York v. Boatman

• Decision Date: 08 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 06–15–00030–CV,06–15–00030–CV
• Citation: 487 S.W.3d 635
• Parties: Leta York, Appellant v. Todd Boatman, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

487 S.W.3d 635

Leta York, Appellant

v.Todd Boatman, Appellee

No. 06–15–00030–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Date Submitted: December 23, 2015

Date Decided: April 8, 2016

Phil N. Smith, Smith & Smith Law Firm, Sulphur Springs, TX, for appellant.

Larry A. Powers, Powers & Blount, LLP, Sulphur Springs, TX, for appellee.

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Burgess

Leta York (York) filed suit in Hopkins County, Texas, seeking to have a 1995 deed conveying real property from her to her daughter, Gwendolyn Boatman (Gwendolyn), declared void; in the alternative, she sought to impose a constructive trust on the 153.185 acres conveyed in the deed. The trial court held that the deed was valid and that Todd Boatman (Todd), Gwendolyn's son and sole beneficiary, was the fee simple owner of the 153.185 acres, subject to a four-acre life estate in favor of York. On appeal, York asserts (1) that the 1995 deed is void and/or invalid as a gift, (2) that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings of fact numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8, and (3) that the evidence is insufficient to prove that Gwendolyn repudiated the constructive trust created by the 1995 deed.

We find (1) that the 1995 deed was a valid gift, (2) that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact, and (3) that no constructive trust existed.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 1967, W.L. Smith and Donnie Smith conveyed a life estate in four acres to their daughter, York, and her husband, Henry York (Henry), with the remainder in fee simple to the Yorks' only daughter, Gwendolyn. In 1985, after both of the Smiths passed away, York and her sister, as the Smiths' sole heirs, partitioned the Smiths' real property, with York being conveyed a fee simple interest in 153.185 acres, including the four acres subject to the life estate from the 1967 deed.

By general warranty deed dated August 10, 1995, York conveyed the 153.185 acres to Gwendolyn “as her separate property.” The deed stated that it was “[s]ubject to all outstanding [r]eservations, [r]estrictions[,] and [r]ights of [w]ay of record....” York's husband, Henry, was not a party to the 1995 deed and died shortly after the 1995 deed was executed.

In November 2003, Gwendolyn executed a gift deed conveying the 153.185 acres back to York, but as per Gwendolyn's instructions, the gift deed was held by her attorney, Jay Garrett, and was never delivered or recorded. In a letter dated December 6, 2004, York's attorney, Lanny Ramsay, demanded that Garrett release and forward the gift deed to him. After learning of York's demand, Gwendolyn requested, by letter, that Garrett return the deed to her, and when he refused to do so, she filed a rescission of the gift deed in the deed records of Hopkins County. In January 2005, Garrett submitted the gift deed into the registry of the court and filed an interpleader action, naming York and Gwendolyn as defendants. Four months later, Gwendolyn filed a pro se answer, requesting that the gift deed be returned to her. In March 2006, the trial court dismissed the interpleader for lack of prosecution and about five months later, ordered that the gift deed be released to Gwendolyn.

Gwendolyn died on April 22, 2012, leaving a Will naming her son, Todd, as the sole beneficiary of her estate. The Will was admitted to probate on June 12, 2012. In July 2012, by special warranty deed, Gwendolyn's estate conveyed the 153.185 acres to Todd.

On January 30, 2013, York, claiming to be the rightful owner of the 153.185 acres, filed suit against Todd to have the 1995 deed declared void, or in the alternative, to impose a constructive trust on the 153.185 acres conveyed in the deed.¹ The trial court held that the 1995 deed was valid and that Todd was the fee simple owner of the 153.185 acres, subject to a four-acre life estate in favor of York.²

II. Analysis

A. York's First Point of Error—Whether the 1995 Deed is Invalid

1. York's First Argument—The 1995 Deed Was Void Because it Was Not a Gift of a Present Interest

York first argues that the 1995 deed was void and/or invalid because it was not a gift “in praesenti,” a gift of a present interest, as it failed to exclude or reserve the four-acre life estate from the 1967 deed or the homestead interest of Henry.³ Nevertheless, a gift by deed does not require proof that the gift was in praesenti. When conveyed by deed, an estate in realty may be made to commence in the future. See Woodworth v. Cortez , 660 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

(“A gift may generally not be made to take effect in the future since a mere promise to give is unenforceable without consideration. However, by virtue of statutory authority an estate in realty may be made to commence in futuro by deed.” (citations omitted)); see also

Davis v. Zeanon, 111 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1937, writ ref'd) (“At common law, an estate in remainder, expectant on the death of the grantor, could not be created, but in this state, by virtue of a special statutory provision, an estate in land may be created by deed to commence in futuro.”).

