Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. v. Mayor's Com'n on Human Rights of City of Springfield

• Citation: 791 S.W.2d 382
• Decision Date: 19 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 72458,72458
• Parties: 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,014 YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC. Defendants-Respondents, v. MAYOR'S COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF the CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, and Betty L. Shortt, Plaintiffs-Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 382

791 S.W.2d 382

53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,014

YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC. Defendants-Respondents, v. MAYOR'S COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF the CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, and Betty L. Shortt Plaintiffs-Appellants.

No. 72458.

Supreme Court of Missouri En Banc.

June 19, 1990.

Rehearing Denied July 31, 1990.

Dennis Budd, Asst. City Atty., Springfield, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Ronald E. Sandhaus and David B. Mandelbaum, Overland Park, Kan., for defendants-respondents.

BILLINGS, Judge.

The controlling issue in this case is whether the Mayor's Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") of Springfield, Missouri, had the authority to find plaintiff violated a city ordinance in connection with a complaint filed by an employee alleging unlawful discrimination in the termination of her employment. The judgment of the trial court enjoining the Commission from enforcing its order for reinstatement and backpay for the employee is affirmed.

The facts giving rise to the order are more fully set out in a prior opinion by the court of appeals which reversed and remanded the case on procedural grounds. See Yellow Freight System v. Mayor's Com'n., 737 S.W.2d 250 (Mo.App.1987). Briefly, the facts pertinent to this decision are as follows: An ordinance, Chapter 18A, §§ 1 thru 29 Springfield City Code, was adopted by the City of Springfield, Missouri, a home rule charter city. This ordinance established the Mayor's Commission on Human Rights, defined its purpose and powers, and granted the right to appeal. The ordinance purported to create a municipal agency with the power to hear contested cases of discrimination in employment and housing, and give relief in accordance with its stated purpose. The ordinance also provided that an appeal or enforcement of the Commission's decision could be brought in the Circuit Court of Greene County and that the city attorney could bring proceedings in the City of Springfield's Municipal Court for punishment of anyone violating the ordinance.

The Commission ordered Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. ("Yellow Freight"), to reinstate a terminated employee and awarded her backpay from her termination date. Yellow Freight sought relief in circuit court, seeking among other things a declaration that the Commission's decision violated provisions of the Missouri Constitution, exceeded statutory authority, exceeded authority granted by City Charter, and requested injunctive relief against the Commission. The trial court granted the relief requested by Yellow Freight and defendants appealed.

A majority of the court of appeals concluded the order of the Commission was invalid to the extent it reinstated the terminated employee and awarded back pay but remanded the case to permit proceedings in municipal court for violation of the ordinance. The dissent, authored by Maus, J., concurred with the court in most respects but dissented as to the portion of the opinion that remanded the case to municipal court. This Court borrows liberally from that dissent without the benefit of quotation marks and with minor modifications.

The City of Springfield, the Commission, and the terminated employee, Mrs. Betty Shortt, argue that the Commission's actions are authorized by implication in § 213.020.3 RSMo, 1986, by the general grant of power found in Missouri Constitution art. VI, § 19, and § 1.3 Springfield City Code. The Court does not agree.

The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented. Without discussion, the Court affirms those findings and conclusions upon the subsidiary issues presented. The disposition of the appeal is controlled by the finding of the trial court that the Mayor's Commission had no jurisdiction to hear and determine an allegation of a violation of a city ordinance by reason of Mo. Const. art. V, § 23. Its final judgment was "that defendant Commission's order ... [is] null, void, of no effect, and for naught." The Court affirms that judgment.

The basic issue can be placed in proper perspective only by consideration of the nature of the remedy provided by the ordinance. "The instant ordinance creates a right and liability which do not exist at common law and prescribes the remedy." St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Mayor's Com'n. on Human Rights and Community Relations of the City of Springfield, Mo., 572 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Mo.App.1978) (The validity of the ordinance was not raised or considered.) The cause of action is for the benefit of the individual. It is directly based upon an alleged violation of that ordinance. The ordinance provides for the determination of that alleged violation and the amount of recovery by an administrative agency of the city.

