Young v. City of Franklin
| Decision Date | 27 June 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 685S254,685S254 |
| Citation | 494 N.E.2d 316 |
| Parties | James B. YOUNG, Appellant, v. CITY OF FRANKLIN, Indiana, and The Common Council of the City of Franklin, Indiana, Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Stephen L. Huddleston, Franklin, James F.T. Sargent, Greenwood, for appellant.
Robert W. Young, Roger Young, Young Gholston & Young, Franklin, for appellees.
Appellant is the owner of fifty (50) acres of real property located in Franklin, Indiana. The land is currently zoned by the City of Franklin for B-4 or limited business use. The undeveloped portion of the property is earning approximately $5,000 per year as farmland. Appellant petitioned the Franklin City Plan Commission to rezone 37.6 acres of his land to R-5, which would permit the development of single-family dwellings. The Plan Commission approved appellant's petition and referred it to the Common Council of the City of Franklin. The Common Council refused to adopt the recommendation of the Plan Commission to rezone appellant's property. Appellant thereafter brought suit against the Common Council and the City of Franklin claiming that the Council's refusal to rezone his land constituted a taking of his property without due process of law. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Franklin and appellant appealed.
Appellant contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for the City of Franklin because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the present zoning deprives appellant of all reasonable use of his property; however, in his own motion for summary judgment, appellant stated there was "no genuine issue as to any material fact." It is true as cited by appellant that the trial court is required to consider each motion separately construing the facts most favorably to the non-moving party in each instance. Garden and Turf Supply Corporation v. Strange (1982), Ind.App., 440 N.E.2d 710. However, in the case at bar there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. The disagreements between the parties are as to the conclusions to be drawn from the agreed facts.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party establishes that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind.R.Tr.P. 56(C); Liebner v. Dobson (1985), Ind.App., 474 N.E.2d 1039. Summary judgment should not be used as an abbreviated trial. Suyemasa v. Myers (1981), Ind.App., 420 N.E.2d 1334. Rather, it is a procedure for applying the law to the facts when no factual controversy exists. Lee v. Weston (1980), Ind.App., 402 N.E.2d 23.
When there is a claim of an unconstitutional taking and the facts are undisputed, a pure question of law is presented and summary judgment is appropriate. See, Ailes v. Decatur County Area Planning Comm'n. (1983), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 1057; City of Anderson v. Associated Furniture & Appliances, Inc. (1981), Ind., 423 N.E.2d 293.
Reasonable zoning regulations are a proper exercise of the police powers of the state. Ailes, supra. However, the exercise of such power may result in a taking of one's property without just compensation and in violation of the Indiana Constitution and the United States Constitution. City of Evansville v. Reis Tire Sales, Inc. (1975), 165 Ind.App. 638, 333 N.E.2d 800. Not every zoning burden placed upon private property constitutes a taking. A taking will be found only where all reasonable uses of the property are prevented. City of Anderson, supra; Foreman v. State ex. rel. Dept. of Natural Resources (1979), 180 Ind.App. 94, 387 N.E.2d 455.
A distinction must be drawn between an assertion that a parcel of property is not zoned for its best and most profitable use and a situation where the present zoning restriction results in a deprivation of one's property rights. Only the latter is confiscatory. Taylor-Chalmers, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs. of LaPorte County (1985), Ind.App., 474 N.E.2d 531; Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Marion County v. Sheehan Constr. Co. (1974), 160 Ind.App. 520, 313 N.E.2d 78.
In cases involving government regulation of the use of private property, the Supreme Court has determined that a taking does not occur merely because the regulation deprives the property owner of the most profitable use of his property. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York (1978), 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631; United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co. (1958), 357 U.S. 155, 78 S.Ct. 1097, 2 L.Ed.2d 1228.
Appellant contends that the refusal of the Common Council to rezone his 37.6 acres from...
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