Yeldell v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0699-05-2 (Va. App. 8/8/2006)
| Decision Date | 08 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 0699-05-2. |
| Parties | LALITA YELDELL, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Margaret P. Spencer, Judge.
Gary R. Hershner for appellant.
Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General; Susan L. Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Felton, Judges Elder and Beales.
Lalita Yeldell ("appellant") appeals from her convictions following a jury trial, for felony driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-266, two counts of involuntary manslaughter in violation of Code § 18.2-36.1, and one count of maiming while driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Code § 18.2-51.4. She contends the trial court erred in: (1) allowing the Commonwealth's accident reconstruction expert to give opinion testimony as to how the motor vehicle collision occurred, and (2) prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining the Commonwealth's accident reconstruction expert about witness statements the expert testified he had considered when forming his opinions. For the reasons that follow, we reverse appellant's convictions and remand for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised.
The record reflects that shortly after 3:00 a.m. on April 11, 2004, appellant's Lexus automobile collided with a Mazda automobile in the northbound lanes of Interstate 95 in the City of Richmond. Chantelle Haynes, the driver of the Mazda, and Tashanna Smallwood, Haynes' front seat passenger, were pronounced dead at the scene. Adrian Wright-Bent, Haynes' backseat passenger, suffered a broken femur, broken pelvic bones, and fractures of most of her facial bones. Rescue workers extracted appellant from her vehicle, which had come to rest on the jersey wall dividing the northbound and southbound lanes of Interstate 95. She was transported to a hospital where she was in a coma for some three weeks following the accident.
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion in limine to "prohibit the Commonwealth from presenting expert reconstruction evidence." Specifically, appellant sought to exclude the expert opinions of Virginia State Trooper Anthony Puckett. Puckett, trained and experienced in accident reconstruction, investigated the scene of the collision. He created a scaled diagram of the area based on measurements he made shortly after the collision, and prior to the vehicles being moved. He spent some thirty hours analyzing the evidence he obtained at the scene.
At the hearing on the motion in limine, Puckett testified as to his observations at the collision scene, and opined as to how each vehicle reached its final resting place. He explained that in reaching that conclusion, he considered the following: "[t]he damage to each vehicle, markings on the roadway, paint transfers of the vehicle, statements by the drivers and statements by witnesses, fluid transfers, debris in the roadway . . . [and t]he measurements of the vehicles."
At the conclusion of the hearing, appellant objected to the admission of Puckett's opinions regarding how the collision occurred. He argued that Puckett's opinions invaded the province of the jury because they were within the common knowledge of a person of reasonable intelligence and relied, in part, on witness statements.
The trial court took appellant's motion under advisement, stating, However, the trial court stated that the accident reconstruction "expert will be allowed to render an expert opinion based upon scientific analysis."
At the beginning of appellant's trial, the trial court reiterated that Puckett would not be permitted to invade the province of the jury in his testimony. The trial court, however, accepted Puckett as an expert in the field of accident reconstruction over appellant's objection.
The Commonwealth began its opening argument by playing a 911 tape for the jury. It argued, presumably from what was on the tape, that the evidence would prove that "[t]he car going the wrong way was driven by the defendant, Lalita Yeldell." Inexplicably the record does not contain the 911 tape, or any transcript of what the 911 tape contained.
During the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Puckett testified that four vehicles were involved in the collision — appellant's green Lexus, Haynes' blue Mazda, a red Buick, and a red Honda. He described the collision scene for the jury, referring to the diagram he had created. Based on his investigation, Puckett opined that appellant's Lexus "struck" the victims' Mazda "head-on," causing the Mazda to rotate counterclockwise into the center lane, where it was struck a second time by the red Buick. He testified that the red Honda, in turn, subsequently struck the Buick. Puckett concluded, from the location of the Mazda's bumper cover he found on the highway, that the Mazda was traveling northbound when it collided with the Lexus.
On cross-examination, appellant's counsel questioned Puckett regarding witness statements in conflict with his conclusion regarding how the collision occurred. The following colloquy occurred:
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, appellant moved to strike Puckett's testimony on the basis that his opinions relied in part upon witnesses' statements and that she was not allowed to cross-examine Puckett as to the reliability of those statements. After the trial court denied appellant's motion to strike, appellant asserted that Puckett's testimony should also be struck because it "invades the province of the jury." Following the presentation of all the evidence, appellant renewed her motion to strike the evidence "for the reasons previously stated." The trial court denied her motion.
The jury found appellant guilty of all four charges.
The Commonwealth asserts, pursuant to Rule 5A:18, that appellant is barred on appeal from raising the issue that Puckett's testimony describing how the collision occurred invaded the province of the jury. Specifically, it argues that "defense counsel made no objection [at trial] that the expert's testimony was inadmissible because it invaded the province of the jury[, rather] . . . [t]he only objection to Trooper Puckett's testimony at trial was that it was not scientifically based." It contends that appellant's motion to strike Puckett's testimony as invading the province of the jury was made after the trial court had ruled on her motion to strike Puckett's testimony as not supported by scientific analysis, and did not save the issue for appeal because it "did not allow the trial court to consider the argument."
"Rule 5A:18 requires an `objection [be] stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.'" Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 760, 589 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) (quoting Rule 5A:18). "The primary function of Rule 5A:18 is to alert the trial judge to possible error so that the judge may consider the issue intelligently and take any corrective actions necessary to avoid unnecessary appeals, reversals and mistrials." Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 530, 414 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1992). Thus, "[u]nder this rule, a specific argument must be made to the trial court at the appropriate time, or the allegation of error will not be considered on appeal." Edwards 41 Va. App. at 760, 589 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 435, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987)).
The record reflects appellant presented the trial court with an opportunity to consider whether Puckett's opinion testimony invaded the province of the jury. Appellant's motion in limine clearly sought to exclude Puckett's testimony on the grounds that it invaded the province of the jury. After concluding voir dire of Puckett, appellant again objected to his opinion testimony, arguing that "the opinions [are] base[d] . . . in part on statements from witnesses and . . . the law of physics," and "based on the problem of the jury . . . [it] is not admissible for Virginia law." Moreover, appellant made a "continuing objection to the opinions" during Puckett's testimony. We therefore conclude appellant preserved the trial court's ruling on the "invasion of the jury's province" for appellate review.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting Puckett's opinion testimony regarding how the fatal collision occurred. She argues his testimony invaded the province of the jury, that Puckett's ultimate conclusions were not scientifically based, and that Puckett's opinions partially relied on the credibility of witness statements.
"The admission...
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