Yorzinski v. Alves

• Decision Date: 16 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 3:05cv1656 (JBA).,3:05cv1656 (JBA).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Henry YORZINSKI, Plaintiff, v. John ALVES, et al., Defendants.

477 F.Supp.2d 461

Henry YORZINSKI, Plaintiff, v. John ALVES, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:05cv1656 (JBA).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

February 16, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Erin Marie Kallaugher, Norman A. Pattis, Bethany, CT, for Plaintiff.

Alan Raymond Dembiczak, John J. Radshaw, Thomas R. Gerarde, Howd & Ludorf, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [DOC. # 22]

ARTERTON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Henry Yorzinski alleges in his Complaint (removed from state court on federal question grounds) violations of 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and Conn. Const. Art. I § 7 for unreasonable search of his house and automobile following his warrantless arrest in the early morning hours of July 3, 2000. Defendants Branford Police Department Officers John Alves, Kris Hor muth, and Peter Kendzierski, Sergeant Mark Ciarciello, and Chief Robert Gill move for summary judgment contending: (1) defendants' search of plaintiff's residence was valid under the protective sweep exception to the Fourth Amendment of the. United States Constitution; (2) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions; (3) plaintiff fails to state a viable claim under Conn. Const. Art. I § 7; and (4) plaintiffs' claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Defs. Mot. [Doc. # 22].¹ For the reasons that follow, defendants' Motion will be denied, except as described in note 1, supra.

I. Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed except where noted. As of July 3, 2000, plaintiff resided at 600 Main Street in Branford, Connecticut, at the intersection of Main, Monroe, and Kirkham Streets, in an apartment consisting of a downstairs kitchen, bathroom, and living room, two upstairs bedrooms, and an attic. At the time, defendants Alves, Kendzierski, and Ciarciello were officers in the Branford Police Department.

On July 3, 2000, the Branford Police Department dispatched officers to the intersection of Main, Monroe, and Kirkham Streets, near the Short Beach Saloon, in response to a report that a white male with a beard and scraggly hair, wearing a t-shirt and shorts, threatened with a handgun two individuals in a car near the intersection of Main and Kirkham Streets. At the time the dispatch went out, defendant Alves was in his police cruiser at the intersection of Main and Kirkham Streets and observed an individual (the plaintiff) fitting the description of the dispatch climbing the stairs to the residence of 600 Main Street. To Alves, it appeared that plaintiff was in a hurry, and Alves shone his spotlight on plaintiff in hopes that plaintiff would stop; it appeared to Alves that plaintiff was fumbling with his keys and in a rush to enter the apartment. Plaintiff testifies that he was afraid Alves might think he was breaking into his own apartment, so he held his keys up so that Alves could see them, and then continued into the apartment. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff exited the apartment with his dog, at which point Alves and Kendzierski approached him, detained him, and conducted a pat-down. When asked whether there was anyone else in the apartment, plaintiff answered in the negative.

Around this time, Sergeant Ciarciello arrived on the scene and ordered Alves and Kendzierski to handcuff plaintiff, which they did. Alves informed Ciarciello of plaintiffs behavior upon shining the spotlight on him, including appearing to be in a hurry and fumbling with his keys, and also informed Ciarciello that plaintiff was exiting the apartment with his dog when the officers detained him. Ciarciello observed the apartment door, left partially open with the keys still in the lock, saw that the lights in plaintiffs apartment were still on, and concluded that another individual might still be in plaintiffs apartment. Ciarciello claims that because of the officers' position approximately 7-8 feet below the door to plaintiffs apartment, they could not see around the corner, and due to the size of the apartment building he did not know how much of the building constituted plaintiffs apartment. As a result of these circumstances, he feared that the officers were vulnerable to attack by someone inside. Ciarciello also claims to have been concerned about potential victims inside the residence and, since the dispatch stated that a gun had been pulled on a man and a woman, he believed that it may have involved a "love triangle" and that a victim may be inside plaintiffs residence.

Accordingly, while Alves transported plaintiff down to the police cruiser, Ciarciello and Kendzierski conducted what they contend was a protective search of plaintiffs residence and which they claim lasted 30-60 seconds. Defendants argue that reasonable suspicion existed to conduct a protective sweep based on the following factors: plaintiffs "evasive" behavior, the fact that plaintiff left the lights on in his apartment with his door partially open and his keys in the door, the fact that the incident reported occurred in close proximity to 600 Main Street, the position of the officers in relation to the door to plaintiffs apartment, the size of the building at 600 Main Street, and concern for potential victims inside.

II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). A party seeking summary judgment "bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts establish [its] right to judgment as a matter of law." Rodriguez v. City of N.Y., 72 F.3d 1051, 1060 (2d Cir.1995) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). "The duty of the court is to determine whether there are issues to be tried; in making that determination, the court is to draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, viewing the factual assertions in materials such as affidavits, exhibits, and depositions, the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id. (citations omitted). "If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence ... and if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the nonmoving party's favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment." R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54, 59 (2d Cir.1997) (internal quotation, citation, and alteration omitted). However, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute will be satisfied if he or she can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "A defendant need not prove a negative when it moves for summary judgment on an issue that the plaintiff must prove at trial. It need only point to an absence of proof on plaintiffs part, and, at that point, plaintiff must `designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548); see also Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir.1994) ("[T]he moving party may obtain summary judgment by showing that little or no evidence may be found in support of the nonmoving party's case."). The non-moving party, in order to defeat summary judgment, must then come forward with evidence that would be sufficient to support a jury verdict in his or her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party."). In making this determination, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. However, a party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading," Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e), and "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" is insufficient. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citations omitted).

III. Discussion

A. Protective Sweep

As the parties. acknowledge, "[w]arrantless entry into a home is per se unreasonable ... absent consent or exigent circumstances." See Waananen v. Barry, 343 F.Supp.2d 161 (D.Conn.2004) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), and Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 216, 101 S.Ct 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981)). However, the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), in an analogy to the stop and frisk principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), held that the Fourth Amendment permits "protective sweeps" undertaken "if the searching officer possessed a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the officer in believing ... that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to...