Young-Gibson v. Patel

• Decision Date: 09 August 2011
• Docket Number: 08-CV-667S
• Parties: BARBARA YOUNG-GIBSON, Plaintiff, v. PRAVIN PATEL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

BARBARA YOUNG-GIBSON, Plaintiff,

v.PRAVIN PATEL, Defendant.

08-CV-667S

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: August 9, 2011

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before this Court is Defendant Pravin Patel's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Barbara Young-Gibson's complaint. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is granted.

II. BACKGROUND

Defendant Pravin Patel owns the Best Western Dunkirk and Fredonia, a hotel located in Dunkirk, New York. (Complaint, Docket No. 1, ¶ 4). Plaintiff is a resident of Glouster, Massachusetts. (Complaint, ¶ 1).

From August 1 to August 6, 2004, Plaintiff was a guest at Defendant's hotel while attending a business seminar. (Complaint, ¶ 4). Plaintiff's stay was unremarkable until August 4, when she alleges that she began to suffer from "migraine-like symptoms." (Complaint, ¶ 4). When these symptoms worsened, Plaintiff contacted her physician, Dr. Edward Foley, who prescribed Plaintiff medication. (Complaint, ¶ 4).

Since Plaintiff was far from home, Dr. Foley told her that he would send theprescription to a pharmacy near her. (Complaint, ¶ 4). Dr. Foley did not tell Plaintiff to which pharmacy he planned to send her prescription, but he told her that he would provide that information. (Complaint, ¶ 4).

Plaintiff did not hear from Dr. Foley again until August 6. (Complaint, ¶ 5). This delay was allegedly not for Dr. Foley's lack of effort. (Complaint, ¶ 5). Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Foley attempted to reach her by telephone at the hotel 20 times, each time allowing the telephone to ring ten times. (Complaint, ¶ 5). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to answer the telephone, which prevented her from learning the location of her prescription. Plaintiff states that she suffered a number of ills while waiting to hear from Dr. Foley, including an eye infection that developed into glaucoma. (Complaint, ¶ 6). These afflictions required numerous doctor visits, surgeries, and expensive medications. (Complaint, ¶ 6).

Plaintiff filed this suit in the District of Massachusetts on August 6, 2007. The suit was transferred to this District on September 4, 2008. Plaintiff is seeking $1,000,000 in damages for loss of her vision and other expenses that she allegedly incurred. (Docket No. 13¹ ;).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move forjudgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (c). Courts faced with motions under Rule 12 (c) apply the same standard used to decide motions brought under Rule 12 (b). Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001).

Rule 12 (b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). Federal pleading standards are generally not stringent: Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). But the plain statement must "possess enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court must construe it liberally, accept all factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 56; ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). Legal conclusions, however, are not afforded the same presumption of truthfulness. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions").

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1945 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Labels, conclusions, or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility exists when the facts alleged allow for a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct charged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The plausibilitystandard is not, however, a probability requirement: the pleading must show, not merely allege, that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 1950; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a)(2). Well-pleaded allegations must nudge the claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Courts therefore use a two-pronged approach to examine the sufficiency of a complaint, which includes "any documents that are either incorporated into the complaint by reference or attached to the complaint as exhibits." Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Can.), Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004). This examination is context specific and requires that the court draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. First, statements that are not entitled to the presumption of truth — such as conclusory allegations, labels, and legal conclusions — are identified and stripped away. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Second, well-pleaded, non-conclusory factual allegations are presumed true and examined to determine whether they "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. "Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint fails to state a claim. Id.

This Court is cognizant of the distinct disadvantage that pro se litigants face and recognizes that federal courts routinely read the submissions of pro se litigants liberally, interpreting them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994).

B. Plaintiff's negligence claim

To establish a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a duty exists, owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) defendants breached that duty; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately resulted from the defendant's breach. Dean v. City of Buffalo, 579 F. Supp. 2d 391, 402 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Soloman v. City of New York, 489 N.E.2d 1294, 1294 (N.Y. 1985).

"Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (quoting Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts 455 (11th ed. 1920)). Ignoring a ringing telephone can constitute actionable negligence only if this Court decides, as a matter of law, that the defendant innkeeper² owed a duty to the guest to answer. See Darby, 753 N.E.2d at 162.

Innkeepers are bound by a duty to exercise reasonable care for the convenience, comfort, and safety of their guests, which includes protecting those guests from harm and providing the inn as a safe harbor. Darby, 753 N.E.2d at 162; De Wolf v. Ford, 86 N.E. 527, 529 (N.Y. 1908); Taieb v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 131 A.D.2d 257, 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(2). New York courts have imposed liability upon innkeepers for failing to remedy dangerous conditions on the premises, failing to protect guests during emergencies, failing to protect guests from criminal attacks, and failing to respect guests' privacy and comfort. See, e.g., Darby, 753 N.E.2d at 162 (collecting Courtof Appeals cases imposing liability for conditions on the premises); De Wolf, 86 N.E. 527 (imposing liability after employee entered guest's room, insulted guest, and removed guest from inn); Taieb, 131 A.D.2d 257 (affirming liability for failure to post employees in stairwells to guide guests during fire evacuation); Pantages v. L.G. Airport Hotel Assocs., Inc., 187 A.D.2d 273 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (affirming liability for failing to question suspicious guests who later committed criminal acts upon premises). Innkeepers, however, are not insurers of their guests' safety. De Wolf, 86 N.E. at 530.

The scope of an innkeeper's duty expands no further than to encompass foreseeable risks. See N.X. v. Cabrini Med. Ctr., 765 N.E.2d 844, 848 (N.Y. 2002); Tagle v. Jakob, 763 N.E.2d 107, 109 (2001); see also In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 119 (N.Y. 2005). Chief Judge Cardozo's maxim that "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed" still resonates in New York, as does his conception of an "orbit," or zone, of danger, created by a defendant's conduct, within which a plaintiff must be located. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 784 N.E.2d 675, 678 (N.Y. 2002) (quoting Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100); Di Ponzio, 679 N.E.2d at 618 (quoting and citing Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100).

Modern New York courts graft an additional requirement onto the duty inquiry: liability will attach only if the plaintiff is harmed as the result of "an occurrence that is within the class of foreseeable hazards that the duty exists to prevent." Di Ponzio, 679 N.E.2d at 619; accord Zahrey v. City of N.Y., No. 98-4546 (DCP)(JCF), 2009 WL 1024261, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2009) (quoting Di Ponzio, 679 N.E.2d at 619); Coniglio v. The Andersons, Inc., No. 03-CV-0153A(F), 2004 WL 1228393, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jun. 3, 2004)(quoting In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 295 (S.D.N.Y 2003); Sanchez, 784 N.E.2d at 678 (citing Di Ponzio, 679 N.E.2d at 619); see Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 29 reporter's note, cmt. d (2010) (characterizing the Di Ponzio duty inquiry as a type of "scope of the risk" analysis). If the type of occurrence that caused the plaintiff's injury was outside of this limited class of hazards that are naturally associated with the defendant's duty, there is no liability. Di Ponzio, 679 N.E.2d at 620-21; Hanna v. Ford Motor Co., 252 A.D.2d 478, 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (...