Youmans v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 08 January 1935 |
Docket Number | 13967. |
Parties | YOUMANS v. CHARLESTON & W. C. RY. CO. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Hampton County; S.W. G Shipp, Judge.
Action by Melvin Youmans against the Charleston & Western Carolina Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
M. G McDonald, of Greenwood, and J. W. Manuel and C. Lester Thomas, both of Hampton, for appellant.
George Warren and Randolph Murdaugh, both of Hampton, for respondent.
This action, held by the trial judge to be one in breach of contract, was brought in the court of common pleas for Hampton county on July 9, 1932. It was alleged, inter alia, that:
The defendant denied every material allegation of the plaintiff, and alleged that the work performed by him as section foreman was of such poor character that repeated complaints were made thereabout; that, rather than discharge him, although his services were unsatisfactory, and he was so notified, the defendant on July 15, 1932, "demoted him from section foreman to that of apprentice laborer" at a salary of approximately $75 per month; but that he refused, upon notice of such demotion, to accept the new place, and voluntarily quit the service of the company.
The trial of the case, October, 1933, resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $5,000. From judgment entered thereon the defendant excepts and brings error.
The exceptions, of which there are fourteen, will be considered in the order in which they appear in the record for appeal. Eight of these charge Judge Shipp with error in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant upon the grounds:
First. That the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the testimony was that the plaintiff was not discharged, but voluntarily resigned from the service of the company.
We think the court was correct in refusing to grant the motion on this ground. In addition to plaintiff's own testimony that he was discharged by the company, such inference might properly be drawn from letters written him by the assistant engineer and the roadmaster of defendant. While it is true that the engineer wrote him on June 13, 1932, that "I can offer you position as apprentice on extra gang if you desire same," still he directed him in the same letter "to turn over all company supplies and keys to tool house on this date to Mr. Garrett." Whether this was intended as, or amounted to, a discharge of the plaintiff, was a question for the jury.
Second. "That the evidence shows that the contract of hire between plaintiff and the defendant was for an indefinite term and was, therefore, terminable at the will of either party."
In Johnson v. American Railway Express Company, 163 S.C. 191, 161 S.E. 473, 475, where a similar question was involved, it was held that ""there is no doubt of the correctness of the general proposition that if an employment is for an indefinite term, and each party may terminate it at his pleasure, the discharge even without cause will afford the employee no ground of complaint." In that case, however, the plaintiff invoked for his benefit an agreement between the defendant company and its employees represented by the American Federation of Express Workers, rule 29 which was as follows:
And rule 37: "If the final decision decrees that charges against the employee were not sustained, the record shall be cleared of the charge; if suspended or dismissed, the employee shall be reinstated and paid for the time lost."
The court, in considering these clauses of the agreement as affecting defendant's claim that it could terminate the contract, because it was for an indefinite term, at its pleasure, said:
The court further observed:
See, also, Marshall v. Railway Company, 164 S.C. 283, 162 S.E. 348, 353.
In the case at bar, a similar agreement between the defendant company and union of employees, "governing the employment and working conditions of employees in the Maintenance of Way Department," was invoked by the plaintiff; certain pertinent provisions thereof being set out in his complaint. Rule 24 reads as follows: "An employee disciplined, or one who considers himself unjustly treated, shall have a fair and impartial hearing, provided written request is presented to his immediate superior within ten (10) days of date of advice or discipline, and the hearing shall be granted within ten (10) days thereafter."
And rule 29: "If the final decision decrees that charges against employees are not sustained, the employee shall be reinstated and reimbursed for any loss in wages resulting therefrom."
In disposing of this ground of the motion, Judge Shipp said:
"This case differs from the Johnson case and the Marshall case, in that there is no paragraph in the contract set out in the complaint, or that has been put in evidence forbidding the railroad to discharge or demote any employee without first having an investigation. Therefore, it differs from those other cases; but yet it is practically the same for it guarantees to every employee who feels himself aggrieved by any act of the railroad company an investigation and a fair trial, at which he has a right to be represented by certain representatives; provided, however, he makes...
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