De Young v. Campbell, 33819

Decision Date12 September 1957
Docket NumberNo. 33819,33819
Citation315 P.2d 629,51 Wn.2d 11
CourtWashington Supreme Court
PartiesRobert T. DE YOUNG, Individually and as Guardian ad litem of Michael Allen DeYoung and of Patricia Ruth DeYoung, both minors, Appellants, v. Robert F. CAMPBELL and Eva C. Campbell, husband and wife, Respondents. Robert T. DE YOUNG, Individually and as Guardian ad litem of Michael Allen DeYoung and of Patricia Ruth DeYoung, both minors, Respondents, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, Appellant. Robert F. CAMPBELL and Eva C. Campbell, husband and wife, Respondents, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation, Appellant.

A. C. VanSoelen, Corporation Counsel, John A. Logan, Frank W. Draper, Assts. Corp. Counsel, Seattle, Powell, Johnson & Livengood, Kirkland, for appellants.

Kahin, Carmody & Horswill, Seattle, for respondents.

WEAVER, Justice.

The city of Seattle appeals from two money judgments against it; the first, in favor of Robert T. DeYoung, individually and as guardian of his two minor children; the second, in favor of Robert F. Campbell and wife. In Mr. DeYoung's action against the Campbells, the same jury returned a verdict for the defendants. These three cases were consolidated for trial and review in this court. Mr. DeYoung admits that he is not aggrieved unless this court reverses the judgments against the city or grants a new trial in the companion appeal wherein Mr. DeYoung is respondent.

The city assigns error to the court's (1) refusal to sustain its challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence; (2) denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury verdicts or for a new trial; and (3) the exclusion of its exhibit No. 60.

We are required to view the evidence most favorable to the successful parties, and all such material evidence must be accepted as true. The jury verdicts will not be disturbed, unless we can say, as a matter of law, that there is neither evidence nor reasonable inference therefrom to sustain the verdicts.

With this in mind, we believe the jury was entitled to find the facts to be as follows:

The University bridge, one of the main conduits of vehicular traffic from the University district to the business section of Seattle, is a bascule bridge. The center portion, with which we are concerned, is 42 feet wide and is decked, for approximately 270 feet, with a steel web-shaped matting known as Irving grating. It accommodates four lanes of traffic, two north and two south. Each lane is approximately 10 1/2 feet wide.

In 1933, four street car rails were installed on the bridge. Seattle discontinued the use of street cars across the bridge in 1940. In 1946 or 1947, the two outside rails were removed. We are concerned with only one of the remaining rails--the east rail of the former southbound track.

The slightly rounded surface of the rail, two and one half inches in width, projected one quarter of an inch above the plane of the Irving grating that form the deck of the bridge. On the west side of the rail was a flange groove one and three quarter inches wide. It appears, from a photograph in evidence, that there was also a groove on the east side of the rail. Construction plans disclose that this groove was one and one half inches wide.

The rail was two feet six inches west of the center line of the bridge. The relation of the position of the rail to the southbound vehicular traffic in the inside lane is described by an engineer of the city as follows:

'Q. So that a car that is running down the center of the lane would in all probability have its left wheels on the streetcar track that is on the inside. That is a matter of physical fact. That is accurate, is that correct? A. If you were hanging right into the center of the lane, but there is plenty of distance there; you wouldn't have to. Q. I say, assuming you are travelling in the center. A. Assuming the automobile was centered directly in the center of the lane itself, then that would be true.' (Italics ours.)

This testimony is substantiated by the many photographs which are in evidence.

There is competent expert testimony that the coefficient of friction on the steel matting, when wet, is comparable to that of concrete pavement when wet; and that the coefficient of friction on the steel rail, when wet, is comparable to wet, packed snow.

There is also expert testimony (some of it conflicting) that the difference in the coefficient of friction between the rail and the steel matting, together with the grooves on each side of the rail and its projection above the deck of the bridge would cause an automobile striking the rail to wobble and sway.

The city engineer testified that he had received some letters, during the period between 1946 and 1953, notifying him that the rails on the University bridge were a traffic hazard, particularly in wet weather. He also testified that an authorized letter, written July 8, 1954, by a member of his department, stated that 'these rails are a traffic hazard, as they are slippery in wet weather.'

On the day of the accident, it was raining and the surface of the bridge was wet. Mrs. Robert F. Campbell, one of the respondents, approached the University bridge in her car, traveling in the southbound outside lane of traffic. She moved to the southbound inside lane, which we have heretofore described in some detail. Approximately half way across the bridge, she passed a car driven by Mrs. Alva Soeby. Mrs. Soeby was driving in the southbound outside lane at 20 to 25 miles an hour. Mrs. Campbell's car was in a normal position in the lane and was traveling parallel to the car driven by Mrs. Soeby. Mrs. Soeby and a passenger in her car testified that Mrs. Campbell's car, as it came abreast, 'wiggled,' 'wobbled,' and 'rocked'; it tipped from one side to the other, although it remained upright. It was out of control. The back end of Mrs. Campbell's car then veered into the outside southbound lane of traffic and would have been struck by Mrs Soeby's car had it (Mrs. Campbell's car) not careened across the bridge into the face of oncoming northbound traffic. It struck the concrete portion of the bridge 58 feet south of the south edge of the Irving grating.

Mr. DeYoung, with his two minor children, was driving north, nearing the south approach of the University bridge. Mr. DeYoung testified that Mrs. Campbell's car was traveling 25 to 30 miles per hour as it shot in front of him. At the same time the Campbell car hit the concrete bulkhead, Mr. DeYoung's car smashed into the side of it. It was a simultaneous collision.

Absent the street car rail, there were no holes, bumps, obstructions, defects, or hazards on the bridge that would cause Mrs. Campbell's car to wobble or rock. The car was in good mechanical condition. The tires and brakes were good; the car had no tendency to skid.

Prior to the accident, Mrs. Campbell was in good health; she was energetic; she was not subject to fainting spells; she had good vision without glasses. As a result of her injuries, she had no recollection of the events...

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18 cases
  • Kreck v. Spalding
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 13 d2 Dezembro d2 1983
    ...rule that the court's discretion in admitting the report is subject to review for manifest abuse of discretion. DeYoung v. Campbell, 51 Wash.2d 11, 17, 315 P.2d 629 (1957); Cantrill v. American Mail Line, 42 Wash.2d 590, 698, 257 P.2d 179 (1953). The great majority of cases in other jurisdi......
  • State v. Kreck, 43704
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 20 d4 Novembro d4 1975
    ...rule that the court's discretion in admitting the report is subject to review for manifest abuse of discretion. DeYoung v. Campbell, 51 Wash.2d 11, 17, 315 P.2d 629 (1957); Cantrill v. American Mail Line, 42 Wash.2d 590, 698, 257 P.2d 179 The great majority of cases in other jurisdictions h......
  • State v. Huynh
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 31 d1 Agosto d1 1987
    ...evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances, from which other connected facts reasonably may be inferred. DeYoung v. Campbell, 51 Wash.2d 11, 315 P.2d 629 (1957). [b]efore evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts can be admitted, two distinct criteria must be met. First, the eviden......
  • Adler v. University Boat Mart, Inc.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 5 d4 Dezembro d4 1963
    ...found upside down on the beach, the integrity of the hull was not impaired except for the patch. As we said in DeYoung v. Campbell (1957), 51 Wash.2d 11, 16, 315 P.2d 629, 632: 'Circumstantial evidence is proof of certain facts and circumstances, from which may be inferred other and connect......
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