Yelder v. Hornsby, Civ. A. No. 84-T-1271-N.

Decision Date20 July 1987
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 84-T-1271-N.
Citation666 F. Supp. 1518
PartiesJessie Mae YELDER, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Andrew P. HORNSBY, Jr., Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Lawrence F. Gardella, Legal Services Corp. of Alabama, Inc., Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiff.

James E. Long, Lois Brasfield, Asst. Attys. Gen., State Dept. of Pensions & Sec., Montgomery, Ala., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Jessie Mae Yelder, the plaintiff, has brought this class-action lawsuit claiming that the following policy of two interrelated Alabama programs, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and the Child Support and Establishment of Paternity (CSEP) program, violates federal law: the state policy of automatically terminating a family's right to continue to receive AFDC benefits if the CSEP program is able to collect from the family's absent parent just one child support payment that exceeds the family's AFDC grant by fifty dollars or more. Yelder has sued as defendant the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, the state official responsible for implementing the two programs.

For reasons that follow, the court concludes that the challenged policy violates federal law and that Yelder and the class she represents are thus entitled to appropriate relief.

I.

The federal AFDC program is a cooperative program between state and federal governments to provide financial assistance to needy dependent children and those who live with and care for them. For states that elect to participate in the federal program and administer it locally, the federal government reimburses them for a portion of the funds they expend under their programs for care of needy children; in return, these states must operate their programs in compliance with applicable federal statutes and regulations. See Title IV-A of the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601, et seq.

In 1975, in an effort to stem the increasing number of families forced to depend on AFDC benefits because absent parents failed to meet their child support obligations, Congress amended the Social Security Act to establish the CSEP program. See Title IV-D of the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651, et seq. The purposes of the program include "enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom such children are living, locating absent parents, establishing paternity, obtaining child and spousal support, and assuring that assistance in obtaining support will be available under this part to all children ... for whom such assistance is requested." 42 U.S.C.A. § 651. The CSEP program requires that all participating states provide CSEP services to their AFDC recipients. 42 U.S. C.A. § 654(4).

Under the federal AFDC and CSEP programs, an AFDC family must assign to the state its right to child support payments from an absent parent; the family may not directly receive such payments. 42 U.S. C.A. § 602(a)(26)(A); 45 C.F.R. §§ 232.11, 302.32(a). Whenever the CSEP program collects a child support payment from a family's absent parent, the program must inform the AFDC program of the payment, 45 C.F.R. § 302.32, and the AFDC program must then determine whether the family's AFDC benefits should be terminated effective the month following receipt of the payment. 45 C.F.R. § 302.32; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 232.20, 206.10(a)(9), 233.33. Of course, any family whose benefits are terminated may later reapply for benefits.

If the AFDC program determines that the family's benefits should be terminated, the CSEP program must distribute the collected child support payment according to a federally mandated formula. First, the first $50.00 of child support collected in any given month must be paid to the family; second, the state reimburses itself for the AFDC assistance paid to the AFDC family during that month; third, any additional amounts up to the amount that the absent parent is obligated to pay by a court order are paid to the family; fourth, any amounts in excess of the amounts to be paid pursuant to the first three steps are used by the state to reimburse itself for past AFDC assistance received; and, fifth, once the state has received an amount large enough to reimburse itself for all the past AFDC assistance the family has received, any excess is paid to the family. 42 U.S.C.A. § 657(b); 45 C.F.R. § 302.51. Under the formula, therefore, most, if not all, of the collected payment will go to reimburse the AFDC program, unless the payment is very large; thus, for many, if not most, families whose benefits are terminated, they must look only to continued child support payments for help.

Alabama administers both the AFDC and CSEP programs through its Department of Human Resources. Under the challenged policy adopted by the Department, whenever the state CSEP program collects from a family's absent parent a child support payment that exceeds the family's AFDC grant by fifty dollars or more, the state AFDC program must automatically terminate the family's right to continue to receive monthly benefits, beginning with the month immediately following receipt of the support payment, irrespective of the likelihood that payments will not be continued, or will be continued in amounts less than the first payment.

Jessie Mae Yelder and her family are participants in both the Alabama AFDC and CSEP programs. The Alabama Department of Human Resources has used the challenged policy to terminate her AFDC benefits several times. At the time this lawsuit was filed in 1984, Yelder's former husband was obligated to pay her $130.00 a month pursuant to a child support order; the payments under the child support order exceeded Ms. Yelder's monthly AFDC assistance of $118.00. If the child support payments had actually been made on a monthly basis, Ms. Yelder would not have been entitled to AFDC assistance. Mr. Yelder's payments were, however, sporadic and of varying amounts; Mr. Yelder paid $150.00 in January 1983, $30.00 in February of 1983, and $180.00 in December of 1983, $120.00 in January of 1984, and only a total of $90.00 between February 1 and May 31, 1984. During this time, according to Ms. Yelder, Mr. Yelder was unemployed.

Pursuant to the policy challenged in this lawsuit, the Alabama Department of Human Resources terminated Ms. Yelder's AFDC benefits three times between 1983 and 1984, even though it was apparent with each termination that Mr. Yelder would more than likely not continue, or even be able to continue, with his support payments. Furthermore, although Ms. Yelder was able each time to have her benefits restored, she and her family suffered greatly during the month or more they had to do without benefits. Because of the first termination, Ms. Yelder could not pay the rent and she and her family were evicted; with the second termination, the family could not pay the gas bill and lost gas service; and, as a result of the third termination, the family lost water and electric service and was again threatened with eviction. Therefore, although under the challenged policy Yelder had to do without benefits only temporarily, the effects of the policy on the well-being of her family, and in particular her children, were severely crippling and were undoubtedly long standing if not permanent.

Ms. Yelder's distressing circumstances are typical of those of other Alabama AFDC recipients who receive sporadic child support payments. The court has therefore certified a plaintiff class of all past, present and future Alabama AFDC recipients "to whom child support is due." Order of December 21, 1984.

II.

Yelder contends that the challenged policy violates federal regulation 45 C.F.R. § 233.33(a), which requires that the state AFDC program determine a family's continued AFDC eligibility "prospectively," that is, based on the program's "best estimate of income and circumstances which will exist in the month for which the assistance payment is made."1 For several reasons, the court agrees with Yelder that the challenged policy violates § 233.33(a).

A.

When a court is confronted with a state agency's interpretation and application of a federal regulation, the court must first consider whether the federal regulation clearly and unambiguously addresses the question at issue. If it does, then that is the end of the matter and the court must give effect to the unambiguous language of the regulation. If, however, the regulation is ambiguous or does not directly address the question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the regulation; rather, the court should determine whether the federal agency that promulgated the regulation has interpreted the regulation; if so, whether the interpretation is a permissible construction of the regulation; and, if so, whether the state agency's interpretation comports with the federal agency's. But if there is no helpful interpretation by the federal agency, the court must then simply determine whether the state agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the regulation. In other words, absent clear and unambiguous language in the federal regulation, a court must give deference to any reasonably acceptable interpretation by the federal agency or, in the absence of a federal interpretation, by the state agency. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1987) (discussing the standard by which a court should determine whether a federal agency's interpretation of a federal law is permissible); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872, 97 S.Ct. 2150, 2155, 53 L.Ed.2d 48 (1977) (discussing the standard by which a court should determine whether a federal agency's interpretation of...

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