Young v. Abalene Pest Control Services, Inc., 81-029

• Decision Date: 02 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-029,81-029
• Citation: 444 A.2d 514,122 N.H. 287
• Parties: Kevin D. YOUNG et al. v. ABALENE PEST CONTROL SERVICES, INC.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 514

444 A.2d 514

122 N.H. 287

Kevin D. YOUNG et al. v. ABALENE PEST CONTROL SERVICES, INC.

No. 81-029.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

April 2, 1982.

Diversified Legal Services P. A., Concord (Mark Rufo, Concord, on the brief and orally), for plaintiffs.

Gallagher, Callahan & Gartrell P. A., Concord (Steven J. McAuliffe, Concord, on the brief and orally), for defendant.

PER CURIAM.

Before purchasing their home in Center Barnstead, New Hampshire, the plaintiffs hired Abalene Pest Control Services, Inc. (Abalene) to inspect the premises for insects. One of Abalene's employees inspected the house and issued a certificate stating that "there was no evidence of termite or other wood destroying infestations" in the property at the time of inspection. Relying on the defendant's certification, the Youngs bought the property. They moved into the house on June 15, 1978, and, three days later, observed evidence of insect infestation. One week later, the Barnstead building inspector confirmed that the house was infested with wood-destroying carpenter ants. He estimated that the "colony of ants had been nesting in ... [the] home for several months." He noted that "Abalene Pest Control Services, Inc. made an inspection on May 18, 1978, and gave a negative report even though there were ... piles of sawdust in several areas."

After the plaintiffs discovered that their home was infested with carpenter ants, Nancy Young became extremely nervous and depressed and sought medical treatment. Her doctor prescribed tranquilizers. On July 29, 1978, the plaintiffs vacated their home, and, later that day, Nancy Young attempted to commit suicide by taking an overdose of tranquilizers.

The Youngs brought a three-count negligence action against Abalene in Merrimack County Superior Court in September 1979. Their first count may be interpreted as alleging both negligence and breach of contract. This appeal relates only to the second and third counts. In count 2, the plaintiffs alleged that Abalene was liable for Nancy Young's "extreme mental suffering and acute mental distress." In count 3, the Youngs sought damages for Kevin Young's loss of consortium. The Superior Court (Dalianis, J.) granted Abalene's motion to dismiss the second and third counts. The Youngs filed an interlocutory appeal from that ruling. We affirm the trial court.

The plaintiffs' second and third counts, seeking recovery for mental distress and loss of consortium, were framed as negligence actions. Whether an action is "on a contract or in tort is not controlled by the form of the action but by its substance." Dunn & Sons, Inc. v. Paragon Homes of New Eng., Inc., 110 N.H. 215, 217, 265 A.2d 5, 7 (1970); see Guerin v. N. H. Catholic Charities, 120 N.H. 501, 505, 418 A.2d 224, 227 (1980). In this case, the duty allegedly violated arose from a contractual obligation. See Dunn & Sons, Inc. v. Paragon Homes of New Eng., Inc., 110 N.H. at 217, 265 A.2d at 8. The parties entered into a contract under which Abalene was to certify whether a house was free from insects. The defendant's performance was so grossly defective that it may have amounted to no performance at all. The "purpose of the contract duty is to secure the receipt of the thing bargained for ...." Dunn & Sons, Inc. v. Paragon Homes of New Eng., Inc., 110 N.H. at 217, 265 A.2d at 8. The plaintiffs did not receive the "thing" for which they bargained. For the reasons which follow, the plaintiffs' damages are limited to those that "the defendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of its breach when the contract was made." Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 611, 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978) (quoting Emery v. Caledonia Sand & Gravel Co., 117 N.H. 441, 446, 374 A.2d 929, 932 (1977)); see Zareas v. Smith, 119 N.H. 534, 538, 404 A.2d 599, 601 (1979).

Kevin Young claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his loss of consortium claim. We disagree. Either spouse is entitled to recover damages for loss of consortium, whether the loss is caused intentionally or negligently. RSA 507:8-a. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that Abalene either intentionally or negligently injured Nancy Young so as to impair her husband's right of consortium. His loss of consortium count, therefore, was properly dismissed.

The plaintiffs next assert that the trial court committed error when it dismissed Nancy Young's count that sought damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. at 615, 392 A.2d at 581, this Court held that damages for mental distress "are not generally recoverable in a contract action." Nancy Young, on the facts of this case, cannot recover damages for mental suffering and emotional distress, although the plaintiffs may recover consequential damages under count one if they succeed in proving breach of the contract. See id., 392 A.2d at 582. Zareas v. Smith, 119 N.H. 534, 538, 404 A.2d 599, 601 (1979).

