Stanford. Rest., Torts, § 383 and comments a, b; § 384 and coments a, c, e, h; Prosser, Torts, § 76, p. 434; Donahoo v. Kress House Moving Corp., 25 Cal.2d 237, 153 P.2d 349.

C. Stanford was not insulated from liability.

Stanford, on the other hand, cannot insulate itself from liability for the condition created on the land by its Contractor by claiming that the Contractor was an 'independent contractor.' Stanford would not ordinarily be liable to third persons for negligence of the Contractor in doing the work, that is, for 'active conduct,' but that is not what is here involved. Prosser, Torts, § 75, p. 432; Snyder v. Southern California Edison Co., 44 Cal.2d 793, 797, 285 P.2d 912; Oettinger v. Stewart, supra, 24 Cal.2d 133, 137-138, 148 P.2d 19.

D. Plaintiff was an invitee or business visitor.

Redetzke, as lessee, was entitled to the possession of the land. The jury could find that plaintiff was an invitee of Redetzke, there on behalf of both Sam Lock and Walter Chuck, Redetzke's former lessees, to help them carry out their legal obligation to Redetzke as his sublessees, and of Redetzke to Stanford, to clean up the land. Plaintiff was thus a business visitor as defined in the Restatement of Torts, section 332. Cf. Donahoo v. Kress House Moving Corp., supra, 25 Cal.2d 237, 242-243, 153 P.2d 349; Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc., 28 Cal.2d 394, 399, 170 P.2d 5; Oettinger v. Stewart, supra, 24 Cal.2d 133, 136, 148 P.2d 19; Crane v. Smith, 23 Cal.2d 288, 297, 144 P.2d 356. As against plaintiff, Stanford could be found to be a trespasser, since plaintiff was there on Redetzke's business and Stanford could be found to be a trespasser as against Redetzke.

The Contractor's Appeal

1. The evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of negligence by the Contractor.

The Contractor created upon the land a dangerous condition, and we are of the opinion that the jury could properly find that it was negligent in two respects: the manner in which it covered the hole, including failure to erect barricades or place warning sings or flags, and its failure to inspect from time to time to see whether the hole remained properly covered and protected. The presence on flat land of an old floor of an outhouse with some stones and boards on it would be no warning to anyone that it covered a hole over 30 feet deep and 3 feet square, especially when there were other boards and rocks lying around. It can hardly be claimed that such a hole is not a dangerous condition upon the land.

The Contractor...