Young v. Board of Trustees of Broadwater County High School

• Decision Date: 04 November 1931
• Docket Number: 6827.
• Parties: YOUNG v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BROADWATER COUNTY HIGH SCHOOL et al.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

4 P.2d 725

90 Mont. 576

YOUNG v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BROADWATER COUNTY HIGH SCHOOL et al.

No. 6827.

Supreme Court of Montana

November 4, 1931

Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 1931.

Appeal from District Court, Broadwater County; Wm. L. Ford, Judge.

Action by Myrtle E. Young against the Board of Trustees of the Broadwater County High School and others. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Kanouse & Schmitz, of Townsend, for appellant.

Frank T. Hooks, of Townsend, for respondents.

MATTHEWS J.

Myrtle E. Young filed complaint in the district court of Broadwater county, praying that the board of trustees of the Broadwater county high school be enjoined from permitting the use of the high school gymnasium for dances not connected with high school activities. On this complaint the court issued an order requiring the board to show cause why an injunction should not issue, to which the board responded by motion to quash, and, after hearing had, the motion was sustained and judgment of dismissal entered. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff is a taxpayer and the owner of the Townsend Auditorium, which she maintains for rent for public dances, and that the board, vested only with enumerated powers, has "used and permitted to be used" the high school gymnasium, erected and maintained for school purposes with funds derived from taxation, for public dances, in direct competition with plaintiff's business, in violation of her constitutional rights and in contravention of law, and that such dances, having no connection with school activities or educational or public purposes, are, and the use of the building is, against the public policy of the state.

While the complaint alleges that the board both "used" and permitted the gymnasium "to be used" in the manner described, from the briefs and argument it is clear that what was done was that, from time to time, the board rented the gymnasium to individuals for the purpose of giving public dances, and the matter of the sufficiency of the complaint was submitted to the trial court, and here, on the theory that such renting is not within the power of the board.

Chapter 101 of the Revised Codes of 1921 provides for the organization, control, and management of county high schools and section 1271 of these Codes, contained in the chapter defines the powers and duties of the board of trustees. This section originally contained eight subdivisions; but it was amended in 1929, clearly for the sole purpose of adding subdivision 9, which reads as follows: "The Board of Trustees shall have power *** to rent, lease and hire such halls, gymnasiums and buildings and portions of buildings as may be suitable for public entertainments to such persons associations or corporations as the board may deem proper and to collect from such persons *** such charges as may be fixed by the Board and deposit such rent with the County Treasurer to the credit of the High School district." Chapter 48, Laws of 1929.

As evidencing the legislative intent and progressive thought on the subject, the foregoing section was amended by the next legislative assembly by eliminating all restrictions and permitting the board to "rent, lease or let" the described property to any "person or entities the board may deem proper" for any purpose and for such time and rental as the board may designate. Section 83, subd. 12, c. 148, Laws of 1931.

As the case was tried in 1930, the statute before amendment is controlling here and the authority of the board is restricted to renting for "public ontertainments." The first question raised is as to the power of the board, under this statute, to rent the gymnasium to persons giving public dances.

"Entertainment" is defined, in part, as "that which serves for amusement," and among the definitions of "amusement" is found "a pleasurable occupation of the senses, or that which furnishes it, as dancing, sports or music." Webster's Dictionary. "Recreational activities," within the meaning of the California law making schoolhouses civic centers, includes dancing. McClure v. Board of Education, 38 Cal.App. 500, 176 P. 711. A public dance is, therefore, a "public entertainment." Commonwealth v. Quinn, 164 Mass. 11, 40 N.E. 1043.

"The meaning of a given term employed in a statute must be measured and controlled by the connection in which it is employed, the evident purpose of the statute, and the subject to which it relates." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sanders County, 66 Mont. 608, 214 P. 596, 598; State ex rel. Intermountain Lloyds v. Porter, 88 Mont. 347, 294 P. 363.

Here, public dances come within the letter of the statute, but do they come within the purpose and intent of the legislature?

The county board is vested with broad discretion in exercising statutory powers [ Brown v. Bailey, 238 Ky. 287, 37 S.W.2d 58; Purcell v. Woodward, 75 Ind.App. 380, 130 N.E. 660], and this rule must be presumed to have been known by the Legislature when it enacted the statute under consideration. Had that body desired to restrict the power to the renting of public school buildings for public entertainments of an educational nature, it would have found suitable words in which to express such restriction.

Cases have been cited denying this right to school boards as a general principle and under divergent statutes, none of which are persuasive, as the right depends entirely upon statutory authority. However, the case of Lewis v. Bateman, 26 Utah, 434, 73 P. 509, 510, cited, is based upon a statute which authorizes school trustees to permit a schoolhouse, when not occupied for school purposes, to be used for any purpose which will not interfere with the seating or other furniture. As it was admitted that, in order to hold dances in the schoolhouse, it became necessary to remove the seats, fastened to the floor, and other furniture, the case was decided when the court found that such letting was in direct contravention of the statute. The court, however, proceeded to declare that such private use was unauthorized and contrary to the public policy, and opposed to the principle that the sovereignty cannot tax its citizens for private purposes, cannot raise money by taxation for the purpose of erecting a dance hall, and "it necessarily follows that a board" has no right to "convert a public school building into a public and private dance hall."

If the reasons given for this dictum are sound, the Legislature cannot authorize the board to rent a school building for hire for any purpose; yet a letting for all manner of "assemblages" is upheld by the courts (Brooks v. Elder, 108 Neb. 761, 189 S.W. 284; Harmon v. Driggers, 116 S.C. 238, 107 S.E. 923), and a continuous renting of school halls as lodge rooms of secret societies is held proper, so long as such renting or lease does not interfere with school work or injure the building. Cost v. Shinault, 113 Ark. 19, 166 S.W. 740, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 483; Lagow v. Hill, 238 Ill. 428, 87 N.E. 369, affirming 143 Ill.App. 523.

The beneficial title to property owned by a school district is in the state, the district holding merely as agent of the state, and therefore the state has full control of school district property. 23 Cal. Jur. 50. It follows that the Legislature, the mouthpiece of the state, may authorize its agents to do anything that is not prohibited by the Constitution of the state.

The statute under consideration but...