Youmans v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.

• Decision Date: 28 July 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 21-1381 (RC)
• Parties: SHATWAYLLA M. YOUMANS, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

SHATWAYLLA M. YOUMANS, Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-1381 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

July 28, 2022

Re Document Nos.: 7, 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE DEFENDANT GREYHOUND'S MOTION TO DISMISS; TRANSFERRING CASE TO THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Shatwaylla M. Youmans, an Arizona resident, brings this pro se action against the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) and Greyhound Bus Inc. (“Greyhound”). Ms. Youmans claims, among other things, negligence against both Defendants that allegedly resulted in her physical injury. The FMCSA moves to dismiss Ms. Youmans's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper party, expired statute of limitations, and improper venue. Greyhound moves to dismiss Ms. Youmans's claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, or alternatively, failure to state a claim. The Court has carefully considered the parties' briefs, applicable law, and the entire record herein. For the reasons that follow, Defendant FMCSA's motion to dismiss is GRANTED, Defendant Greyhound's motion to dismiss is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the case is TRANSFERRED to the Southern District of Florida.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are alleged as follows: On February 15, 2014, Ms. Youmans boarded a Greyhound bus at a bus station in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, with her child. See Compl. at 8, 29, ECF No. 1.^[1] At the time, Greyhound was promoting an advertising campaign for the Harlem Globetrotters and an unspecified “innovative bus invention.” Id. at 8. As passengers were boarding the bus, the Greyhound driver left the bus unattended, and an unidentified person entered the bus's cockpit. Id. at 11. As Ms. Youmans boarded the bus, the unidentified person adjusted the control board near the steering wheel and changed the boarding escalators into a “moving staircase,” catapulting her into the air. Id. Ms. Youmans fell to the ground, injuring her back, skull, neck, and lay there unable to move until her cousin picked her up and helped her to her seat on the bus. Id. at 11-12. No ambulance was called for her; instead, the Greyhound driver entered the bus and began driving to the Greyhound Station in Orlando, Florida, without attending to her. Id. at 12-13. Upon arrival, Ms. Youmans filed a “deficiency report.” Id. at 13. Thereafter, Ms. Youmans went to an emergency room in St. Augustine, Florida, where the Greyhound driver filled out an injury report on her behalf. Id.

Ms. Youmans alleges that FMCSA was negligent in failing to inspect the Greyhound terminal to ensure its safety, which she claims led to her injury, and that Greyhound was negligent under “general” and “premises liability” theories of negligence. Pl.'s Resp. Order Ct. (“Pl. Opp'n”) at 3, ECF No. 11. The Complaint also alleges that FMCSA and Greyhound engaged in a conspiracy to perform medical experiments on her, kidnap her child, and traffic illicit drugs throughout Florida, Arizona, and Georgia. Compl. at 8, 13, 14, 16-19, 21. Ms.

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Youmans claims that she filed several reports to the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). Id. at 21.

Both Defendants move to dismiss. FMCSA asks the Court to dismiss Ms. Youmans's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper party, expired statute of limitations, and improper venue. Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“FMCSA Mot.”) at 4-6, ECF No. 9-1. Greyhound seeks dismissal of Ms. Youmans's claims for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, failure to state a claim. Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Greyhound Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 7-1. The motions are now ripe for decision.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss an action when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction.”). It is the plaintiff's burden to establish that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

Because subject matter jurisdiction focuses on the Court's power to hear a claim, the Court must give the plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2001). Thus, the Court is not limited to the allegations contained in the Complaint. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Instead, “where necessary, the court may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts

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evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981)). Once a court “determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it can proceed no further.” Verizon Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 254 F.Supp.3d 208, 214 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).

Rule 12(b)(2) allows a court to dismiss an action when it lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). A federal court looks to the state's long-arm statute to determine whether there is a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A); Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc'y, 894 F.2d 454, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Personal jurisdiction may be satisfied by either specific or general jurisdiction. Brit UW, Ltd. v. Manhattan Beachwear, LLC, 235 F.Supp.3d 48, 54 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing D'Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc., 534 F.Supp.2d 86, 90 (D.D.C. 2008)). With respect to general jurisdiction, the inquiry is “whether [a] corporation's affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138-39 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A corporation's “place of incorporation and principal place of business” are the “paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.” Id. at 137 (alterations in original; quotation marks and citation omitted).

With respect to specific jurisdiction, the Court must engage in a two-step analysis to determine: (1) whether jurisdiction is appropriate under the state's long-arm statute, and (2) whether notions of due process are satisfied by exercising jurisdiction over the non-resident. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Due process requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant has “minimum contacts with [the

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forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'” Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). These contacts must be grounded in “some act by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.” Asahi Metal Indus. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). In addition, the suit must “arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1025 (2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Put differently, “the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state [must be] such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” GTE, 199 F.3d at 1347 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that a court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd., 529 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “A plaintiff makes such a showing by alleging specific acts connecting the defendant with the forum ....” Am. Action Network, Inc. v. Cater Am., LLC, 983 F.Supp.2d 112, 118 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting United States v. Phillips Morris, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d. 116, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the Court may receive and weigh affidavits and any other relevant matter to assist it in determining the jurisdictional facts. See id. However, the Court must resolve any factual discrepancies with regard to establishing personal jurisdiction in favor of the plaintiff. See Crane, 894 F.2d at 456.

A pro se complaint is held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

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But even pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Additionally, the Court need not assume the role of advocate for a pro se plaintiff. See Davis v. Kelly, 160 F.3d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] court need not act as an advocate for pro se litigants ....”); Sun v. D.C. Gov't, 133 F.Supp.3d 155, 168 n.6 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[I]t is not the Court's job...