In this case, we hold that Nancy Young's alleged injuries were not foreseeable as a matter of law.

Accordingly, we remand for trial on count one.

Affirmed and remanded.

BATCHELDER, J., did not sit; DOUGLAS, J., dissented.

DOUGLAS, Justice, dissenting:

Because the trial court granted Abalene's motion to dismiss, we must assume that all the facts pleaded by the plaintiffs are true, and construe all inferences from those facts favorably to the plaintiffs. Morgenroth & Assoc's, Inc. v. Town of Tilton, 121 N.H. 511, 516, 431 A.2d 770, 773 (1981). "If the facts as alleged would constitute a basis for legal relief, the motion to dismiss should be denied." Royer Foundry & Mach. Co. v. N.H. Grey Iron, Inc., 118 N.H. 649, 651, 392 A.2d 145, 146 (1978).

A defendant can be held liable for negligence only if he owes the plaintiff a duty to conform his conduct to a particular standard of care. Libbey v. Hampton Water Works Co., 118 N.H. 500, 502, 389 A.2d 434, 435 (1978); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 176-77, 71 A.2d 792, 794-95 (1950); Chiuchiolo v. New England &c. Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 336-38, 150 A. 540, 544 (1930); see Hurd v. Railroad, 100 N.H. 404, 408, 129 A.2d 196, 200 (1957).

A duty is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by negligent conduct. See F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 18.2, at 1018 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Harper & James]; Comment, Duty, Foreseeability, and the Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 33 Maine L.Rev. 303, 319 (1981). In negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, however, duty should involve more than foreseeability. A strict foreseeability approach forecloses inquiry into other important factors such as public policy, distribution of loss, the utility of the defendant's conduct, the cost to the defendant of doing business, and deterrence of future tortious conduct. Id. at 322.

Whether a defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff is sometimes treated as a question of law for the judge. 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra § 18.8, at 1058-59. If the elements establishing a duty are clear, then a court may decide the question as a matter of law. Id. at 1059; cf. Cloutier v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140, 1145 (1981). But see Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 809, 395 A.2d 843, 847 (1978) ("A court will rarely be able to say as a matter of law that ... the purpose of manner of its [a product's] use ... was not foreseeable").

Unless the existence of a duty is so clear as to be established as a matter of law, however, it should be treated as a jury question because "[t]he duty issue frequently poses questions of the kind usually given to the jury." Harper & James, supra, § 18.8, at 1059. Like any other issue, the judge should leave the question of duty to the jury "if it is a debatable one." Id. at 1060. But see Libbey v. Hampton Water Works Co., 118 N.H. 500, 502, 389 A.2d 434, 435 (1978).

This court has recognized that the existence of a duty may be a question of fact for jury determination. See Chiuchiolo v. New England &c. Tailors, 84 N.H. at 331, 150 A. at 541 (whether an exploding gauge would frighten the plaintiff so as to cause her injury was considered a question of fact for the jury); see Derosier v. Company, 81 N.H. 451, 459, 130 A. 145, 150 (1925). Borderline cases should go to the jury because "it is deemed wise to obtain the judgment of the jury, reflecting as it does the earthy viewpoint of the common man--the prevalent sense of the community...." Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 611 (1st Cir. 1955). Our system of justice is based on the premise that juries are capable of determining difficult questions, see State v. Elbert, 121 N.H. 43, 44, 424 A.2d 1147, 1148 (1981), and their function should not be usurped unnecessarily.

In this case, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss Nancy Young's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Dismissing Nancy Young's claim would have been proper had the facts clearly indicated that Abalene had no duty to the Youngs as a matter of law, that is, that the type of injury that Nancy Young suffered was not foreseeable, and that Abalene should not bear financial responsibility for public policy reasons. See generally Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 15 (1953). The facts of this case, however, present the type of "doubtful situation" in which the "jury must say where the line is to be drawn." Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 54, 120 N.E. 86, 88 (1918); see Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. at 809, 395 A.2d at 847. Duty, as complex a concept as it is, may be established or not established as a matter of law, see Harper & James, supra § 18.8, at 1058-59, but in this case, duty cannot be established as a matter of law.

A home assumes an important role in peoples' lives, and a reasonable person could find that its loss might cause severe depression. This court has repeatedly recognized...