Young Mfg., Inc. v. Brooks, s. 88-2000

Decision Date16 May 1989
Docket NumberNos. 88-2000,88-2458,s. 88-2000
Citation543 So.2d 388,14 Fla. L. Weekly 1198
Parties14 Fla. L. Weekly 1198 YOUNG MANUFACTURING, INC., Appellant, v. Robert BROOKS, d/b/a Hiz and Miz and Hiz and Miz Sportswear and Miz Tennis Creations, Inc., d/b/a Hiz and Miz and Hiz & Miz Sportswear, Appellees. Robert BROOKS, d/b/a Hiz and Miz and Hiz and Miz Sportswear and Miz Tennis Creations, Inc., d/b/a Hiz and Miz and Hiz & Miz Sportswear, Appellants, v. YOUNG MANUFACTURING, INC., Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Brad I. Schandler, for appellant/appellee Young Mfg., Inc.

Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash, Block & England and Gary S. Brooks, for appellees/appellants Brooks.

Before BARKDULL and BASKIN, JJ., and JOSEPH P. McNULTY, Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

We conclude this day that the trial court erroneously miscalculated pre-judgment interest awarded to plaintiff/appellant, Young Manufacturing, Inc., in this breach of contract action. We reverse only that aspect of the appeal/cross-appeal herein.

In a joint and several final judgment entered after a non-jury trial on February 19, 1986, the trial court found that the total amount of damages suffered by Young because of the breach of contract was $7,169.85. The parties previously having stipulated that approximately four weeks prior to the entry of the judgment one co-defendant "settled" his obligation to Young in the premises for a payment of $5,000.00, the trial court reduced the total damages payable to Young by the amount of the settlement. Thereupon, judgment was entered for a net sum of $2,169.85 in damages due Young from the remaining defendants. The court also reserved jurisdiction to award pre-judgment interest, but in a post-judgment order the court denied such interest in any amount.

This court subsequently affirmed the judgment generally, but expressly reversed the denial of pre-judgment interest. Young Manufacturing, Inc. v. Brooks, 507 So.2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). On remand, the trial court calculated pre-judgment interest only on the $2,169.85 remaining on the amount of damages found due, the net result of which was that no pre-judgment interest at all was awarded on the first $5,000.00 of the total damages due. This was error.

It is now settled that pre-judgment interest is to make the aggrieved plaintiff "whole" from the date of the loss which, in the case of unliquidated damages, necessarily must contemplate the time value of monies due but unpaid until liquidated at trial. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212 (Fla.1985). Young's damages resulting from the breach of contract here, as found by the trial court, were $7,169.85. It was thus entitled, first, to interest on this amount from the date of the breach (August 13, 1979) to the date of the settlement...

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3 cases
  • Vitt v. Rodriguez
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 15 de junho de 2007
    ...See, e.g., Joyner v. Bernard, 153 Fla. 372, 14 So.2d 724, 725 (1943); Pearson v. Grice, 8 Fla. 214 (Fla.1858); Young Mfg., Inc. v. Brooks, 543 So.2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). In applying the common law rule to the case before us we conclude that the trial court erred in its ruling that Mr. Ro......
  • OVERSEAS PRIVATE INV. v. Metropolitan Dade County
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida
    • 27 de maio de 1993
    ...Florida law. See Fla. Min. & Materials v. Van Antwerp, 601 So.2d 621 (Fla.App.Ct. 2nd Dist.1992); see also, Young Manuf. Inc. v. Brooks, 543 So.2d 388 (Fla.App. 3rd Dist. 1989). Accordingly, judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against Dade County in the total amount of $6,6......
  • Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Millar, 5H04
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 24 de novembro de 1993
    ...due, September 19, 1985, and the date on which Underwriters made the payment, December 18, 1987. We agree. See Young Mfg., Inc. v. Brooks, 543 So.2d 388 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Accordingly, as to the above matters only we reverse and remand, and otherwise GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., and DONNER, ......

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