Yolanda D., Matter of

• Citation: 651 N.Y.S.2d 1,673 N.E.2d 1228,88 N.Y.2d 790
• Parties: , 673 N.E.2d 1228 In the Matter of YOLANDA D. Orange County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Alexander W., Appellant.
• Decision Date: 22 October 1996
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 1

651 N.Y.S.2d 1

88 N.Y.2d 790, 673 N.E.2d 1228

In the Matter of YOLANDA D. Orange County Department of Social Services, Respondent Alexander W., Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 22, 1996.

Maria Joy Frank, Yorktown Heights, for appellant.

Richard B. Golden, County Attorney of Orange County, Goshen (Stephen Toole, of counsel), for respondent.

Stuart I. Greenberg, Monroe, Law Guardian for Yolanda D.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Judge.

The issue presented on this appeal is whether Family Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the appellant, the uncle of the abused child, as a person legally responsible for his niece's care (see, Family Ct. Act § 1012[a], [g] ). Concluding that appellant was a proper respondent in the child protective proceeding pursuant to section 1012(a) of the Family Court Act, we affirm the order of the Appellate Division.

The respondent on this appeal, the Orange County Department of Social Services (DSS), brought this Family Court Act article 10 proceeding alleging that appellant sexually abused his niece, Yolanda D., during the summer of 1991. ¹ The petition alleged that the abuse occurred on numerous occasions at appellant's Pennsylvania home. After a hearing, Family Court found that appellant had sexually abused his 12-year-old niece during the summer of 1991, and that he had been a person legally responsible for her care during that time. Family Court also found that Yolanda had been sexually abused by the appellant when she was 10 and 11 years old. Yolanda was adjudged an abused child and a dispositional order was entered placing appellant under the supervision of DSS and requiring him to attend a sex offender therapy program. Family Court also directed the entry of an order of protection requiring appellant to stay 1,000 feet away from Yolanda and the other children named in the petition.

Appellant appealed the fact-finding and dispositional orders arguing, in part, that he had not been a proper respondent in the Family Court proceeding because he was not a person legally responsible for Yolanda's care. ² The Appellate Division rejected appellant's jurisdictional challenge, determined that appellant's role was the "functional equivalent of a parent" and affirmed Family Court's finding that appellant was a proper respondent under section 1012(a) of the Family Court Act (218 A.D.2d 648, 651, 630 N.Y.S.2d 537). We granted appellant's motion for leave to appeal to this Court.

The sole issue raised by the appellant on this appeal is whether he met the statutory definition of a "person legally responsible" for Yolanda's care during the summer of 1991. A child protective proceeding is brought against a "respondent," a term defined by article 10 as "any parent or other person legally responsible for a child's care who is alleged to have abused or neglected such child" (Family Ct. Act § 1012[a] ). Section 1012(g) further defines "person legally responsible" as

"the child's custodian, guardian, [or] any other person responsible for the child's care at the relevant time. Custodian may include any person continually or at regular intervals found in the same household as the child when the conduct of such person causes or contributes to the abuse or neglect of the child."

Appellant argues that he did not fit within any of the statutory categories of legally responsible persons at the time the abuse occurred. Initially, appellant contends that he was not a custodian or guardian because he did not have legal custody or guardianship of Yolanda during the summer of 1991. Appellant further claims that he could not be considered Yolanda's custodian because he was not a regular or continuous member of his niece's household or the functional equivalent of a parent. As to the catch-all provision in the statute, "any other person responsible for the child's care at the relevant time," appellant would limit this category to individuals acting in loco parentis or assuming a parental role toward the child, who are also regular or continuous members of the child's household. DSS, the respondent on this appeal, contends that the record supports the Appellate Division's affirmance of the finding that appellant was a person legally responsible for Yolanda's care.

We note that the term "custodian" has not been limited or modified by any qualifiers such as "nontemporary" or "legal." Indeed, the legislative history and other commentary indicate that a broader definition than that proposed by appellant was intended (see, Letter from sponsor of an amendment to section 1012[g] to the Governor, Bill Jacket, L. 1972, ch. 1015 [stating the intent to include paramours, persons without legal custody of the child, within the jurisdiction of Family Court]; Besharov, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 29A, Family Ct. Act § 1012, at 268).

Moreover, to the extent that the statute provides that custodians may include persons found in the "same household" as the child, section 1012(g) does not preclude a finding that the child's regular or continuous presence in another person's household may make that person a custodian (see, Matter of Robert J., 178 A.D.2d 1004, 580 N.Y.S.2d 894 [grandfather who provided caretaking activities at his home rather than at child's household found to be a custodian under section 1012(g) ] ). Consequently, limiting the scope of "custodian" to embrace only those persons who may be regularly or continuously found in the child's household is unwarranted given the absence of an express directive to construe the statute restrictively (see, Matter of Maureen G., 103 Misc.2d 109, 114, 426 N.Y.S.2d 384 ["Subdivision (g) amplifies the class of respondents liable under article 10; it is not meant as a limitation"] ). ³

Appellant's narrow interpretation of "other person responsible for the child's care" is similarly unsupported by the terms of the statute. By seeking to limit the application of this provision to those persons who may be found in the child's household on a regular or continuous basis, appellant renders it coextensive with "custodian," making it superfluous. Since courts must, where possible, give effect to every word of a statute, and "other person responsible" exists side by side with "custodian" in section 1012(g), a person may be a proper respondent in a child protective proceeding even if that person is not a custodian of the child.

As we must interpret statutes in a manner consistent with and in furtherance of the legislative intent behind the enactment (Catlin v. Sobol, 77 N.Y.2d 552, 558, 569 N.Y.S.2d 353, 571 N.E.2d 661), we turn first to the purpose section of article 10 to discern the meaning of "other person responsible for the child's care." The stated purpose of article 10 is to

"help protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-being. It is designed to provide a due process of law for determining when the state, through its family court, may intervene against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so that his needs are properly met" (Family Ct. Act § 1011).

Since section 1011 of the Family Court Act casts intervention by a Family Court as an event likely to occur against the wishes of a parent, article 10 proceedings are geared toward protecting the child from injury or mistreatment which may result from abusive or deficient parenting. Subdivisions (a) and (g) of section 1012 embody legislative recognition of the reality that parenting functions are not always performed by a parent but may be discharged by other persons, including custodians, guardians and paramours, who perform caretaking duties...