Young v. Bierschenk
Decision Date | 20 January 1925 |
Citation | 201 N.W. 591,199 Iowa 309 |
Parties | ELLA YOUNG, Appellee, v. JACOB BIERSCHENK et al., Appellants; LIVING SPRINGS LAND COMPANY et al., Appellees |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Benton District Court.--JAMES W. WILLETT, Judge.
SUIT on promissory notes given by a corporation. Recovery is sought against individual defendants on a contract which it is claimed created a liability to the plaintiff. The trial court directed a verdict in behalf of the plaintiff, and two of the individual defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Kirkland & White, for appellant Bierschenk.
Hugh Mossman and Pickett, Swisher & Farwell, for appellant Ball.
Tobin Tobin & Tobin and Nichols, Nichols & St. Clair, for appellee Young.
I.
The Living Springs Land Company was a corporation organized under the laws of this state, and engaged in the purchase and sale of real estate. The individual defendants are the officers and directors of said corporation. In 1916, appellee loaned to the said corporation the sum of $ 8,000, for which she took the note of said corporation, indorsed by certain individual stockholders. In 1917, she loaned said corporation the further sum of $ 1,000, and took a similar note therefor. No defense is interposed in behalf of the corporation. The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the individual appellants, Bierschenk and Ball, are liable for the amount due on said notes to appellee. Said appellants did not sign said notes, either as maker, surety, or indorser. Appellee's contention is that appellants are liable for the amount due on the notes, because of a contract entered into between appellants and other stockholders in said corporation. Appellee was not a party to said contract.
It appears from the record that, in the year 1918, the corporation became financially involved, and a meeting of the stockholders and directors was held in March, 1919. At that time, the corporation was owing a large amount of money, and certain of its notes had been indorsed by different stockholders of the corporation. The notes of appellee were so indorsed by three of said stockholders, not including appellants herein; while each of appellants had indorsed other obligations of the corporation. It appears that, at the meeting referred to, a statement of the debts of the corporation was made out on a slip of paper, showing an aggregate of nearly $ 39,000 of indebtedness; and said statement showed that the assets of the company at that time aggregated about $ 31,000. It appears that the indebtedness of the corporation to appellee was listed among the liabilities that were so shown at that time. At this meeting, the various stockholders discussed the question of making provision for the payment of the debts of the corporation, but no definite plan was then agreed upon. Thereafter, the appellant Bierschenk consulted an attorney in regard to the indebtedness of the corporation on which he was liable as indorser or surety. An arrangement was entered into, by which one of the stockholders, one Lorenz, agreed in writing to pay $ 18,850 of the indebtedness of the corporation; and certain other stipulations were entered into, respecting the adjustment of some of the outstanding indebtedness between the stockholders of the corporation and Lorenz, he assuming and agreeing to pay certain notes of the corporation upon which appellant Bierschenk was the sole indorser. This relieved Bierschenk of a portion of his liability.
About April 1, 1919, another meeting of the stockholders of the corporation was held, at which the indebtedness of the corporation was again discussed. It was apparent that the liability of the individual stockholders for the debts of the corporation which they had assumed was not equal in amount. As a result of this meeting and conference, the parties entered into a written contract, which is as follows:
Thereafter, the stockholders proceeded to act under said contract. The property of the corporation was disposed of, and the proceeds therefrom used in the payment of various debts of the corporation. Appellee seeks to recover from appellants on the theory that the contract was made for her benefit, and that appellants, by executing the same, became personally liable to her for the amount of the indebtedness of the said corporation to her on the said promissory notes.
It is the rule in this state that a contract between two persons, executed for the benefit of a third person, based upon sufficient consideration, may be enforced by the third person for whose benefit it was made. We do not, however, pass upon the question as to whether or not the contract in question was made for the benefit of appellee, or if so made, whether appellee's remedy is at law or in equity. A ruling as to that question is expressly reserved. We merely assume that she might have such right, in this action, for the purpose of a discussion of other questions involved in the case.
Appellee contends that the contract was an obligation on the part of the signers thereto, by which they bound themselves, jointly and severally, to pay the indebtedness of the corporation including the indebtedness of appellee, and that, under said contract, appellee has the right to recover the amount of the said indebtedness from the individual signers...
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