Yellow Cab Co. of Providence v. Public Utility Hearing Bd.

• Decision Date: 10 May 1963
• Citation: 96 R.I. 247,191 A.2d 23
• Parties: YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF PROVIDENCE v. The PUBLIC UTILITY HEARING BOARD. M.P. 1527 to M.P. 1532.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 23

191 A.2d 23

96 R.I. 247

YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF PROVIDENCE v. The PUBLIC UTILITY HEARING BOARD.

M.P. 1527 to M.P. 1532.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 10, 1963.

Albert J. Hoban, Providence, for protestant.

J. Joseph Nugent, Atty. Gen., Francis A. Kelleher, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, William Young Chaika, Providence, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

These six applications for certificates of authority to operate taxicab services within the city of Providence were filed by the respective applicants with the public utility administrator pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1938, chap. 100, § 3, now G.L.1956, § 39-14-3. Hearings thereon were conducted by the administrator and on June 25, 1962, after finding in each case that the applicant was fit, willing and able to operate a taxicab service and that the public convenience and necessity required such service, he issued certificates permitting each of the applicants to operate one taxicab in the city of Providence.

The Yellow Cab Company of Providence, hereinafter referred to as the protestant, in each case prosecuted an appeal therefrom to the public utility hearing board, which on December 11, 1962, finding the public convenience and necessity for such service and the fitness of the applicants to operate a taxicab service, ordered the issuance to each applicant of a certificate to operate one taxicab in the city of Providence. From each of these orders of the hearing board the protestant has prosecuted an appeal to this court.

It appears that the applications here being considered were filed with the administrator at varying times between 1952 and 1959 but for reasons that the record does not disclose were not heard by the administrator until 1959. Prior to such hearings the administrator, pursuant to the provisions of § 39-14-4 which require that notice of the pendency of the hearing be given to common carriers operating in the area designated in the application, gave notice to the protestant, it being a common carrier within the purview of § 39-14-2. At the conclusion of these hearings the aforementioned orders were issued by the administrator.

From each of these orders the ptotestant prosecuted an appeal to the public utility hearing board, hereinafter referred to as the hearing board, pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956, § 39-5-9, which provide that any person 'aggrieved by a decision or order of the public utility administrator, other than a decision or order fixing any rate * * * shall have the right to appeal to the public utility hearing board * * *.' Section 39-5-10 provides that the appeal contemplated in § 39-5-9 shall take the form of a hearing de novo so that the protestant on these appeals was heard before the hearing board on both fact and law. In this respect it must be noted that § 39-14-13 makes provision for appeal from an order of the administrator directly to the supreme court by persons aggrieved thereby where such order is made pursuant to the provisions of chap. 14 of title 39, the taxicab statute.

The record here discloses that in these proceedings the issues were heard and determined under the procedures provided for in §§ 39-5-9 and 39-5-10, and it is clear that the parties were acting on the theory that any person aggrieved by an order of the administrator other than one involving rates may be reason of § 39-5-9 elect to have the matter heard de novo by the hearing board, an intermediate factfinding tribunal, or to proceed under the specific appeal provisions set out in § 39-14-13. Because in the circumstances of the cases it does not appear that any right of the parties has been foreclosed by such election, we will determine the issues raised therein in the posture in which they are presented. We expressly disclaim, however, any intention to determine the effect, if any, of the provisions of § 39-5-9 on the appeal provided for in § 39-14-13.

It was argued on behalf of one of the applicants that the protestant was without standing to carry an appeal from the orders of the administrator to the hearing board, it not being a party aggrieved by such orders. In support of this contention the applicant insists that such orders did not have the effect of impairing any personal or property right of the protestant or of imposing any burden or obligation upon it. Therefore, it is argued, in view of Lampinski v. Rhode Island Racing and Athletics Comm., R.I., 181 A.2d 438, the protestant is not a person aggrieved by the orders of the administrator. With this contention we are unable to agree.

The term 'aggrieved' in the context in which it appears in § 39-5-9 is not to be construed as strictly as the requirement of aggrievement in statutes setting up true appellate procedures. On the contrary, it is our opinion that the term as used in the instant statute must be construed liberally if effect is to be given to the remedial purposes thereof. The appeal to the hearing board provided in § 39-5-9 clearly is not intended to provide for a true appellate review of the decision of an inferior tribunal. Rather, in our opinion, it is intended to make available to those who were parties to the prior hearing and whose interests were adversely affected by the decision rendered therein a new hearing on all the issues of facts and law before an intermediate fact-finding tribunal.

The protestant was a party to the hearing before the administrator, having been made a party in interest thereto by the pertinent provisions of § 39-14-4. It is our opinion that as such a party the orders of the administrator had an adverse effect upon its interests. The primary purpose of the regulation of the taxicab business is to provide the public with safe and adequate transportation. A secondary purpose of such regulation is to preserve the investment of those conducting such businesses from the deleterious effects of wasteful competition. See Breen v. Division of Public Utilities, 59 R.I. 134, 194 A. 719. It is then our opinion that in these circumstances the protestant is a person aggrieved by an order of the administrator within the purview of the appeal procedure provided in § 39-5-9.

We turn to the various reasons advanced by the protestant as grounds for reversing the decision and orders of the hearing board. The authority of this court to reverse an order or decision made by the hearing...