Yingling v. Klotz, 2669.

• Decision Date: 28 March 1946
• Docket Number: No. 2669.,2669.
• Citation: 193 S.W.2d 742
• Parties: YINGLING et al. v. KLOTZ et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

193 S.W.2d 742

YINGLING et al. v. KLOTZ et al.

No. 2669.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Tenth District. Waco.

March 28, 1946.

Rehearing Denied April 18, 1946.

Appeal from District Court, Hidalgo County; W. R. Blalock, Judge.

Suit by Ida M. Klotz and husband against R. G. Yingling and another for an injunction restraining defendants from entering upon named plaintiff's premises or interfering with her right of possession, wherein defendants filed a cross-action for declaratory judgment validating alleged extension of contract to care for the realty in question or in the alternative for the value of services rendered. From a judgment for plaintiffs as prayed for and denying any recovery on cross-action, defendants appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

Kelley & Looney, Ralph T. Rawlins, and L. Hamilton Lowe, all of Edinburg, for appellants.

Sawnie B. Smith, of Edinburg, for appellees.

HALE, Justice.

This suit grew out of a written contract entered into on March 1, 1941 by Mrs. Ida M. Klotz of Indianapolis, Indiana, hereafter referred to as appellee, and R. G. Yingling and son of Hidalgo County, Texas, hereafter referred to as appellants. By the terms of the contract appellants agreed to care for appellee's ten acre citrus orchard for a period of three years and in consideration of their services they were to receive one-half of all fruit produced from the orchard during that period of time. Appellants went into possession of the orchard and performed the contract to the satisfaction of appellee. The contract was then extended for an additional year from March 1, 1944.

Appellee, joined by her husband, instituted the suit on June 23, 1945 alleging in substance that she had moved from her former home in Indiana to Hidalgo County, Texas, with a view to repossessing her citrus orchard and living on the same as her homestead. She further alleged that appellants were, at that time, unlawfully trespassing upon her orchard under some character of claim growing out of the former contract and were improperly interfering with her right of exclusive possession. She sought an injunction restraining them from entering upon her premises and from further interfering with her alleged right of possession.

Appellants answered with general and special denials and with affirmative pleas averring in substance that the original written contract had been extended by mutual agreement or acquiescence of the parties for two additional years and that if the contract as extended was not then in full force and effect, appellee was nevertheless estopped from denying its validity as so extended. They prayed that appellee take nothing and by way of cross-action sought a declaratory judgment validating their alleged extension of the original contract for the year 1945-46 and in the alternative they sought judgment for the value of the services they had rendered for appellee subsequent to March 1, 1945.

On June 28, 1945 the case was tried on its merits before a jury. Upon the conclusion of the evidence appellee seasonably filed and presented an extensive motion for an instructed verdict. Her motion was based in part upon contentions that (1) the undisputed evidence showed conclusively as a matter of law that no contract was made or extended for the care of her orchard for any period of time after March 1, 1945 and (2) there was no evidence raising any issue on the affirmative defenses or grounds of recovery alleged by appellants. The court sustained the motion, withdrew the case from the jury, rendered judgment for appellee as prayed for and denied any recovery to appellants on their cross-action.

Under appropriate points in their brief appellants say the court erred in taking the case from the jury and in rendering the judgment which was rendered because they contend the evidence raised issues of fact for the jury which when found would have enabled the court to determine as a matter of law whether (1) the original contract was extended for the year 1945-46, (2) appellee was estopped to deny such extension, (3) appellants were entitled on their cross-action to a declaratory judgment validating the contract as so extended, and (4) appellants were entitled to judgment for the value of the services rendered by them after March 1, 1945.

It is elemental that when a case is tried before a jury the duty rests upon the trial judge to submit to the jury for its determination all controlling issues of fact raised by the pleadings and tendered by the evidence. Casey v. Jones, 189 S.W.2d 515, pts. 3-7, error refused. It is only when no such issue is so raised and tendered that the trial judge is authorized to withdraw a case from the jury or to direct a verdict. James v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., Tex.Civ. App., 182 S.W.2d 921, pts. 1-2, error refused. Hence, a correct disposition of this appeal turns primarily upon whether or not there was any evidence which tendered any of the issuable facts raised by the pleadings of the parties.

The original contract, the substance of which has been stated above, was introduced in evidence. All negotiations with reference to any renewal or extension thereof were evidenced by a series of letters and telegrams about which there was no dispute. To set forth all of the correspondence in full would...