Yoder v. Honeywell Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-1464,95-1464
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,825 Regina M. YODER, Lester L. Yoder, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HONEYWELL INC., Bull HN Information Systems, Inc., formerly known as Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1215

104 F.3d 1215

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,825

Regina M. YODER, Lester L. Yoder, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HONEYWELL INC., Bull HN Information Systems, Inc., formerly

known as Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-1464.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Jan. 8, 1997.

Richard M. Foster of Cockrell, Quinn & Creighton, Denver, CO (Marc W. Weingarten of Greitzer & Locks, Philadelphia, PA, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Russell S. Ponessa (Robert B. MacDonald, also of Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman, Minneapolis, MN; Robert J. Potrykus and Giovanni M. Ruscitti, Denver, CO; and Bert L. Wolff of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York City, with him on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Honeywell Inc.

Daniel F. Warden of Bond & Morris, Denver, CO, for Defendant-Appellee Bull HN Information Systems, Inc.

Before HENRY, LOGAN and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

LOGAN, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Regina M. and Lester L. Yoder appeal the district court's dismissal of their products liability action against defendants Honeywell Inc. (Honeywell) and Bull HN Information Systems, Inc. (Bull). Regina Yoder allegedly suffered repetitive stress injuries as a result of using defective computer keyboards while employed at United Airlines in Denver, Colorado. Plaintiffs assert that summary judgment was improper because material issues of fact remain as to whether (1) Bull was the alter ego or instrumentality of its parent Honeywell, and (2) Honeywell was a manufacturer or apparent manufacturer under Colorado law and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 400. Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' action against defendant Bull as barred by the statute of limitations.

I

Numerous plaintiffs, including the Yoders, originally filed suit in December 1992 in the Eastern District of New York against Honeywell and other computer keyboard manufacturers. In April 1994 that court severed the Yoder plaintiffs' case, as permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 21, and transferred it to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404. Honeywell was the only defendant at that time.

Honeywell's first answer filed in January 1993 denied in general terms plaintiffs' allegations that Honeywell manufactured the keyboards at issue. In August 1994, shortly after the transfer of venue, in a scheduling/planning conference Honeywell more specifically made the identity of the manufacturer an issue. On December 7, 1994, Honeywell and plaintiffs jointly inspected the keyboards used at the reservation center where Regina Yoder had worked. Honeywell then formally notified plaintiffs on February 2, 1995, that Honeywell Information Systems Inc., a subsidiary of Honeywell now known as Bull HN Information Systems, Inc., manufactured the keyboards. Plaintiffs moved on March 5, 1995, to join as a party defendant Bull HN Information Systems, Inc., f/k/a/ Honeywell Bull, Inc. and f/k/a Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. The predecessors of Bull HN Information Systems, Inc. also include Incoterm Corporation; we refer to these entities collectively as Bull. In plaintiffs' amended complaint they alleged that Honeywell and/or Bull manufactured the keyboard equipment and asserted that Bull and its predecessors were alter egos or instrumentalities of Honeywell.

The district court granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment. The court first found that Honeywell was not liable to plaintiffs as a manufacturer of the keyboards. Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 900 F.Supp. 240, 242 (D.Colo.1995). The district court noted that

None of the ... keyboards examined bore trademarks identifying the manufacturer on the front of the keyboard enclosures. Each of the seven keyboards had labels bearing a trademark on the bottom of the keyboard enclosures. Three of the keyboards bore the trademark name Incoterm and four bore the Honeywell trademark. Based on [a former Honeywell employee's] examination of the keyboards he determined that the keyboards were not manufactured by Honeywell. Plaintiffs have made no showing that a genuine issue of fact exists that Honeywell manufactured, sold, or distributed any computer keyboard alleged to be defective.

Id. at 242 (citations omitted). The district court then declined to interpret Colorado products liability law to impose liability on a corporation that provides a trademark for a product under an "apparent manufacturer" theory. Id. at 246. The court also found that plaintiffs failed to establish that genuine issues of material fact remained whether to pierce Bull's corporate veil to hold the parent, Honeywell, liable. Finally, the district court granted Bull's motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiffs' claim was time-barred.

