Youghal, LLC v. Entwistle

• Decision Date: 23 March 2020
• Docket Number: SJC-12754
• Citation: 484 Mass. 1019,141 N.E.3d 444
• Parties: YOUGHAL, LLC v. Amanda ENTWISTLE & another.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

484 Mass. 1019

141 N.E.3d 444

YOUGHAL, LLC

v.Amanda ENTWISTLE & another.¹

SJC-12754

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

March 23, 2020.

Francis B. Fennessey, Charlton, for the plaintiff.

Alan H. Aaron, Framingham, for the defendants.

H. Esme Caramello, for City Life/Vida Urbana & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Joseph N. Schneiderman, for Chelsea Collaborative, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

RESCRIPT

The defendant tenants appeal from a Housing Court judgment for the plaintiff landlord on its summary process complaint, the denial of relief on certain of their counterclaims, and from the award of nominal damages on other counterclaims. The landlord appeals from the denial of its motion to dismiss the tenants' appeal. The Appeals Court dismissed the tenants' appeal on timeliness ground, and we granted further appellate review. We conclude that the tenants' appeal is timely, and that the landlord's summary process complaint must be dismissed because the summons and complaint were served within fourteen days of the tenants' receipt of the notice to quit. We affirm the judgment with respect to the tenants' counterclaims.

Background. The landlord commenced a summary process action against the tenants seeking to recover possession of the subject premises and damages for unpaid rent. The tenants responded by claiming improper termination of the tenancy, and counterclaiming for breach of the warranty of habitability, in violation of G. L. c. 239, § 8A ; violation of G. L. c. 186, § 14 (utilities, services, and quiet enjoyment); G. L. c. 239, § 2A (reprisal for reporting violations of law); and G. L. c. 93A (consumer protection).² After a bench trial, on November 2, 2017, the judge ordered judgment for the tenants on two counterclaims, and awarded nominal damages. With respect to the landlord's summary process complaint, she ordered judgment for the tenants if they paid $6,225 to the landlord within ten days and filed a receipt of the payment with the court;³ otherwise, the judge ordered judgment for the landlord. The tenants did not make the payment, and final judgment entered on November 15, 2017.

On November 13, 2017, before the entry of final judgment, the tenants filed a motion seeking a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 59, 365 Mass. 827 (1974). The judge denied the motion on November 21, 2017; the tenants filed a notice of appeal within ten days after the denial of that motion. In addition, the judge denied the landlord's motion to dismiss the appeal and request for an execution. Over the landlord's opposition, an appeal bond was set.

On the parties' cross appeals, the Appeals Court dismissed the tenants' appeal on timeliness ground. We granted further appellate review to consider whether a motion, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59, served before the entry of final judgment, is timely for purposes of Mass. R. App. P. 4 (a), as amended, 464 Mass. 1601 (2013). We conclude that it is. We also conclude that the summary process complaint must be dismissed because it was served within the fourteen-day period after receipt of the notice to quit. We find no error in the Housing Court judgment with respect to the counterclaims, and affirm that portion of the judgment.

Discussion. On review of the Housing Court judge's decision, "we accept her findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. The judge's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo" (citations omitted). Anastos v. Sable, 443 Mass. 146, 149, 819 N.E.2d 587 (2004).

1. Propriety of tenants' appeal. Although the landlord challenged the propriety of the tenants' appeal on several grounds, the Appeals Court dismissed the appeal on a different ground.⁴ The Appeals Court concluded that the tenants' appeal was untimely and must be dismissed because the notice of appeal was filed more than ten days after the entry of ... judgment."⁵ G. L. c. 239, § 5. We disagree: the appellate clock was stopped by the tenants' timely posttrial motion. Under Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a) :

"If a timely motion under the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the lower court by any party:

"...

"(3) to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59 or for relief from judgment under Rule 60, however titled, if either motion is served within ten days after entry of judgment; or

"(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial,

"the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect...."

Although the tenants filed their notice of appeal more than ten days after judgment entered, on November 15, 2017, it was filed within ten days of the denial of their motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment. The rule 59 motion was a "timely motion" for purposes of Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a), even though it was filed before the entry of judgment.