Yet, even if transfer of a present interest were required, there is no indication in the 1995 deed that York did not immediately convey all of her present rights and title in the 153.185 acres or that any part of the conveyance was to take place in the future. The 1995 deed purports to convey York's rights and title in the 153.185 acres to Gwendolyn. At the time of the 1995 deed, York owned the 153.185 acres subject to the four-acre life estate and homestead rights of Henry. Thus, on its face, the deed purports to grant all of York's interest in the property to Gwendolyn.

York argues, however, that that conveyance is invalid because the deed fails to reserve Henry's rights in the property. York reasons that, because she had no authority to convey Henry's rights, the 1995 deed is invalid. Nevertheless, “[o]ne spouse's conveyance of her separate property family homestead, without the joinder of the other spouse, is not void as to the conveying spouse. It is, however, inoperative against the continuing homestead claim of the nonjoining spouse.” Geldard v. Watson, 214 S.W.3d 202, 207 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.)

(citation omitted). Moreover, a homestead right “is analogous to a life tenancy, with the holder of the homestead right possessing the rights similar to those of a life tenant for so long as the property retains its homestead character.” Laster v. First Huntsville Props., Co., 826 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex.1991). And,

[a]lthough the homestead estate is not identical to a life estate because one's homestead rights can be lost through abandonment, “it may be said that the homestead laws have the effect of reducing the underlying ownership rights in a homestead property to something akin to remainder interests and vesting in each spouse an interest akin to an undivided life estate in the property.”

Id.

(quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 686, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983) ). Accordingly, even though the deed does not specifically reserve Henry's homestead and life estate rights, the conveyance was made subject to those rights as a matter of law, and the failure of the deed to specifically reserve those rights does not render it void as to York.⁴

See id. ; see also

Davis, 111 S.W.2d at 772.

2. York's Second Argument—The 1995 Deed is Invalid Because the Evidence is Insufficient to Establish that the 1995 Deed Was a Gift

The trial court's conclusion that Todd Boatman was the fee simple owner of the 153.185 acres was based on an implied finding that the 1995 deed was a gift from York to Gwendolyn.⁵ In her second point of error, York argues that the 1995 deed was not a valid gift of the property because she lacked the requisite donative intent and because no actual delivery and acceptance occurred. Specifically, she argues that she and Gwendolyn agreed to transfer the property to Gwendolyn in order to protect it from seizure by the government to satisfy Henry's nursing home costs and then transfer it back to York upon Henry's death.

A gift of realty can be made either by deed, as is alleged in this case, or by parol gift. Troxel v. Bishop, 201 S.W.3d 290, 297 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)

. The elements of a valid gift by deed are: (1) donative intent, (2) delivery of the property, and (3) acceptance of the property. Id. at 296. The owner must release all dominion and control over the gifted property. Id. Generally, the party claiming the gift has the burden of establishing the elements of gift, but because the 1995 deed purports to convey the property at issue from York to Gwendolyn it is presumed that York intended the conveyance to be a gift. See id. ; Richardson v. Laney, 911 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1995, no writ) (citing Kyles v. Kyles, 832 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1992, no writ) ). To rebut this presumption, York had to “prove a lack of donative intent by clear and convincing evidence at the trial court level.” Richardson, 911 S.W.2d at 492. Moreover, the requirement of clear and convincing evidence “does not alter the standard of review to be applied at the appellate court level for sufficiency of the evidence challenges.” Id. Thus, notwithstanding the clear and convincing evidence standard, the trial court's findings must be supported by factually sufficient evidence. Id.

“When we review a finding for factual sufficiency, we consider all of the evidence and will set aside a finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” Edwards v. Mid–Cont'l Office Distribs., L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied)

(citing Francis v. Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex.2001) (per curiam); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986) (per curiam)). The trial court, being the sole...