The violation of an ordinance may establish an element of tortious conduct in a common law or statutory tort action cognizable in the circuit court. See Breeding v. Dodson Trailer Repair, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 281, 287 (Mo.banc 1984). A municipal corporation may by ordinance, within the scope of its police power, regulate conduct and prescribe a penalty for violation of an ordinance. Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 881 (Mo.banc 1962); 93 A.L.R.2d 1012 (1964). A well-established general rule illustrates the basic limitation upon the authority of a city to create a cause of action for recovery by an individual: "[A] municipal corporation cannot create by ordinance a right of action between third persons or enlarge the common law or statutory duty or liability of citizens among themselves." 6 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 22.01 (3rd ed. Rev.1988). That limitation is recognized in Missouri.

It has been repeatedly ruled in this state that a city has no power, by municipal ordinance, to create a civil liability from one citizen to another, nor to relieve one citizen from that liability by imposing it on another. Norton v. City of St. Louis, 97 Mo. 537, 542, 11 S.W. 242; Sanders v. Railroad, 147 Mo. 411, 426, 48 S.W. 855; Becker v. Schutte, 85 Mo.App. 57, 62; City of St. Louis v. Conn. Ins. Co., 107 Mo. 92, 96, 17 S.W. 637, 28 Am.St.Rep. 402. The application of this doctrine to cases based on negligence has led to differences of opinions and conflicting decisions (Sludor v. Transit Co., 189 Mo. 107, 135, 88 S.W. 648, 5 L.R.A. [N.S.] 186, and the dissenting opinion of Judge Marshall in that case), but as applied to contractual and similar obligations and liabilities it has never been questioned. (See, also, State ex rel. [Star Publishing Co.] v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 60 S.W. 91, 51 L.R.A. 151, 81 Am.St.Rep. 368).

City of Joplin v. Wheeler, 173 Mo.App. 590, 604-05, 158 S.W. 924, 928-29 (1913); Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d at 882-83.

This basic limitation is respected by the provisions of the Constitution of Missouri, statutes, and rules governing violations of ordinances. The relevant provision of the constitution states that "[a] municipal judge shall hear and determine violations of municipal ordinances in one or more municipalities." Mo. Const. art. V, § 23. Section 479.010 RSMo, 1986, provides "[v]iolations of municipal ordinances shall be tried only before divisions of the circuit court as hereinafter provided in this chapter." "Ordinance violation" is the subject of Rule 37 which in part states: "Rule 37 governs the procedure in all courts of this state having original jurisdiction of ordinance violations and the disposition of statutory and ordinance traffic offenses in a traffic violations bureau." Rule 37.01. "All ordinance violations shall be prosecuted by information." Rule 37.34(a).

It must be noted that it has been held that the statute proscribing employment discrimination and establishing the State Commission on Human Rights did not unconstitutionally delegate judicial power to an administrative agency even though the Commission was granted power to award backpay to complainants. Percy Kent Bag Co. v. Missouri Com'n. on Human Rights, 632 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Mo.banc 1982). However, that case does not aid appellants. It is not necessary to analyze all the reasons the legislative power of a charter city is not coextensive with that of the state. It is sufficient to observe that it is within the authority of the state to create the cause of action described above. Further, the state is subject to no constitutional restriction such as that contained in Mo. Const. art. V, § 23.

As stated, the cause of action purportedly created by the ordinance is for the benefit of an individual. Under its terms, recovery is predicated upon the determination of a violation of the ordinance. That ordinance provides that determination and any recovery awarded is to be enforced by the Commission represented by the City Attorney. This is a procedure to determine the violation of an ordinance which the constitutional provision, statute and rules provide must be initiated and heard before a municipal judge. For this reason alone, the Court could find the Commission's determination that the ordinance was violated is of no force or effect. However, the Court does not imply that a municipal court has the jurisdiction to award any complainant back wages or any other recovery.

Appellants seek to uphold the determination, the award, and the ordinance upon the basis of Mo. Const. art. VI, § 19(a), adopted in 1971. See Gates v. City of Springfield, 744 S.W.2d 487 (Mo.App.1988), concerning the application of that section to a previously adopted charter. But, it may be assumed that the validity of the ordinance is to be measured by § 19(a) which says:

Any city which adopts or has adopted a charter for its own government, shall have all powers which the general assembly of the state of Missouri has authority to confer upon any city, provided such powers are consistent with the constitution of this state and are not limited or denied either by the charter so adopted or by statute. Such a city shall, in addition to its home rule powers, have all powers conferred by law.

That section...