Rule 59 requires only that "a motion for a new trial [or to alter or amend the judgment] shall be served not later than [ten] days after the entry of judgment" (emphasis added). Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 (b), (e). Nothing in the rule precludes a litigant from filing its motion before judgment actually has entered, and nothing in the rule renders such a motion "untimely." See Reporters' Notes (1973) to Rule 59, Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure, at 1116 (LexisNexis 2015) ("The wording of 59 [b], however, allows a motion to be made both before or after the entry of judgment"). Contrast Mass. R. A. P. 4 (a) (notice of appeal filed before disposition of enumerated timely-filed motions without effect).

Manzaro v. McCann, 401 Mass. 880, 881-882 & n.2, 519 N.E.2d 1337 (1988), does not require a different result. Unlike this case, Manzaro did not involve an early-filed rule 59 motion. In that context, our observation that the " rule 59 (e) motion was filed on September 12, 1986, within ten days from judgment as directed by that rule," recognizes only that the rule 59 (e) motion was not late and, therefore, that the time for appeal did not begin to run until the motion was decided. Manzaro, 401 Mass. at 882, 519 N.E.2d 1337. To the extent Empire Loan of Stoughton v. Stanley Convergent Sec. Solutions, Inc., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 709, 119 N.E.3d 318 (2019), suggests that a motion for reconsideration, to alter or amend a judgment, or for relief from judgment is not timely if it is served before judgment enters, it is overruled.

The landlord's claims concerning the procedural propriety of the appeal are equally without merit. The landlord suggests that Mass. R. A. P. 4 does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal prescribed in G. L. c. 239, § 5. However, although G. L. c. 239, § 5, requires a party appealing from a summary process judgment to "file a notice of appeal with the court within [ten] days after the entry of the judgment," a timely motion pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 59 to alter or amend a judgment suspends the finality of the judgment. See Manzaro, 401 Mass. at 882, 519 N.E.2d 1337. The statutory period commences anew when the rule 59 motion is disposed, i.e., when the entry of judgment is effective.

With respect to the landlord's claim that, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules, the tenants' notice of appeal was ineffective because it failed to include a request to set an appeal bond, the tenants did not request waiver of the bond. We recognize that rule 12 provides:

"Upon receipt of notice of appeal and request for setting of bond within the time prescribed by G. L. c. 239, § 5, the clerk shall forthwith schedule a hearing before the court on whether an appeal bond shall be required and on the form and amount of such appeal bond. The hearing shall be held within three business days of said receipt."

As stated, however, G. L. c. 239, § 5, specifies the timing for filing a notice of appeal; it does not address the mechanism for setting an appeal bond. In that context, rule 12 is best understood to require that, if both a notice of appeal and a request for setting of a bond are filed within the statutory period, a hearing will be held within three business days. The absence of a request for setting of bond, however, does not render an otherwise timely notice of appeal defective.

Finally, with respect to the landlord's claim that the tenants' notice of appeal was inadequate to claim an appeal from the final judgment, we acknowledge that the notice of appeal stated that the tenants were "aggrieved by the Findings of Fact, Rulings of Law, Decision and the denial of their Motion for New Trial or to Alter or Amend Judgment." In the circumstances here, we conclude the notice was adequate, particularly because the appeal permitted by G. L. c. 239, § 5, is an appeal from a final judgment.

Having concluded that the appeal properly is before us, we proceed to address the claims raised by the tenants.

2. Termination of the tenancy. As of June 1, 2017, the tenants, who occupied the premises pursuant to a written lease, had an unpaid rent balance of $1,250. On June 6, 2017, the landlord's agent sought to terminate the tenancy by delivering to the tenants a notice to quit the premises in fourteen days. See G. L. c. 186, § 11. See New Bedford Housing Auth. v. Olan, 435 Mass. 364, 373, 758 N.E.2d 1039 (2001) ("where a statute requires written notice to terminate a tenancy, that notice must be sent before an action for summary process may be commenced"). The agent taped the notice to the door of the premises. One tenant testified that she was not present when the notice was delivered, and that she did not receive it until June 7, 2017. The tenants claim that their tenancy therefore remained unchanged through June 21, 2017, the fourteenth day after actual receipt of the notice to quit. See Johnson v. Stewart, 11 Gray 181, 183 (1858) ("When an act is to be done within a given number of days from the date or the day of...