York v. Wyman

• Decision Date: 06 November 1916
• Citation: 98 A. 1024
• Parties: YORK v. WYMAN.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

98 A. 1024

YORK

v. WYMAN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Nov. 6, 1916.

On motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Somerset County, at Law.

Action by Rachel York against Herbert Wyman. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant moves to set aside the verdict, and to grant a new trial. Motion granted, and new trial ordered.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, KING, BIRD, HALEY, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

Merrill & Merrill, of Skowhegan, for plaintiff. George W. Gower, of Skowhegan, for defendant.

PHILBROOK, J. This case comes to us upon a special motion by the defendant who asks that the verdict against him be set aside, and a new trial granted, because of the misconduct of a member of the jury which rendered that verdict.

From the testimony presented in support of the motion it appears that while the case was still pending, and before the arguments of counsel had been made or the presiding justice had delivered his charge to the jury, a member of the panel was at a livery stable in the town where the trial was in progress, for the purpose of stabling his horse. While there, a man, related to the plaintiff by marriage, stated to or in the presence and hearing of this juror, according to the testimony of one witness, that the defendant and his wife, both being material witnesses, had "lied like hell and that he hoped the woman (meaning the plaintiff) would get the case." To which the juror replied "that he thought so too, and as far as he was concerned they would." According to the testimony of another witness the man stated "that Wyman and his wife had swore to a lie, or to that effect, and that the case should be decided to the woman" (meaning the plaintiff); and that the juror replied, "I think so too."

This incident did not come to the knowledge of the defendant, or his attorney, until after the verdict had been rendered.

More than once, and in no uncertain language, we have placed the seal of condemnation, not alone upon the attempts of parties by word or deed to influence or prejudice jurors outside the courtroom, but also upon the indiscretion of their friends along the same line. And we have not stopped to inquire whether the attempt was successful, nor whether the mind of a juror was actually influenced, but only whether or not the mind of a juror might have been influenced by the attempt, or whether the attempt might have any tendency to influence the mind of a juror. Heffron v. Gallupe, 55 Me. 563; Bradbury v. Cony, 62 Me. 223, 16 Am. Rep. 449; Belcher v. Estes, 99 Me. 314, 59 Atl. 439; Shepard v. B., B. & B. Railway, 101 Me. 591, 65 Atl. 20; Driscoll v. Gatcomb, 112 Me. 289, 92 Atl. 39, L. R. A. 1915B, 702. In a sister jurisdiction we find Nesmith v. Clinton Fire Insurance Co., 8 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 141, cited in Bradbury v. Cony, supra, where it was proved that during the trial of an action in which there was much conflicting evidence, a juror listened to the statements of a third party, attacking the credibility of the defendant's witnesses. The court held that when it appears that the jury have been approached in such a manner as might have influenced the verdict, it should be set aside, without reference to the source or the motive of the interference. This latter case bears strong resemblance to the one at bar. In Cilley v. Bartlett, 19 N. H. 312, one of the parties, in the presence and hearing of one or more of the jury, asserted in the most positive terms that the...