Young v. Clegg

• Decision Date: 30 January 1884
• Docket Number: 10,508
• Citation: 93 Ind. 371
• Parties: Young v. Clegg
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

93 Ind. 371

Young v. Clegg

No. 10,508

Supreme Court of Indiana

January 30, 1884

From the Clark Circuit Court.

M. C Hester, for appellant.

C. L Jewett, for appellee.

OPINION

Franklin C.

Appellee sued appellant in the Clark Circuit Court for libel. The ground of the complaint was a letter written by the appellant to one Andrew J. Carr.

A demurrer was overruled to the complaint. Issues were formed, and there was a trial by jury, which returned a verdict for appellee for $ 25. Over a motion for a new trial, judgment was rendered upon the verdict.

Errors have been assigned upon the rulings upon the sufficiency of the complaint, and the overruling of the motion for a new trial.

Appellee, in his complaint, avers that appellant, by the letter referred to, charged him with having accepted a bribe as prosecuting attorney, to influence his official conduct. The letter reads as follows:

"Charlestown, January 3d, 1879.

"Mr. A. J. Carr--Dear Sir--I understand, from what I think is a truthful source, that you gave Mr. Clegg a bribe, as follows: If he would release your son you would give him a contingent fee of $ 100 to prosecute me on the Jacob's claim. Please allow me to call your attention to the fact that the giver of a bribe is as guilty in the eye of the law as the taker. I only have to say, withdraw your suit, and I shall not try to work up the facts. If you do not you will take your chances.

"Respectfully yours,

"Solon Young."

It is averred in the complaint that this letter referred to appellee as prosecuting attorney; that he was the prosecuting attorney in the circuit court for Clark and Floyd counties; that there was then pending in the Clark Circuit Court an indictment against the son of said A. J. Carr, and that for the purpose of injuring appellee in his reputation, appellant wrote and published the said letter, intending thereby to charge appellee with being bribed to perform an official act in his capacity as prosecuting attorney.

It is insisted by appellant that the letter is not libellous; that it does not charge appellee with accepting a bribe; that it only charges the offering of a bribe to him.

We think that a fair and reasonable construction of the language of the letter is that it charges appellee with the crime of bribery. Carr could not give a bribe to him without his accepting it; and, further in the letter, appellant says that the giver is as guilty in the eye of the law as the taker of a bribe. There could be no giver without a taker. It charges appellee as much with accepting as it does Carr with giving. The language can not be construed to mean to charge Carr with merely offering a bribe; such a construction can not reasonably be placed upon the language used; and when the letter is taken in connection with the allegations of the complaint, we think there is a sufficient cause of action shown.

There was no error in overruling the demurrer to the complaint, or the motion in arrest of judgment. This ruling also disposes of the objection, in the specification of errors, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient.

Under the motion for a new trial, the fourth reason, based upon the fourth instruction, is first insisted upon. The following language in that instruction is objected to: "As to whether said letter is libellous or not is a question of law that has been settled by the court. It has been determined that the language of the letter, as explained and construed by the innuendoes or averments of the complaint, constitute a libel, for which plaintiff has a right of action; yet these innuendoes or averments raise a question of fact which it is the province of the jury to decide."

The language of the letter is by no means ambiguous or susceptible of different...