Cotsoridis v. Lueker

• Decision Date: 30 January 2015
• Docket Number: C.A. PC 14-5941
• Parties: ANTHONY COTSORIDIS, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM H. LUEKER, ESQ., in his Capacity as Deputy Chief of Legal Services/Hearing Officer, State of Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, and THOMAS AHERN, in his Capacity as Administrator, State of Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers; and GO ORANGE LLC d/b/a ORANGE CAB OF NEWPORT, Defendants.
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

ANTHONY COTSORIDIS, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM H. LUEKER, ESQ., in his Capacity as Deputy Chief of Legal Services/Hearing Officer, State of Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, and THOMAS AHERN, in his Capacity as Administrator, State of Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers; and GO ORANGE LLC d/b/a ORANGE CAB OF NEWPORT, Defendants.

C.A. No. PC 14-5941

Superior Court of Rhode Island

January 30, 2015

Providence County Superior Court

Plaintiff: Michael F. Horan, Esq.

For Defendant: Christy L. Hetherington, Esq. J. Russell Jackson Esq.

DECISION

VAN COUYGHEN, J.

This case is before the Court on Anthony Cotsoridis' (Plaintiff) request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiff challenges the legality of the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers' (the Division) denial of his motion to intervene. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-30-1.

I Facts and Travel

On October 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Request for Authority to Transfer a Taxicab Certificate with the Division. In his request, Plaintiff sought to acquire Certificate MCT-59 (the Certificate) from P&P, Inc. The Certificate authorizes six taxicabs in the assigned territory of Newport Middletown, Portsmouth, and Jamestown.^[1] While Plaintiff's request for Authority to Transfer the Certificate was pending, Go Orange LLC d/b/a/ Orange Cab of Newport (Go Orange) applied for new authority to operate thirty-four taxicabs in Bristol, Jamestown, Middletown, Newport and Portsmouth (the Go Orange application). Since Plaintiff's pending application for the transfer of the Certificate concerned the same territory for which Go Orange was seeking its new certificate, Plaintiff moved to intervene in the pending Go Orange application pursuant to Rule 17 of the Division's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

On November 18, 2014, the Hearing Officer denied Plaintiff's Motion to Intervene. The Hearing Officer reasoned that since Plaintiff's request for transfer was still pending, he did not have "any existing interest in the taxicab industry . . . in Newport County such that his intervention is necessary or appropriate." As such, the Hearing Officer concluded that Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a sufficient interest in the Go Orange application to intervene pursuant to Rule 17. Instead, the Hearing Officer welcomed Plaintiff to observe the hearing and to offer public comment, in keeping with Division Rule 18(c)(5).

Thereafter, on December 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in accordance with § 9–30–1. Plaintiff also sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Division to grant his motion to intervene.^[2]

II Standard of Review

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides that this Court "shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Sec. § 9–30–1. In this regard, "the Superior Court has broad discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief under the UDJA." Tucker Estates Charlestown, LLC v. Town of Charlestown, 964 A.2d 1138, 1140 (R.I. 2009).

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he obvious purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to facilitate the termination of controversies. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. E. W. Burman, Inc., 120 R.I. 841, 845, 391 A.2d 99, 101 (1978). Accordingly, "declaratory judgment statutes should be liberally construed; they should not be interpreted in a narrow or technical sense." Millett v. Hoisting Eng'rs' Licensing Div. of Dep't of Labor, 119 R.I. 285, 291, 377 A.2d 229, 233 (1977).

It should be noted that Plaintiff's complaint seeks declaratory relief and does not appeal the Division's denial of his motion to intervene pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).^[3] "It is well settled that a plaintiff aggrieved by a state agency's action first must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a claim in court." R.I. Emp't Sec. Alliance, Local 401, S.E.I.U., AFL-CIO v. State, Dep't of Emp't and Training, 788 A.2d 465, 467 (R.I. 2002). However, our Supreme Court has '"made exceptions when the exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile."' Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813, 818 (R.I. 2007) (quoting R.I. Emp't Sec. Alliance, 788 A.2d at 467); see also § 42–35–15 ("Any preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency act or ruling is immediately reviewable in any case in which review of the final agency order would not provide an adequate remedy.").