II

Plaintiffs first assert that summary judgment ¹ in favor of Honeywell was improper. We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Farthing v. City of Shawnee, Kan., 39 F.3d 1131, 1134 (10th Cir.1994).

Because this is a diversity action, we first determine which state law to apply. The choice of law is determined by the conflict of laws rules of the forum state. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021-22, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). The district court stated that Colorado law would apply as the law of the forum state, apparently overlooking that this case originated in the Eastern District of New York. "The rule is settled that when a district court grants a venue change pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the transferee court is obligated to apply the law of the state in which the transferor court sits." Benne v. International Business Machines Corp., 87 F.3d 419, 423 (10th Cir.1996) (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639, 84 S.Ct. 805, 820, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964) (rule applies whether defendant or plaintiff initiates change of venue)). In this case, therefore, New York choice of law rules apply.

New York employs an "interest analysis" test, which requires application of the substantive law of the state which has the greatest interest in the litigation. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 491 N.Y.S.2d 90, 95, 480 N.E.2d 679, 684 (1985). But before applying this test, New York courts determine whether an actual conflict in the substantive law exists. Defendant Honeywell asserts that the specific substantive tort law of all states with a significant interest in this litigation--Colorado, Delaware and Minnesota ²--require that plaintiffs prove a defendant was the manufacturer (or is liable as an apparent manufacturer) of the product. Thus, defendants assert there is no conflict, and we should apply Colorado law on the tort liability claims. If a potential conflict does exist, Colorado, as plaintiffs' domiciliary and the place where Regina Yoder received the injury, would seem to have the greatest interest in the outcome, see Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 70, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (1972). But see Hadar v. Concordia Yacht Builders, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 1082, 1093-94 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (state where product manufactured has large stake in governing liability of manufacturers in its territory). Therefore, we look to Colorado for the applicable substantive tort law.

Under New York choice of law principles, however, "the law of the state of incorporation determines when the corporate form will be disregarded and liability will be imposed on shareholders." Fletcher v. Atex Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1456 (2d Cir.1995) (citations and quotations omitted). If we were to apply this rule the law of Delaware, the state of defendant Bull's incorporation, would apply to the corporate veil issue. Because the substantive tort law of Colorado applies here, however, we question whether New York would apply Delaware law to this related issue. In any event, our review of Delaware law indicates it is similar to Colorado, although Delaware may require somewhat more to pierce a corporate veil. Compare Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del.Ch.1992) (to pierce corporate veil of subsidiary plaintiff must show fraud or "that the parent and the subsidiary operated as a single economic entity" and "that an overall element of injustice or unfairness" is present) (quotations and citations omitted) with Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Pioneer Uravan, Inc., 878 F.2d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.1989) (listing ten factors Colorado courts consider in determining whether subsidiary is instrumentality of parent; also considering element of injustice). Thus, we analyze the corporate veil issue under Colorado law.

A

Plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil of Bull and hold its parent Honeywell liable in tort because, they alleged, Bull was the alter ego or mere instrumentality of Honeywell. "[C]orporate veils exist for a reason and should be pierced only reluctantly and cautiously. The law permits the incorporation of businesses for the very purpose of isolating liabilities among separate entities." Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir.1995) (quotations omitted) (applying Colorado law).

When, however, the corporate structure is used so improperly that the continued recognition of the corporation as a separate legal entity would be unfair, the corporate entity may be disregarded and corporate principals held liable for the corporations's actions. Thus, if it is shown that shareholders used the corporate entity as a mere instrumentality for the transaction of their own affairs without regard to separate and independent corporate existence, or for the purpose of defeating or evading important legislative policy, or in order to perpetrate a fraud or wrong on another, equity will permit the corporate form to be disregarded and will hold the shareholders personally responsible for the corporation's improper actions.

Micciche v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 372-73 (Colo.1986) (citations omitted).

In Lowell Staats, we noted that under...