With respect to Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief, it is well-settled that this Court, in deciding whether to issue an injunction, considers "whether the moving party (1) has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) will suffer irreparable harm without the requested injunctive relief, (3) has the balance of the equities, including the possible hardships to each party and to the public interest, tip in its favor, and (4) has shown that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will preserve the status quo." Iggy's Doughboys, Inc. v. Giroux, 729 A.2d 701, 705 (R.I. 1999).

III Analysis

As an initial matter, this Court must determine whether Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief is proper given that he did not appeal the Division's denial of his motion pursuant to the APA. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated that, "[a]lthough exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory condition precedent to judicial review under § 42–35–15, this Court has recognized that in certain instances a party may seek declaratory relief in the Superior Court." Town of Richmond v. R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 941 A.2d 151, 156 (R.I. 2008). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has also "recognized that the validity or applicability of an agency rule or practice may be decided in an action for declaratory relief, notwithstanding the fact that an administrative hearing was requested." Id. In fact, § 42–35–15(a) specifically provides that "utilization of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law" is not precluded by its provisions.

Moreover, Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies because, in being denied the right to intervene, Plaintiff has not been able to seek a remedy in the administrative forum.^[4] In addition, judicial economy would not be served by requiring Plaintiff, who is not a party, to wait until Go Orange's application was finalized, since, if Plaintiff is successful, a new hearing would have to be held. See Almeida v. Plasters' & Cement Masons' Local 40 Pension Fund, 722 A.2d 257, 259 (R.I. 1998) (noting that a thorough administrative process "promotes judicial economy by avoiding needless repetition of administrative and judicial factfinding . . . .") (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of the forgoing, this Court shall consider Plaintiff's request for declaratory relief.

As indicated above, Plaintiff claims that the Division erroneously denied his motion to intervene pursuant to the Division's Rule 17(b). Rule 17(b) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Subject to the provisions of these rules, any person with a right to intervene or an interest of such nature that intervention is necessary or appropriate may intervene in any proceeding before the Division. Such right or interest may be:

"(1) A right conferred by statute.

"(2) An interest which may be directly affected and which is not adequately represented by existing parties and as to which movants may be bound by the Division's action in the proceeding. The following may have such an interest: consumers served by the applicant, defendant, or respondent and holders of securities of the applicant, defendant, or respondent.

"(3) Any other interest of such a nature that movant's participation may be in the public interest."

In denying Plaintiff's motion, the Hearing Officer concluded that Plaintiff failed to meet the above-stated criteria since Plaintiff's Request for Transfer of the Certificate had not yet been approved. However, in reviewing Plaintiff's petition for declaratory judgment, this Court notes that Plaintiff's pending application concerns the same territory for which Go Orange is seeking to operate thirty-four new taxicabs.^[5] It is axiomatic that should the Division grant Go Orange's application, Plaintiff's interest would be affected as there would be thirty-four new cabs operating and competing with Plaintiff in the same area.

Additionally, this Court finds that it is in the public interest for Plaintiff to intervene in the Go Orange application. As mentioned above, it would be a waste of judicial and agency resources for the Division to possibly have to conduct another hearing regarding Go Orange's application should Plaintiff's Request for Transfer be granted. It is in the public's interest to have these hearings proceed efficiently. See Rule 17.

Moreover G.L. 1956 § 39-14-3 states that "[n]o person, association, or corporation shall operate a taxicab . . . until the person, association, or corporation shall have obtained a certificate from the division certifying that public convenience and necessity require the operation of a taxicab . . . ." With respect that section, our Supreme Court has stated that "a condition precedent to issuing a certificate . . . is a finding that the public convenience and necessity warrants the increase in service that would result therefrom." Yellow Cab Co. of Providence v. Pub. Util. Hearing Bd., 96 R.I....